Abstract:

China's housing price-to-income ratio reach a new high of 9.2 in 2020. High house prices have exacerbated the housing problem of residents， reduced the purchasing power and fertility of residents， distorted the allocation of social resources， and has become a thorny social problem， which has also attracted great attention of our country. As we all know， high land price is an important reason for high house prices. Therefore， optimizing land transfer rules is an important work at present. The existing land transfer often adopts the first-price sealed-bid auction， but this “the highest price gets” land auction mechanism often leads to a high transaction price. Although local governments actively innovate land auction rules， the effect is not ideal. Therefore， the land auction mechanism of “Limiting land price and competing promised house price” is put forward， and the conditions for the effectiveness of regulating house price are given.The most commonly used land auction mechanism is analyzed， i.e.， the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism， and the work of this mechanism causing high house prices is revealed. Secondly， the land auction mechanism of “Limiting land price and competing promised house price is put forward”. Finally， through the comparative analysis of the two mechanisms， the conditions for the effectiveness of the new land auction mechanism in regulating house prices are obtained.The results show that the first-price sealed-bid auction mechanism introduces the competition of bidders for land price， the bidder with the highest bid price wins， and the land transaction price completely depends on the highest bid price in the market， resulting in the high house price； On the other hand， when the land auction mechanism of “Limiting land price and competing promised house price” is adopted， the competition of bidders for the promised house price is introduced， and the bidder with the lowest construction cost will win the auction. The government can effectively control the land price and reduce the house price by setting appropriate price limits； At the same time， when this new mechanism is adopted， too low price limit is difficult to ensure that the government can obtain reasonable financial revenue. Too high price limit will make the mechanism unable to control land price and reduce house price. Therefore， the government should carefully determine the appropriate price limit.The function principle of the land access mechanism of the first price sealed auction is revealed， which leads to the high house price， and creatively puts forward the two-stage land auction mechanism of “Limiting land price and competing promised house price”， which has a high guiding role for the practice of land auction.

Key words: land auction, bidding equilibrium, limiting land price, competing promised house price