自营或联营？创新投资影响下强势零售商延保服务模式选择

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1010

Abstract

Abstract:

The impact of manufacturers' innovation investment on the extended warranty service model of powerful retailer is studied. The research shows that no matter whether the manufacturer invests in innovation or not， retailer shows cooperation tendency only when the cost advantage of OEM is more than 50%. However， innovation investment relaxes the market scale and fixed cost threshold of joint venture between retailers and manufacturers， and promotes the joint venture willingness of both sides. The greater the cost advantage of OEM， the easier it is to reach cooperation， and the cooperation realizes Pareto improvement of both sides. With the change of price sensitivity and cost difference， manufacturer show different cooperative attitudes， but the cooperation motivation is always stronger than retailer. The sub game perfect Nash equilibrium shows that innovation investment is the dominant strategy of manufacturers， and retailers also "free ride" from innovation investment.Finally， through numerical analysis， it is found that the appropriate relaxation of cooperation conditions by retailer is beneficial to the improvement of consumer surplus and social welfare. The research results can provide theoretical and practical enlightenment for the extended warranty service cooperation between manufacturer and retailer.

Key words: self-operation, joint operation, innovation investment, extended warranty service

CLC Number:

C391

Zhen Liu,Qiang Guo,Jiajia Nie. Retailer's Optimal Extended Warranty Strategy? Collaboration with Manufacturer or Not[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(1): 268-275.

Figures/Tables 6

参数	NN模型		NU模型
参数	$a < 4 c e r d$	$4 c e r d ≤ a$	$λ c e r ≤ a$
$p$	$3 a 4$	$d (6 a + c e r) - a 8 d - 1$	$d (6 a + 2 λ c e r) - a 8 d - 1$
$p e$	$a 4 d$	$a + c e r (4 d - 1) 8 d - 1$	$a - λ c e r 8 d - 1$
$w$	$a 4$	$d (2 a - c e r) 8 d - 1$	$d (2 a + 6 λ c e r) - λ c e r 8 d - 1$
$q$	$a 4$	$d (2 a - c e r) 8 d - 1$	$2 d (a - λ c e r) 8 d - 1$
$q e$	$0$	$d (a - 4 c e r d) 8 d - 1$	$d (a - λ c e r) 8 d - 1$
$π r$	$a 2 8$	$d (a 2 - a c e r + 2 c e r 2 d) 8 d - 1$	$d (a - λ c e r) 2 8 d - 1 - f$
$π m$	$a 2 16$	$d 2 (2 a - c e r) 2 (8 d - 1) 2$	$d (a - λ c e r) (4 a d + 4 λ c e r d - λ c e r) (8 d - 1) 2 + f$

条件	IN模型		IU模型
条件	$a < c e r d (4 - k 2)$	$c e r d (4 - k 2) ≤ a$	$λ c e r < a$
$p$	$a (6 - k 2) 2 (4 - k 2)$	$2 a (6 d - d k 2 - 1) + c e r d (2 - k 2) 2 (8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1)$	$a (6 d - d k 2 - 1) + λ c e r d (2 - k 2) 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$
$p e$	$a d (4 - k 2)$	$a - c e r + 4 c e r d - c e r d k 2 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$	$a - λ c e r 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$
$s$	$a k 2 (4 - k 2)$	$d k (2 a - c e r) 2 (8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1)$	$d k (a - λ c e r) 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$
$w$	$a 4 - k 2$	$d (2 a - c e r) 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$	$2 a d - λ c e r + 6 λ c e r d - 2 λ c e r d k 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$
$q$	$a 4 - k 2$	$d (2 a - c e r) 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$	$2 d (a - λ c e r) 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$
$q e$	$0$	$d [a - c e r d (4 - k 2)] 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$	$d (a - λ c e r) 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1$
$π r$	$a 2 2 (4 - k 2)$	$d [2 a 2 - 2 a c e r + c e r 2 d (4 - k 2)] 2 (8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1)$	$d (a - λ c e r) 2 8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1 - f$
$π m$	$a 2 4 (4 - k 2)$	$d 2 (4 - k 2) (2 a - c e r) 2 4 (8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1) 2$	$d (a - λ c e r) [d (4 - k 2) (a + λ c e r) - λ c e r] (8 d - 2 d k 2 - 1) 2 + f$

条件	$Ω 1 ? Ω 3$ ， $Ω ˉ 1 ? Ω 3$ ， $Ω 2 ? Ω 3$ ， $Ω ˉ 2 ? Ω 3$ ， $Ω 2 ? Ω 4$ ， $Ω ˉ 2 ? Ω 4$	$Ω ˉ 1 ? Ω ˉ 3$ ， $Ω ˉ 2 ? Ω ˉ 3$ ， $Ω ˉ 2 ? Ω ˉ 4$
SPNE	IU策略	IN策略

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Retailer's Optimal Extended Warranty Strategy? Collaboration with Manufacturer or Not

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