Abstract: With the development of economic globalization and China's vigorous implementation of the "One Belt and One Road" strategy, while foreign enterprises enter the Chinese market, Chinese enterprises are also looking for suitable partners in the global market to integrate domestic resources to optimize their own supply chain and improve their global competitiveness simultaneously. Hence transnational ownership control in global supply chain is becoming one of current research hotspots. Based on ownership cooperation of downstream local manufacturers and upstream oversea suppliers in the supply chain, focusing on the ownership ratio and ownership control between the supply chain enterprises, taking the two-stage sequential progressive decision-making model (i.e. initial stage and mature stage) for the domestic enterprise into account. The case of the manufacturer in the local market, and the manufacturer transfers to the overseas market due to cost factors in the later stage is first considered in this paper then the analysis framework of transnational ownership cooperation in supply chain is explored.
Furthermore, through introducing static and dynamic bargaining game methods, considering the ownership cooperation between the local market and overseas market in the transnational supply chain is a multi-stage dynamic game process, Nash and Rubinstein game models for ownership cooperation are established, it studies ownership allocation mechanism and ratio at the initial and mature stage respectively. What is more, it gets the optimal profits of both partners under different cooperation modes, and derives the optimal ownership ratio based on the ownership control. At last, the different optimal options for transnational ownership cooperation are obtained in different scenarios, which will benefit local companies to make right decision. It is found that when the local manufacturer and overseas supplier want to implement the ownership cooperation, the profitability of local manufacturer should be taken into consideration first, and whether to further achieve the ownership cooperation depends on the basic capacity of the domestic market, the difference in income tax rates between the two countries and the internal operation cost of the transnational supply chain. In addition, if the local enterprise wants to acquire the controlling stake, the two sides will have the willingness to cooperate only when the ownership allocation proportion gap is not very large. The case of absolute control of either party will make the cooperation difficult to achieve.

Key words: supply chain, transnational-ownership cooperation, ownership game, sequential decision-making, game tactics