Abstract: With the rise of intelligent reservation systems in congestion-prone service systems, the phenomena of “long waiting time” have been greatly alleviated. The simple operation of cloud queueing system has been well accepted by a large number of businesses and customers. A queuing-game model is established, and the impact of “cloud queuing system” on customers and service provider is analyzed theoretically in the framework of the current popular service industries. The following results are obtained in this paper. First, the equilibrium strategies for two types of customers are characterized. Second, it is found that the prevalence of cloud queueing can encourage the online customers to join, but it worsens the utilities of offline customers, and reduce their enthusiasm. Third, the revenue of service provider can be improved in the presence of cloud queueing, and a higher price should be set accordingly.

Key words: queueing game； cloud queueing； customer utility； revenue maximization