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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2020, Vol. 28 ›› Issue (3): 174-181.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.1456

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Research on Enterprise Collaborative Low Carbon Emission Reduction under Three-Dimensional Trading Mode

XING En-feng1, SHI Cheng-dong1, YAN Xiu-xia1, CHENG Shun-bin2, LIN Jing3, NI Shi-ping4   

  1. 1. Business School, Shandong University of Technology, Zibo 255000, China;
    2. General Office, Mazhan Town Government, Linyi 276000, China;
    3. Enterprise Audit Office, Zibo Heating Company, Zibo 255000, China;
    4. Personnel office, 12 th Oil Production Plant of PetrochinaChangqing Oilfield, Xi'an 710200, China
  • Received:2018-10-12 Revised:2019-03-13 Online:2020-03-20 Published:2020-04-08

Abstract: Under the low-carbon economy, the supply chain node enterprise transaction model has evolved from the traditional resource-product two-dimensional transaction to the three-dimensional transaction of resource-product-carbon emission rights. Faced with the change of trading methods, how the enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain of remanufacturing can cooperate with low-carbon emission reduction in the context of the uncertain low-carbon product sales market and the uncertain waste low-carbon product recycling market is studied in this paper.
First, the "mean-variance" is used to describe the risk aversion characteristics of manufacturers, sellers, and third-party recyclers. Secondly, the objective function of expected utility decision making with differentiated weights in three-dimensional trading model is constructed. Then, with the Stackelberg game theory, the game relationship among the node enterprises in the closed-loop supply chain of low-carbon remanufacturing is analyzed, and discusses such important variables as the selling price of low-carbon products, the trading price of carbon emission rights, and the recycling grid of low-carbon waste products, as well as the change rules of expected utility of the node enterprises and the whole chain.
Finally, through numerical examples and sensitivity analysis, the effects of carbon emissions, sensitivity coefficient of consumer low-carbon products and trading price of carbon emission rights on enterprises at all nodes under three game relations of zero sum, centralized decision-making and cooperative emission reduction are analyzed respectively. It shows that when enterprises cooperate in low-carbon emission reduction, the sales price and wholesale price of low-carbon products both decrease, the market share increases, and the expected utility of sellers and manufacturers both increase, which provides important enlightenment for the government to formulate low-carbon cooperative emission reduction policies. The degree of risk aversion, carbon emissions trading price, carbon emissions and low carbon products for consumers in sensitive coefficient and expected utility node enterprises, low carbon products market share, is a negative relationship, for how to design the relevant parameter, optimizing the low-carbon remanufacturing closed-loop supply chain management and collaborative reduction, has an important guiding role.

Key words: retailer drive, carbon emission rights, reduction cooperation, risk aversion, contract, low-carbon supply chain

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