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主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2015, Vol. 23 ›› Issue (5): 23-31.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.05.004

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The Design of IPO Listing System and the Quality of Information Disclosure——Based on the Comparison of Whether the Sponsor Policy is Implemented or not

GAO Hui, WEI Yu-long, LIU Yang   

  1. Business School of Nanjing Normal University, Nanjing 210023, China
  • Received:2013-03-26 Revised:2014-02-26 Online:2015-05-20 Published:2015-05-20

Abstract: In view of the status quo of unsatisfactory quality in the domestic IPO information disclosure in recent years, comprehensively considering the relationships among pre-listing companies, sponsors, and regulatory authorities, the research framework of information asymmetry is applied, the social optimal models of whether the sponsor policy is implemented or not are compared. In theory, by solving and comparing the equilibrium of the models, it is found that under the appropriate regulatory functions, the sponsor system can improve the quality of information disclosure of pro-listing companies. However, the empirical analysis found that, the current domestic IPO sponsor system performs poorly in improving the quality of information disclosure, for the reason of insufficient regulatory actions which fails to effectively constraint participants.

Key words: pre-listing company, sponsor system, quality of information disclosure

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