Abstract: Multi-agent participation has become the basic characteristic of enterprise innovation activities in modern economy environment. In order to confirm the influence of innovation agents on enterprises innovative modes selection, the innovative mode selection game model including the participation of suppliers and customers is build in this paper. From the analysis of the model, it is found that according to the different innovative modes selected by enterprises, three competitive markets can be formed, including Stackelberg market, Cournot market and complete monopoly market. Using evolutionary game method, the equilibrium solutions to the model can be found. The following conclusions can be draw: the participation of suppliers and customers will increase the proportion of companies which choose radical technology innovation. Accordingly, the desire of companies choosing incremental technology innovation will decline. Besides, this effect will be strengthened with the increasing of the proportion of radical technological innovation in the market. When the demand is elastic, customer participation can promote radical technological innovation. Whereas, radical technological innovation can be enhanced by the supplier participation while the demand is inelastic. To incremental technology innovation, this conclusion is completely opposite. Numerical examples are used to analyze the results, which further verify the conclusion. The research conclusions of this dissertation contribute to revealing the influence of multi-agent participation on innovative modes selection and make some explanations to the core issue of innovation of enterprises innovative resources allocation in the condition of multi-agent participation.

Key words: radical technology innovation, incremental technology innovation, innovation mode, multi-participators