τ值," /> τ值,"/> τ-value,"/> 考虑层级联盟的需求不确定联合采购成本分摊策略研究
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中国管理科学 ›› 2025, Vol. 33 ›› Issue (2): 195-206.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1858cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1858

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考虑层级联盟的需求不确定联合采购成本分摊策略研究

杨洁1, 张欣1, 李登峰2()   

  1. 1.福建农林大学经济与管理学院,福建 福州 350002
    2.电子科技大学经济与管理学院,四川 成都 610054
  • 收稿日期:2022-08-23 修回日期:2023-03-06 出版日期:2025-02-25 发布日期:2025-03-06
  • 通讯作者: 李登峰 E-mail:lidengfeng@uestc.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72201063);福建省自然科学基金项目(2024J01408)

Cost Allocation Strategy of Joint Procurement with Level Coalition Structures and Uncertain Demand

Jie Yang1, Xin Zhang1, Dengfeng Li2()   

  1. 1.College of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China
    2.School of Economics and Management,University of Electronic Science and Technology of China,Chengdu 610054,China
  • Received:2022-08-23 Revised:2023-03-06 Online:2025-02-25 Published:2025-03-06
  • Contact: Dengfeng Li E-mail:lidengfeng@uestc.edu.cn

摘要:

现实经济活动中,采购主体往往倾向于与其他采购者(局中人)联合采购以降低采购成本。随着采购参与主体的不断增加,形成更大的联盟,此过程体现出联盟结构的层级性。针对联合采购联盟具有的层级联盟特征,同时考虑现实采购中的需求不确定性,研究此类联合采购成本分摊问题,以为各采购主体的策略选择提供理论依据和方法支持。由于模糊数的逆运算问题,本文定义了单调性联盟条件,将其应用于层级联盟结构合作博弈τ值中,构建层级联盟结构区间值合作博弈τ值模型,并对其有效性和科学性进行了公理化证明。此外,通过一个医药联合采购实例表明了该模型的有效性和实用性。研究表明:联盟程度越紧密,联合采购所节约的成本越多,成员可通过成为关键局中人增强自身讨价还价的话语权,以节约更多采购成本。

关键词: 层级联盟结构, 需求不确定, 成本分摊, 联合采购, τ值')">τ

Abstract:

In the procurement of real economic activities, enterprises tend to jointly purchase with other purchasers to reduce procurement costs. When the coalition continues to expand, a larger coalition will be formed, and the coalition structure level is reflected in this formation process. For joint procurement alliances with level coalition structure, the cost allocation problem of such joint procurement is studied with consider the uncertainty of demand in actual procurement, to provide theoretical basis and method support for the selection of joint procurement strategies among players (relationship). In order to solve the problem of joint procurement cost allocation with level coalition structures and uncertain demand, the interval τ-value allocation solution of cooperative game with coalition structure is defined, which can be expressed as τi(v¯)=[mi+α-(Mi-(v)-mi),mi+α+(Mi+(v)-mi)]. The specific construction process as follows: (1) Firstly, the interval-value is adopted to describe the fuzziness of demand, and the condition of union monotonicity is defined, namely v+(S)-v-(S)v+(S\i)-v-(S\i). This method to perform interval subtraction can effectively avoid the problem of fuzzy number inversion. (2) Secondly, the condition of union monotonicity is introduced into the classical level coalition structure cooperative game model, and the definition of the interval-value cooperative game of the level coalition structure is given. (3) Then, this game model is introduced into classical cooperative game τ-value model to construct the cooperative game τ-value model of the interval-value with the coalition structure. (4) In addition, the axiomatic of individual rationality and overall effectiveness are proved of this model. (5) Lastly, in order to prove the effectiveness and practicality of the model, the method is applied to the real case of "Beijing-Tianjin-Hebei + Shandong" joint procurement of COVID-19 reagents. The conclusions of this paper are drawn: (1) Compared with real number research, fuzzy number research is more scientific and accurate. (2) The level coalition structure has a significant impact on the cost allocation strategy of joint procurement, that is, when the purchase quantity is the same, the closer the alliance is, the more cost will be saved by joint procurement. Therefore, members can increase their bargaining power by becoming key players to save more procurement costs.

Key words: level coalition structures, uncertain demand, cost allocation, joint procurement, τ-value')">τ-value

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