关键词: 环境规制；合作策略；跨界污染；非累积性污染物；累积性污染物

Abstract: Especially in recent years, a single source of emissions is typically comprised of multiple pollutants that also lead to regional and global negative externalities in reality. On the one hand, some pollutants discharged by industrial enterprises during the production process will have a short-term, regional and non-cumulative impact on their source area and adjacent areas. Examples of pollutants causing these impacts include sulfur dioxide, suspended particulates in the air, and odor pollutants discharged in production, which have more local, regional, and negative external influences on the region and adjacent areas. On the other hand, other pollutants discharged through industrial enterprises will increase to existing pollution stocks, and gradually accumulate with long-term global cumulative impact. Examples of pollutants with such negative environmental impacts include greenhouse gases and CFCs, etc. With the gradual accumulation, a series of global environmental problems such as global warming have been caused. Therefore, we should not only pay attention to the short-term regional environmental problems, but also to the long-term global environmental problems. Under this background, considering the different environmental damage caused by multiple pollutants (non-cumulative and cumulative pollutants), the optimal control theory is used to construct a game model for optimal control of transboundary pollution. Firstly, based on Stackelberg game, the dynamic decision-making processes of local governments as leaders and industrial enterprises as followers are analyzed, and the optimal pollutant emissions of industrial enterprises are determined. Subsequently, a game model of optimal control of transboundary pollution in two adjacent regions under non-cooperative and cooperative games is constructed to analyze the environmental governance strategies of local governments, including the optimal environmental protection tax and investment in environmental pollution control, and to explore the dynamic changes of pollutant stocks. Meanwhile, the two game structures are compared and analyzed. By theoretical analysis and simulation result, whether it is non-cooperative or cooperative game between regions, the correlation between the optimal pollutant emission and the proportion of pollutant emission reduction in industrial enterprises is uncertain, mainly depending on its size; the optimal environmental protection tax in each region is positively correlated with the proportion of pollutant emission reduction in industrial enterprises. But under the cooperative game, each region will consider the damage caused by its non-cumulative pollutants to its adjacent areas; each region will increase investment in environmental pollution control; the total revenue of all regions is higher than that of non-cooperative game, and the higher part (cooperative surplus) is affected by cumulative pollutant stock damage and non-cumulative pollutant damage to adjacent areas, but has nothing to do with the damage of non-cumulative pollutants to its own area. Finally, through the analysis and research of this paper, it is expected to provide a certain theoretical basis for local governments to formulate policies for cross-regional cooperation in environmental pollution control.

Key words: environmental regulation; cooperation strategy; transboundary pollution; non-accumulative pollutants; accumulative pollutants