不完全信息下多阶段移动应用产品与服务合作的可更新契约

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.02.014

中国管理科学 ›› 2018, Vol. 26 ›› Issue (2): 126-141.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.02.014

不完全信息下多阶段移动应用产品与服务合作的可更新契约

张旭梅¹, 任廷海¹, 周茂森², 但斌¹

1. 重庆大学经济与工商管理学院, 重庆 400044;
2. 深圳大学管理学院, 广东深圳 518060

收稿日期:2016-06-22 修回日期:2017-03-09 出版日期:2018-02-20 发布日期:2018-04-20
通讯作者: 张旭梅(1966-),女(汉族),四川仁寿人,重庆大学经济与工商管理学院教授,博士,博士生导师,研究方向:供应链管理,Email:zhangxumei@cqu.edu.cn. E-mail:zhangxumei@cqu.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71272086）；国家科技支撑计划课题（2015BAF05B01）

The Contract Revision of Cooperation of Multi-stage Mobile Application Product and Service under Incomplete Information

ZHANG Xu-mei¹, REN Ting-hai¹, ZHOU Mao-sen², DAN Bin¹

1. School of Economics and Business Administration, Chongqing University, Chongqing 400044, China;
2. College of Management, Shenzhen University, Shenzhen 518060, China

Received:2016-06-22 Revised:2017-03-09 Online:2018-02-20 Published:2018-04-20

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 考虑不完全信息下由提供移动应用产品与服务的ERP厂商、APP厂商与客户企业组成的产品服务供应链，针对ERP厂商与APP厂商产品服务合作中存在的逆向选择与道德风险问题，构建两阶段的动态博弈模型，分析了APP厂商隐藏与披露能力信息对产品与服务质量、供应链系统绩效与ERP厂商利润的影响，提出了信息披露、收益共享的单阶段契约与存在契约变更的两阶段契约激励策略，比较了两种契约的价值。研究表明：通过在产品开发阶段观察APP厂商的契约菜单选择以及获得的产品质量信息，甄别APP厂商的能力信息，在服务阶段进行契约变更，有利于提高产品与服务质量，降低ERP厂商风险，使供应链系统利润与ERP厂商自身利润实现帕累托改善。最后，通过算例对研究结论进行了直观考察和说明。

关键词: 产品服务供应链, 不完全信息, 多阶段博弈, 契约变更, 移动应用

Abstract: In a product and service supply chain (PSSC) consisting of an ERP vendor, an APP vendor and a customer enterprise with incomplete information, adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist in the collaboration between the ERP vendor and the APP vendor when they provide an ERP product service system (PSS) to the customer enterprise jointly. The ERP vendor provides advanced software development technology and industry solution in the development of the ERP system while the APP vendor provides mobile application based on the ERP function to the ERP vendor. The ERP vendor sells the ERP product service system to the customer enterprise and both the ERP vendor and the APP vendor provide after-sales service to the customer enterprise jointly. Specifically, the APP vendor provides the maintenance and upgrading services of the APP system while the ERP vendor provides the maintenance, upgrading and secondary development services of the ERP system. To analyze how the product and service quality, performance of the PSSC system and profit of the ERP vendor are affected when the APP vendor chooses to conceal or reveal its capacity information, a model of two-stage dynamic game is constructed. Moreover, a single stage contract based on information disclosure and revenue sharing and a two-phase contract with contract revision are put forward in this paper and values of two contracts are compared. It is found that the ERP vendor can identify the APP vendor's capacity information through the observation of the APP vendor's contract menu selection during the product development phase and thus revises the contract based on available information during the service stage. This can help improve the product and service quality and reduce the risk of the ERP vendor, leading to the improvement of channel profits and achievement of Pareto improvement. Finally, numerical examples are provided to inspect and illustrate the research conclusions. In summary, the collaboration problem of multi-stage mobile application product service system with information upgrading and contract revision under incomplete information is researched, and theoretical guidance and decision-making basis are provided for enterprises to implement mobile management pattern.

Key words: product service supply chain, incomplete information, multi-stage game, contract revision, mobile application

中图分类号:

F253

张旭梅, 任廷海, 周茂森, 但斌. 不完全信息下多阶段移动应用产品与服务合作的可更新契约[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(2): 126-141.

ZHANG Xu-mei, REN Ting-hai, ZHOU Mao-sen, DAN Bin. The Contract Revision of Cooperation of Multi-stage Mobile Application Product and Service under Incomplete Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018, 26(2): 126-141.

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不完全信息下多阶段移动应用产品与服务合作的可更新契约

The Contract Revision of Cooperation of Multi-stage Mobile Application Product and Service under Incomplete Information

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