内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (5): 83-90.

内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序

杨晓花¹, 夏火松¹, 谷伟², 陈文磊³

1. 武汉纺织大学管理学院, 湖北武汉 430074;
2. 中南财经政法大学统计与数学学院, 湖北武汉 430074;
3. 武汉大学经济管理学院, 湖北武汉 430072

收稿日期:2011-10-24 修回日期:2013-09-21 出版日期:2014-05-20 发布日期:2014-05-14
作者简介:杨晓花（1979-），女（汉族），湖北人，武汉纺织大学管理学院副教授，博士，研究方向：博弈论及决策理论.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71171153）；湖北省教育厅一般项目（2011jyty024）

Equilibrium Move Order of Multi-Period R&D Game under Endogenous Timing

YANG Xiao-hua¹, XIA Huo-song¹, GU Wei², CHEN Wen-lei³

1. School of Management, Wuhan Textile University, Wuhan 430074, China;
2. School of Statistics and Mathematics, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430074, China;
3. Economics and Management School, WuHan University, Wuhan 430072, China

Received:2011-10-24 Revised:2013-09-21 Online:2014-05-20 Published:2014-05-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 基于内生时机的博弈理论，研究了内生的R&D时机下双寡头企业先进行R&D活动后进行产品市场价格竞争的多阶段动态博弈的均衡R&D顺序，其中产品市场上的需求函数是线性的且企业在产品市场上的行动是同时进行的。运用逆向归纳法研究表明均衡R&D顺序只由企业的R&D外溢水平决定：若两企业的外溢水平都较低（较高），则均衡R&D顺序为两企业同时行动（分别以两企业为领头者的序贯行动）；若一个企业的外溢水平较低而另一企业的外溢水平较高，则均衡R&D顺序为以低外溢水平的企业为领头者的序贯行动。在序贯R&D时两企业的R&D总水平、社会总福利水平及产品市场产量（价格）都高于（低于）同时R&D时的情形。

关键词: 内生时机, R&D, 外溢, 均衡

Abstract: Based on endogenous timing game theory, the equilibrium move order of R&D is studied in this paper in a multi-stage game in which firms R&D are followed by competition in product market, with the assumption that in product market the demand function is linear and the move-order is simultaneously. With backward induction it is shown that, equilibrium R&D order is only decided by firms' R&D spillover. When both firms' spillover rates are low (high), the equilibrium R&D order is simultaneous play (sequential play with both leader-follower configurations). When one firm's spillover rate is low and the other's is high the equilibrium R&D order is sequential play with the low-spillover-rate-firm as the leader. When equilibrium R&D order is sequential play the total R&D level, the social welfare and the output(price) in product market are (is) higher (lower) than simultaneous R&D.

Key words: endogenous timing, R&D, spillover, equilibrium

中图分类号:

F273

杨晓花, 夏火松, 谷伟, 陈文磊. 内生时机下多阶段R&D博弈的均衡行动顺序[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(5): 83-90.

YANG Xiao-hua, XIA Huo-song, GU Wei, CHEN Wen-lei. Equilibrium Move Order of Multi-Period R&D Game under Endogenous Timing[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(5): 83-90.

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