基于非线性系统稳定性理论的P2P网络借贷三方演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1007

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 由于风险管理意识不足、监管措施缺位、制度设计不完善等问题，近年来我国P2P借贷违约事件频繁发生。为了挖掘P2P网贷行业问题产生的本质机理，并考虑到P2P网贷行业运行是一个多参与主体的博弈过程，本文建立了监管机构、P2P平台和借款人之间的三方博弈复制动态模型。然后，我们将该复制动态模型的演化稳定策略分析问题，转化成一个非线性系统关于平衡点的稳定性分析问题。接着，基于非线性系统稳定性理论，我们首先发现对于三方博弈模型不能简单运用雅可比矩阵的迹和行列式来判断稳定性；然后，对不同情况下的演化稳定策略进行了详细讨论，并得出结论：如果违约借款人在面对合规经营的P2P平台时收益为零、监管支出小于监管收益以及监管机构对违规经营P2P平台的惩罚力度足够，则监管机构、P2P平台和借款人100%都会收敛于监管、合规经营和守约的策略。另外，本文给出了确保期望演化稳定策略的惩罚力度下限的具体值。根据该数据，监管机构可以设定一个相对温和的惩罚力度，让作为金融创新模式的P2P网络借贷能够稳定、健康的发展。最后，根据相关的假设和得出的结论，完善P2P网络借贷监管制度可从如下几个方面进行考虑：①违约借款人在面对合规经营的P2P平台时收益为零；②降低监管成本；③增加监管收益；④加大对违规经营P2P平台的惩罚力度；⑤降低违规经营P2P平台的额外收益；⑥降低合规经营P2P平台的运营成本；⑦提高P2P平台长期合规经营所获得的额外收益。

关键词: P2P网络借贷；三方博弈；演化稳定策略；非线性系统；稳定性理论

Abstract: Online P2P lending is a financial innovation model that provides information intermediary services for borrowers and investors to achieve direct lending, where the Internet is the main channel. Since the establishment of the Ppdai in China in 2007, online P2P lending has grown rapidly in China, attracting many users and facilitating a large number of lending transactions. However, due to the lack of awareness of risk management, the lack of regulatory measures and inadequate system design, the "violent thunder" incidents in China’s online P2P lending industry are endless. Therefore, perfecting its legal regulation system is the research hotspot in the current financial field.

Key words: online P2P lending; three-party game; evolutionary stability strategy; nonlinear system; stability theory

中图分类号:

C931

邓春生. 基于非线性系统稳定性理论的P2P网络借贷三方演化博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(11): 134-145.

DENG Chun-sheng. Three-Party Evolutionary Game Analysis of P2P Network Lending Based on Nonlinear System Stability Theory[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2021, 29(11): 134-145.

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