信息不对称条件下激励相容的输配电价模型研究

中国管理科学 ›› 2014, Vol. 22 ›› Issue (5): 91-97.

信息不对称条件下激励相容的输配电价模型研究

蔡建刚¹, 叶泽²

1. 吉首大学旅游与管理工程学院, 湖南张家界 427000;
2. 长沙理工大学经济与管理学院, 湖南长沙 410114

收稿日期:2011-10-20 修回日期:2013-04-01 出版日期:2014-05-20 发布日期:2014-05-14
作者简介:蔡建刚（1984-），男（汉族），浙江诸暨人，吉首大学旅游与管理工程学院，讲师，研究方向：电价理论与方法.
基金资助:
国家社会科学基金重大项目（12&ZD052）；国家社会科学基金项目（07BJY079）；教育部新世纪优秀人才计划（070124）

The Incentive Compatibility Price Model of Transmission and Distribution under Asymmetric Information

CAI Jian-gang¹, YE Ze²

1. School of Tourism and Management Project, Jishou University, Zhangjiajie 427000, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Changsha University of Science and Technology, Changsha 410114, China

Received:2011-10-20 Revised:2013-04-01 Online:2014-05-20 Published:2014-05-14

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 政府与输配电企业之间存在着信息不对称，通过引入价格、输电量和转移支付三个政策工具，政府可以设计一套激励相容机制以诱使企业诚实申报成本。在激励相容机制基础上建立的输配电企业管制定价模型，不仅能维护消费者的利益，而且还能确保输配电企业不亏损。特别是当政府将输配电企业利润与消费者剩余视为同等重要时，输配电价将等于边际成本，资源将得到最优配置，此时输配电企业也将获得最大的利润。模型为我国输配电定价形成机制提供了理论与政策依据。

关键词: 信息不对称, 输配电价, 管制, 激励相容

Abstract: There is an asymmetric information between government and enterprise of transmission and distribution. However, government can design a set of incentive compatible mechanism to induce enterprise reporting cost honestly through introducing three policy instruments which are price, transmission capacity and transfer payment. The regulation pricing model of transmission and distribution enterprise based on incentive compatible mechanism not only safeguards the consumers' interests, but also ensures the transmission and distribution enterprise without losing. When the government regards the profit of transmission and distribution enterprise and the surplus of consumer as of equal importance, the price will be equal to marginal cost, and resources will be optimal configuration. At the same time, the enterprise will receive maximization profits. The model used in this paper provides theoretical and practical guidance for pricing mechanism of our transmission and distribution price.

Key words: asymmetric information, transmission and distribution price, regulation, incentive compatibility

中图分类号:

TM73
F123.9

蔡建刚, 叶泽. 信息不对称条件下激励相容的输配电价模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(5): 91-97.

CAI Jian-gang, YE Ze. The Incentive Compatibility Price Model of Transmission and Distribution under Asymmetric Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(5): 91-97.

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