主管：中国科学院
主办：中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
　　　中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院
中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2010, Vol. 18 ›› Issue (1): 113-119.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

卖方边际成本可变的多物品多属性逆向拍卖研究

姚升保   

  1. 中南财经政法大学工商管理学院, 湖北 武汉 430073
  • 收稿日期:2009-02-10 修回日期:2010-01-05 出版日期:2010-02-28 发布日期:2010-02-28
  • 作者简介:姚升保(1977- ).男(汉族).湖北黄冈人.中南财经政法大学讲师.博士研究方向:决策分析.
  • 基金资助:

    教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(09YJC630229);国家自然科学基金项目(70771041)

Multi-unit Multi-attribute Reverse Auctions with Variable Marginal Costs for Suppliers

YAO Sheng-bao   

  1. School of Business Administration, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China
  • Received:2009-02-10 Revised:2010-01-05 Online:2010-02-28 Published:2010-02-28

PDF (PC)

1319

被引次数

20

摘要： 研究卖方边际成本可变的多物品多属性逆向拍卖问题。首先,根据卖方边际成本可变的特点设计了一种多轮逆向拍卖机制;其次,基于近视最佳反应策略的基本假设,分析卖方的投标策略;最后,利用仿真实验方法,研究买方事先公布估价信息对拍卖的影响。基本结果是:本拍卖机制在多数情况下是有效率的;相对买方不公布估价信息的拍卖机制,买方事先公布估价信息的多物品多属性拍卖具有稍差的市场效率,但能够显著地提高拍卖收敛速度。

关键词: 多属性拍卖, 边际成本, 投标策略, 市场效率, 仿真

Abstract: Multi-unit multi-attribute reverse auctions with variable marginal costs for suppliers are studied in this article.Firstly,an iterative auction mechanism is proposed according to the characteristic of variable marginal costs.Secondly,bidding strategies for the suppliers in the proposed mechanism are analyzed based on the assumption of the myopic best response strategies.Thirdly,the simulation experiments are conducted to study the effects of the valuation information,which is declared by the buyer on the auction.Results from numerical experiments show that,the mechanism achieves market efficiency in most instances.Compared to the auction mechanism in which the buyer's valuation information is not declared,the mechanism convergences fast but has lower market efficiency.

Key words: multi-attribute auction, marginal cost, bidding strategy, market efficiency, si mulation

中图分类号: