关键词: 制造企业；服务化；收益函数；演化博弈；仿真分析

Abstract: The transformation of manufacturing enterprises from traditional manufacturing to service-oriented manufacturing is one of the important ways to transform, upgrade and enhance competitiveness. However, enterprises are bound by their own resources and service capabilityin the process of transformation, and often need the cooperation of service providers. At the same time, professional service providers also need more business to improve revenue,Hence, it is of great theoretical and practical significance to study how manufacturing enterprises and service providers cooperate to develop servitization strategies.But the existing research mainly focuses on how to carry out servitization by manufacturing enterprises themselves, less attention has been paid to joint service providers in manufacturing enterprises.For the lag of existing research, based on the construction of the income function of manufacturing enterprises and service providers, a two-party asymmetric evolution game model is built, the rules of manufacturing enterprises and service providers to implement servitization are explored, and MATLAB simulation is used to deeply study that how relevant factors impact manufacturing enterprises work with service providers to implement servitization. The results show that, (1)the degree that manufacturing enterprises rely on the service provided by service providers and the degree thatdifferentiated competition between service-oriented manufacturing enterprises and traditional manufacturing enterprises are positively correlated with the willingness of manufacturing enterprises and service providers to cooperate in implementing servitization. Moreover, the degree of differentiated competition has a stronger effect on the willingness to cooperate than the degree of product service dependence. (2)Manufacturing enterprises and service providers in the traditional mode, and servitization alliances in the servitization mode all conform to the economic man hypothesis, according to the income and cost before and after the servitization, to decide whether to adopt the cooperation strategy. Compared with the income, they are sensitive to the change of servitization cost, while service providers are vulnerable to the interference of income and cost and shake the willingness of cooperation. (3)Service providers are more vulnerable to the impact of unilateral cooperation costs and adopt non-cooperation strategies. And the influence of unilateral cooperation cost on strategy has the law of diminishing marginal benefit, so the decision-maker should pay attention to the control of initial unilateral cooperation cost. (4)The existence of optimal service income distribution coefficient makes the manufacturing enterprises and service providers have the strongest willingness to adopt cooperation strategy. This result can provide theoretical support for decision makers in the process of servitization cooperation between manufacturing enterprises and service providers.

Key words: manufacturing enterprises；servitization；income function；evolutionary game；simulation analysis