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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (10): 301-312.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1198cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1198

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需求不确定下考虑信息分享的供应商溯源投入与渠道选择策略研究

谭春桥1,2(),赵会敏1,周丽3   

  1. 1.中南大学商学院, 湖南 长沙 410083
    2.南京审计大学商学院, 江苏 南京 211815
    3.北京物资学院信息学院, 北京 101149
  • 收稿日期:2021-06-15 修回日期:2022-03-09 出版日期:2024-10-25 发布日期:2024-11-09
  • 通讯作者: 谭春桥 E-mail:chunqiaot@sina.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72371132);国家自然科学基金重大项目(71991460);北京市智能物流系统协同创新中心及开放课题(BILSCIC-2019KF-01)

Research on Supplier Market Encroachment and Supplier's Traceability Investment Considering Information Sharing Strategy under Uncertain Demand

Chunqiao Tan1,2(),Huimin Zhao1,Li Zhou3   

  1. 1.School of Business, Central South University, Changsha 410083, China
    2.School of Business, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China
    3.School of Information, Beijing Wuzi University, Beijing 101149, China
  • Received:2021-06-15 Revised:2022-03-09 Online:2024-10-25 Published:2024-11-09
  • Contact: Chunqiao Tan E-mail:chunqiaot@sina.com

摘要:

考虑由供应商和零售商组成两级供应链的需求不确定性,零售商可以预测需求,供应商可通过提升产品可溯源水平来扩大市场需求。针对零售商是否分享需求预测信息及供应商是否进入市场四种决策情形,构建多阶段动态博弈模型,分析供应商开通直销渠道进入市场、零售商分享信息的条件,讨论零售商信息分享策略、供应商渠道选择及溯源投入决策之间的影响。研究结果表明:供应商进入市场的策略受直销成本和零售商信息分享策略的影响,零售商的信息分享策略取决于产品溯源成本和渠道间竞争程度。当直销成本较小(较大)时,无论零售商是否分享需求信息,供应商会选择进入(不进入)市场;当直销成本处于中间水平时,零售商分享需求信息会激励供应商进入市场。供应商的市场进入策略不一定总是使零售商的收益受损,当产品溯源投入成本和渠道间竞争程度满足一定条件时,供应商进入市场可以提升零售商的收益,且随着需求预测准确程度的提升,零售商更愿意供应商进入市场,但分享信息的可能性先减后增。

关键词: 信息分享, 渠道结构, 产品溯源, 市场进入, 数量竞争

Abstract:

With the development of e-commerce and the growing awareness of consumer traceability, it is common for suppliers to encroach on the market and improve product traceability to increase their profits. In addition market demand is uncertain,the retailer can obtain a signal and predict demand. Retailers can influence the above two operational strategies of suppliers through information sharing strategies. The impact of supplier encroachment on retailers is also more complex when considering product traceability.The following research questions are addressed. Faced with the threat of suppliers' potential market encroachment and traceability investment strategy, should retailers share demand forecast information with upstream suppliers, or under what circumstances should they share demand forecast information? How will retailers' information sharing strategies affect suppliers' channel selection and traceability investment strategies?Aims to explore the interaction between the strategies of supply chain members, a two-echelon supply chain composed of a supplier and a retailer is considered as the research object, and the influence between retailer's demand forecast information sharing strategy, supplier’s market encroachment and product traceability investment strategy under uncertain demand information are analyzed. In the first stage, retailers decide whether to share the demand forecast information with suppliers before obtaining the demand forecast information. In the second stage, the supplier decides the level of product traceability and whether to encroach on the market. In the third stage, retailers obtain the demand information and follow the agreement in the first stage to share or not share the demand information. In the fourth stage, the supplier decides the wholesale price of the product. Finally, if the supplier encroaches on the market, the supplier and the retailer determine the quantity of their own sales channels at the same time, else only the retailer determines the number of distribution channels. There are four decision-making scenarios based on whether the retailer shares demand information and whether the supplier encroaches on the market, by comparing the equilibrium strategies and results under these scenarios.Some key findings are proposed. The supplier’s encroachment strategy is affected by the operating cost of direct channel and the retailer’s information sharing strategy, while the retailer’s information sharing strategy depends on the product traceability cost and the degree of competition between channels. In addition, the supplier’s encroachment strategy does not always impair the retailer’s revenue. When the product traceability cost and the degree of competition between channels meet certain conditions, the supplier's encroachment can increase the retailer's revenue, and as the accuracy of demand forecasting improves, retailer prefers supplier to encroach on the market, but the possibility of sharing information first decreases and then increases.

Key words: information sharing, channel structure, product traceability, market encroachment, quantity competition

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