“双积分”政策下汽车制造商竞争定价与减排策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.1566

摘要/Abstract

摘要： “双积分”政策的实施对汽车制造商的定价决策产生了重要影响。考虑卖方由同时生产燃油车和新能源汽车的制造商1和仅生产新能源汽车的制造商2组成，在消费者低碳偏好和价格竞争影响下分别针对制造商1对燃油车采取和不采取节能减排措施的情况，研究“双积分”政策下汽车制造商的定价策略和减排决策，探讨新能源汽车积分值和积分比例要求对政府和企业决策的作用效果。进一步，通过对不同情形的结果进行分析，得到“双积分”政策的出台、消费者低碳偏好及制造商采取节能减排措施对制造商定价和减排决策带来的变化，并通过算例分析验证了结论。研究结果表明：(1)“双积分”政策可以降低新能源汽车的价格，提高新能源汽车制造商的利润，促进燃油车主动减排。(2)当新能源汽车的需求价格弹性系数和需求交叉价格弹性系数处于较高水平时，政府要制定较高的每台新能源汽车积分值。(3)燃油车的油耗水平存在一个环境属性标准，当油耗水平低于一定值时，随着新能源汽车积分比例要求的不断增大，制造商1选择提高燃油车价格。(4)消费者低碳偏好是提高燃油车减排水平的重要因素，政府可以对减排技术先进的燃油车制造商进行低油耗认证，提高消费者低油耗燃油车需求，激励燃油车制造商积极减排。

关键词: “双积分”政策；低碳偏好；竞争定价；减排策略；汽车制造商

Abstract: The production and trading modes of automobile manufacturers have been changed by the “double credits” policy, which is followed by a new context about automobile pricing and emission reduction issues. The seller is composed of two different manufacturers (M1 produces both oil-fueled automotive(OFA)and new energy vehicles (NEVs), while M2 produces only NEVs). By taking consumers’ low-carbon preference into consideration, the market needs and OFA’s fuel consumption are negatively correlated, and consumers have a lower price elasticity of demand for low-carbon products, thus, the market demand is affected by the dual effects of consumers’ low-carbon preference and automobile’s price. The methodology of mathematical modelling is equipped under two scenarios of that M1 adopts emission reduction strategies or not, the pricing strategies and emission-reduction decisions of automobile manufacturers under the policy of “double credits” are explored, as well as the effects of NEV credit value of each NEV and the ratio requirements of NEV credit on the decision-making of government and enterprises are discussed. Furthermore, the changes of the pricing and emission reduction decisions made by the “double credits” policy, consumers’ low-carbon preference and the energy-saving and emission reduction measures adopted by manufacturers, are tested by using the methodology of example analysis under different scenarios.

Key words: the “double credits” policy; low-carbon preference; competitive pricing; emission reduction strategies; automobile manufacturers

中图分类号:

F272.3

卢超, 王倩倩, 赵梦园, 闫俊琳. “双积分”政策下汽车制造商竞争定价与减排策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(1): 64-76.

LU Chao, WANG Qian-qian, ZHAO Meng-yuan, YAN Jun-lin. A Study on Competitive Pricing and Emission Reduction Strategies of Automobile Manufacturers under the “Double Credits” Policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(1): 64-76.

参考文献

［1］ Ma Ye,Shi Tianyu,Zhang Wei,et al. Comprehensive policy evaluation of NEV development in China, Japan, the United States,and Germany based on the AHP-EW model［J］. Journal of Cleaner Production, 2019, 214:389-402.
［2］ Azel F M, Davies H, Wells P.What works? An ANFIS-based policy evaluation framework for electric vehicle technologydevelopment［J］. International Journal of Electric and Hybrid Vehicles, 2017, 9(3): 222-252.
［3］ Bergek A, Berggren C.The impact of environmental policy instruments on innovation: A review of energy and automotive industry studies［J］. Ecological Economics,2014, 106:112-123.
［4］卢超, 尤建新, 戎珂,等. 新能源汽车产业政策的国际比较研究［J］. 科研管理, 2014, 35(12): 26-35.Lu Chao, You Jianxin, Rong Ke, et al.International comparison of industrial policies for new-energy vehicles［J］. Science Research Management, 2014, 35(12): 26-35.
［5］ Zhao Fuquan,Hao Han, Liu Zongwei. Technology strategy to meet China’s 5L/100 km fuel consumption target for passenger vehicles in 2020［J］. Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, 2016, 18(1): 7-15.
［6］ Kodjak D. Global evolution of heavy-duty vehicle fuel economy and GHG regulations［J］. Carbon Management, 2011, 2(3): 245-260.
［7］ Atabani A E, Badruddin I A, MekhilefS, et al. A review on global fuel economy standards, labels and technologies in the transportation sector［J］. Renewable & Sustainable Energy Reviews, 2011, 15(9): 4586-4610.
［8］ Hao Han, Ou Xunmin, Du Jiuyu, et al. China’s electric vehicle subsidy scheme: Rationale and impacts［J］. Energy Policy, 2014, 73: 722-732.
［9］ Mohammadnejad M, Ghazvini M, Mahlia T M I. Fuel economy standards for light duty vehicles and their potential to aid Iran toward achieving fuel saving and emissions reduction［J］. Clean Technologies and Environmental Policy, 2014, 16(3): 661-666.
［10］ Huo Hong,He Kebin, Wang M,et al. Vehicle technologies,fuel-economy policies, and fuel-consumption rates of Chinese vehicles［J］.Energy Policy,2012, 43: 30-36.
［11］郑吉川, 赵骅, 李志国. 双积分政策下新能源汽车产业研发补贴研究［J］. 科研管理,2019, 40(2):126-133.Zheng Jichuan, Zhao Hua, Li Zhiguo. A research on new energy vehicle industry R&D subsidy under the policy of “double credits” ［J］. Science Research Management,2019, 40(2):126-133.
［12］卢超, 闫俊琳. 考虑“双积分”交易的双寡头新能源车企研发博弈［J］. 工业技术经济, 2019, 38(1): 67-73.Lu Chao, Yan Junlin. A R&D game of dual－oligopoly new energy vehicle enterprises:Under the context of CAFC and NEV integrals transaction［J］. Journal of Industrial Technological Economics, 2019, 38(1): 67-73.
［13］刘宗巍, 刘斐齐, 王悦, 等. CAFC、NEV双积分与碳配额法规综合研究与组合政策思考［J］.汽车工程学报, 2017, 7(1):1-9.Liu Zongwei, Liu Feiqi, Wang Yue, et al. Integrated study and combined policy suggestions on CAFC，NEV and carbon credits［J］.Chinese Journal of Automotive Engineering, 2017, 7(1):1-9.
［14］ Huo Hong, Wang M, Zhang Xiliang, et al. Projection of energy use and greenhouse gas emissions by motor vehicles in China: Policy options and impacts［J］. Energy Policy, 2012, 43: 37-48.
［15］ Wang Yue, Zhao Fuquan, Yuan Yinshou, et al. Analysis of typical automakers’ strategies for meeting the dual-credit regulations regarding CAFC and NEVs［J］. Automotive Innovation, 2018, 1(1): 15-23.
［16］程永伟, 穆东. 双积分制下汽车生产商生产决策优化［J］. 系统工程理论与实践, 2018, 38(11):2817-2830.Cheng Yongwei, Mu Dong. Optimal production decision of vehicle manufacturer based on double-score system［J］. Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice, 2018, 38(11):2817-2830.
［17］孙嘉楠,肖忠东.考虑消费者双重偏好的低碳供应链减排策略研究［J］.中国管理科学,2018,26(4):49-56.Sun Jianan, Xiao Zhongdong. Decision-making of dual-channel supply chain emission reduction based on consumer preference to low-carbon［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science,2018,26(4):49-56.
［18］ Ji Jingna, Zhang Zhiyong, Yang Lei. Carbon emission reduction decisions in the retail-dual-channel supply chain with consumers’ preference ［J］. Journal of Cleaner Production,2017, 141: 852-867.
［19］刘名武,吴开兰,付红,等.消费者低碳偏好下零售商主导供应链减排合作与协调［J］.系统工程理论与实践,2017,37(12):3109-3117.Liu Mingwu, Wu Kailan, Fu Hong, et al. Cooperation on carbon emission reduction in a retailer-led supply chain with consumer’s low-carbon preference［J］.Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice,2017,37(12):3109-3117.
［20］ Liu Zugang, Anderson T D, Cruz J M.Consumer environmental awareness and competition in two-stage supply chains［J］.European Journal of Operational Research,2012,218:602-613.
［21］ Zhang Linghong, Wang Jingguo, You Jianxin.Consumer environmental awareness and channel coordination with two substitutable products［J］.European Journal of Operational Research,2015,241:63-73.
［22］王强, 李卫红, 胡荣. 价格竞争下的双寡头R&D合作与非合作博弈分析［J］. 科技进步与对策, 2010, 27(16): 22-25.Wang Qiang, Li Weihong, Hu Rong. Game analysis for cooperative and noncooperative R&D in duopoly with price competition［J］. Science & Technology Progress and Policy, 2010, 27(16): 22-25.
［23］刘新民, 赵梁, 王垒, 等. 考虑随机市场需求的双渠道供应链风险补偿策略研究——从质量与价格竞争视角［J］. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(1): 73-84.Liu Xinmin, Zhao Liang, Wang Lei, et al. Research on risk-reward strategy of dual channel supply chain with stochastic market demand: From the perspective of quality and price competition［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(1): 73-84.
［24］ Wu Chenghan, Lai Jingyi.Dynamic pricing and competitive time-to-market strategy of new product launch under a multistage duopoly［J］.European Journal of Operational Research,2019, 277(1): 138-152.
［25］赵连霞. 制造商开辟网络直销下的混合渠道供应链定价决策［J］. 中国管理科学, 2015, 23(S1): 557-563.Zhao Lianxia. Pricing policy of hybrid channel supply chain with manufacturer’s online-marketing［J］.Chinese Journal of Management Science， 2015, 23(S1): 557-563.
［26］胡本勇, 陈旭. 基于收益共享合约的策略一致性与供应链合作研究［J］. 管理工程学报, 2017, 31(2): 91-100.Hu Benyong, Chen Xu. Policies consistency and supply chain coordination under revenue sharing contract［J］. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management, 2017, 31(2): 91-100.
［27］李新然, 吴义彪. 政府“以旧换再”补贴下的差别定价闭环供应链［J］. 系统工程理论与实践,2015, 35(8): 1983-1995.Li Xinran, Wu Yibiao. Differential price closed-loop supply chain under the government replacement-subsidy［J］. Systems Engineering—Theory & Practice, 2015, 35(8): 1983-1995.

[1]	张华, 李莉, 朱星圳, 何向. 网络购物平台最优价格促销策略：价格折扣还是现金券？[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(10): 130-141.
[2]	舒斯亮, 柳键. 不同权力结构下供应链概率销售策略比较研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(9): 152-161.
[3]	丁龙, 胡斌, 常珊. 制造商RFID策略与零售商窜货策略的动态博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(8): 82-94.
[4]	程粟粟, 张帆, 李冬冬. 基于绿色技术研发的绿色供应链微分博弈及协调模型[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(8): 95-105.
[5]	胡玉生, 李金林, 张文思, 赵天. 可加效用下基于消费者惰性的易逝品动态定价[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(6): 99-105.
[6]	王宇, 翟佳, 邓杰. 股权融资下企业市场竞争策略选择的模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(5): 98-108.
[7]	王璐, 马庆庆, 杨劼, 郑君君. 基于复杂网络演化博弈的绿色消费者对新能源汽车扩散的影响研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(4): 74-85.
[8]	林莉, 王玉, 吴嘉聪. 消费者视角下中小企业社群动态定制仿真建模及其管理策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3): 13-29.
[9]	余顺坤, 闫泓序, 杜思悦, 林依青. 基于SC-RS的我国工业电力用户价值画像模型研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(3): 106-116.
[10]	曲薪池, 侯贵生, 孙向彦. 消费者异质偏好结构下动态创新竞合系统定价与创新策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(1): 88-99.
[11]	曹裕, 易超群, 万光羽. 碳税政策下随机双渠道库存与协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(1): 111-123.
[12]	牛攀峰，侯文华. 考虑供应商产品交付水平的供应链融资策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(10): 70-83.
[13]	闫泓序，余顺坤，林依青. 我国工业电力用户价值画像模型构建与应用研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(10): 224-235.
[14]	谈丹, 魏航, 李佩. 制造商技术开放策略问题研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(7): 84-95.
[15]	樊相宇, 胡博雅, 武小平. 考虑无缺陷退货下零售商转运的供应链回购契约研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(7): 139-147.