买方抗衡势力下双渠道促销合作微分博弈研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.09.008

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在企业多周期连续促销背景下，假设需求受上下游企业促销努力水平、产品商誉和消费者支付意愿的共同影响，考虑产品商誉和消费者支付意愿的动态变化，构建双渠道模式制造商和零售商线上线下联合促销的四种微分博弈模型，以解决供应链上企业的促销决策问题。结果表明，两阶段补偿契约提高了零售商促销的积极性，实现上下游企业利润的帕累托改进，在买方抗衡势力的作用下，制造商将进一步提高促销成本分担比例使得零售商达到集中决策下的最优促销努力水平，但该契约对制造商促销努力激励不足。为此，进一步设计两阶段成本分担契约以实现同时激励上下游企业的促销努力，无论买方抗衡势力如何变化该契约都不会造成上下游企业的决策偏离，实现供应链完美协调。

关键词: 双渠道, 促销决策, 买方抗衡势力, 供应链协调

Abstract: In the dual-channel supply chain, it is meaningful to develop reasonable promotion strategies to improve the profit of the upstream and downstream enterprises and reduce channel conflicts. Basing on the assumption that the channel demand is affected by the enterprises' dynamic promotion behavior, the product goodwill and consumers' heterogeneous channel preference, the dual-channel promotion problem between the manufacturer online and the retailer offline is studied, constructed the vertical joint promotion differential game models which were based on product goodwill and consumers' willingness to pay are constructed, explored the incentive effect of four models of non-cooperative, centralized, two-stage compensation contract and two-stage cost sharing contract on the promotion decision of channel members is explored, the influence mechanisms of buyer's countervailing force on channel members' promotional efforts and cooperative contracts is discussed, and the influences of consumers' channel preference and channel substitution parameter on enterprises' promotion decisions are analyzed.
The following conclusions are drawn from the study:①Under the influence of buyer's counterbalance force, the proportion of promotion cost sharing of upstream enterprises in the two-stage compensation contract has a double impact on the profit of upstream and downstream enterprises, this contract can motivate the retailers to reach the optimal promotion effort level which is achieved under the centralized decision-making, and also realize the Pareto improvement of the profit of the supply chain, but the incentive for manufacturers to promote are inadequate; ②The two-stage cost-sharing contract can motivate the enterprises of the upstream and downstream to promote at the same time, and ensure that the optimal promotion effort level equals to the situation under centralized decision-making, and no matter how the buyer's counterbalance forces change, it won't cause the decision deviation of the upstream and downstream enterprises, all the enterprises can realize the profit Pareto improvement after the transfer payment, and the supply chain can achieve perfect coordination; ③The influence of consumers' channel preference on the promotion efforts of upstream and downstream enterprises is determined by the marginal profit which is generated by channel preference.

Key words: dual-channel, promotion decision, mechanism of countervailing power, supply chain coordination

中图分类号:

F713.1

林晶, 王健, 郑敏. 买方抗衡势力下双渠道促销合作微分博弈研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(9): 80-92.

Lin Jing, Wang Jian, Zheng Min. Research on Dual-channel Promotion Cooperation and Differential Game under Buyer's Countervailing Power[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(9): 80-92.

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