主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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中国管理科学 ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (1): 242-250.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1500

• • 上一篇    

酒店官网和OTA渠道博弈研究

郭强1(),陈小兰1,赵新元2   

  1. 1.海南大学旅游学院, 海南 海口 570228
    2.澳门科技大学博雅学院, 澳门特别行政区 999078
  • 收稿日期:2021-07-31 修回日期:2021-12-12 出版日期:2024-01-25 发布日期:2024-02-08
  • 通讯作者: 郭强 E-mail:gq@hainanu.edu.cn
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(71661006);海南省自然科学基金创新研究团队项目(2019CXTD402);海南大学人文社科科研创新团队项目(HDSKTD202017)

The Channel Game between the Hotel Direct Official Website and the Online Travel Agent

Qiang Guo1(),Xiaolan Chen1,Xinyuan Zhao2   

  1. 1.School of Tourism, Hainan University, Haikou 570228, China
    2.School of liberal Arts, Macao University of Science and Technology, Macao 999078, China
  • Received:2021-07-31 Revised:2021-12-12 Online:2024-01-25 Published:2024-02-08
  • Contact: Qiang Guo E-mail:gq@hainanu.edu.cn

摘要:

酒店对在线旅游代理商(online travel agent, OTA)的话语权主要表现为佣金议价权和客房定价权。以酒店聚焦官网运营战略来重掌对OTA的话语权为背景,针对官网和OTA渠道博弈问题,以常被忽视的成本因素为决策变量构建一对一博弈模型,讨论了单渠道官网模式、双渠道净价模式、双渠道佣金模式三种模式下酒店收益最优的实现条件。研究发现:首先,酒店实现收益最优不一定要与OTA合作,一定条件下酒店采用单渠道官网模式就能够实现最优。其次,酒店决定与OTA合作时,运用双渠道净价模式能够实现利润最大化,其实现条件可分为两种情况。最后,酒店在双渠道净价模式下实现收益最优时,仅能满足OTA参与约束,无法实现激励相容。

关键词: 双渠道供应链, 佣金模式, 净价模式, OTA, 营销努力

Abstract:

The hotel’s discourse right to the online travel agent (referred to as OTA) is mainly manifested in commission bargaining power and room pricing power. In recent has years, the hotel has focused on operating the official website to regain the discourse right to the OTA, Taking this the background it targets to tackle the channel game issues between the hotel online direct channel and the OTA. The neglected cost is taken as the decision variables to construct a one-to-one game model and the realization conditions of the optimal returns are discussed under three models: the “single-channel official website model,” the “dual-channel merchant model,” and the “dual-channel agent model.” It is found that: Firstly, the hotel does not necessarily need to cooperate with OTA to achieve the best revenue. Under certain conditions, the hotel can achieve the best profit by adopting the single-channel official website model. Secondly, when a hotel decides to cooperate with an OTA, the dual-channel merchant model can be used to maximize profits, and there are two conditions for its realization. Finally, when the hotel achieves the best revenue under the dual-channel merchant model, the hotel and the OTA can only meet the participation constraint and cannot achieve incentive compatibility.

Key words: dual-channel supply chain, agent model, merchant model, OTA, marketing effort

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