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中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (9): 68-79.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.09.007

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不确定性环境下不同补货策略的供应链契约协调研究

刘家国1, 王军进1, 周锦霞1, 刘璠2   

  1. 1. 大连海事大学航运经济与管理学院, 辽宁 大连 116026;
    2. 中南财经政法大学工商管理学院, 湖北 武汉 430073
  • 收稿日期:2018-07-07 修回日期:2019-02-19 出版日期:2019-09-20 发布日期:2019-09-29
  • 通讯作者: 刘家国(1979-),男(汉族),湖北枣阳人,大连海事大学航运经济与管理学院,教授,博士,研究方向:物流与供应链管理研究,E-mail:liujiaguo@gmail.com. E-mail:liujiaguo@gmail.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金资助项目(71402038,71774019);教育部人文社科后期项目(19JHQ096);辽宁省兴辽英才项目(XLYC1807097);辽宁省高等学校创新人才支持计划资助项目(WR2017004)

Research on Supply Chain Contract Coordination of Different Replenishment Strategies under Uncertain Environment

LIU Jia-guo1, WANG Jun-jin1, ZHOU Jin-xia1, LIU Fan2   

  1. 1. School of Maritime Economics and Management, Dalian Maritime University, Dalian 116026, China;
    2. School of Business Administration, ZhongNan University of Economics and Law, Wuhan 430073, China
  • Received:2018-07-07 Revised:2019-02-19 Online:2019-09-20 Published:2019-09-29

摘要: 针对产出和需求不确定性导致的残值或补货问题,考虑单个制造商和零售商所组成的双边随机供应链,双方采取事前订单形式,构建两种不同现货市场补货策略模型,研究随机环境下最优原材料投入量-成品订货量决策行为及供应链协调。研究表明:零售商自行补货时,收益共享合同不能分担上游产出不确定性风险,制造商为避免产出过剩会减小投入量导致合同失效,但融合了缺货惩罚-余货补偿双向机制的收益共享契约能够进行有效协调。当由制造商补货时,现货市场降低了产出不确定性风险且提高了系统产出投入比,并能重新使收益共享契约生效。此外,有效契约协调后的各方收益均为系统最优收益的仿射函数,并由协商后的收益共享比例控制着分配系数。理论分析和数值仿真说明了合同协调的有效性。算例分析还发现,设计的收益共享风险共担契约相比单一的收益共享契约能够更好地降低不确定性对收益的影响。

关键词: 不确定性环境, 现货市场, 补货策略, 供应链契约

Abstract: In view of the salvage value or replenishment problem caused by the output and demand uncertainty, considering a bilateral random supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and retailer, the two sides take the form of pre-order to construct two different spot-market replenishment strategy models, and study the optimal decision-making behaviors of input quantity of raw materials and order quantity of finished products, and supply chain coordination problem under random environment. The research shows that when the retailer replenishes the products by itself, the revenue sharing contract cannot cope with the risk of output uncertainty, and the manufacturer will reduce the input to avoid the overproduction, which will lead to the contract failure. However, the revenue sharing contract attached with the two-way mechanism of penalty for shortage and compensation for surplus can work effectively. When the manufacturer replenishes the products, the spot market reduces the output uncertainty risk and improves the ratio of output on input of the chain system, and can make the original revenue sharing contract work again. After the coordination of effective contracts, the profits of all parties are affine functions of the optimal profits of the system, and the distribution coefficient is controlled by the revenue sharing proportion after negotiation. Theoretical analysis and numerical simulation demonstrate the effectiveness of contract coordination. It is also found from the numerical analysis that the designed revenue-sharing and risk-sharing contract can better reduce the impact of uncertainty on revenues than the single contract.

Key words: uncertain environment, spot market, replenishment strategy, supply chain contract

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