基于政府补贴的企业最优减排技术选择研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.07.017

中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (7): 177-185.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.07.017

基于政府补贴的企业最优减排技术选择研究

李冬冬¹, 杨晶玉²

1. 西北工业大学人文与经济学院, 陕西西安 710072;
2. 西安交通大学管理学院, 陕西西安 710049

收稿日期:2017-02-24 修回日期:2017-07-25 出版日期:2019-07-20 发布日期:2019-08-01
通讯作者: 李冬冬(1990-),男(汉族),安徽马鞍山人,西北工业大学人文与经法学院助理教授,研究方向:环境经济学,E-mail:lidongdong2010ky@126.com. E-mail:lidongdong2010ky@126.com
基金资助:
中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目（G2018KY0306）；西北工业大学学位与研究生教育研究基金资助项目（19GZ220101）；西北工业大学2019年专业学位研究生课程案例库建设项目（19GH010201）

Choice of Optimal Environmental Technology Based on Government Subsidy

LI Dong-dong¹, YANG Jing-yu²

1. School of Humanities, Economic and Law, Northwester Ploytechnical University, Xi'an 710072, China;
2. Management School of Xi'an Jiaotong University, Xi'an 710049, China

Received:2017-02-24 Revised:2017-07-25 Online:2019-07-20 Published:2019-08-01

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 通过构建三阶段博弈模型，得到了清洁工艺治污和末端治污企业的减排研发绩效，并进一步利用数值模拟方法分析了最优补贴政策下，技术溢出率、污染损害程度及排污税对企业治污技术选择的影响。研究表明：无补贴政策下，企业最优的选择为末端治污技术，经济和环境无法取得双赢。最优补贴政策下，当污染损害在一定范围内时，无论技术溢出率取何值，基于利润最大化和政府福利最大化视角，企业的最优技术选择都为清洁工艺治污技术。最优补贴政策下，无论排污税取何值，清洁工艺治污模式下的企业利润都高于末端治污模式下的企业利润；排污税影响不同治污模式下的社会福利水平，当排污税较小时，清洁工艺治污模式下的福利水平大于末端治污模式下的情形，当排污税较大时，末端治污模式下的福利水平大于清洁工艺治污模式下的情形，为保证企业的减排技术选择和政府的选择一致，取得经济和环境无法取得双赢，政府应设置一个合理的排污税水平。

关键词: 减排研发, 溢出率, 补贴政策, 排污税

Abstract: A three-stage dynamic game model between government and firm to is constructed explore the firm's optimal R&D investment and the government optimal subsidy policy under different abatement technology modes. Moreover, a numerical method is used to analysis the factors that influence the firm's abatement and social performance. First, the R&D subsidy policy is always welfare-enhancing rather than the case of laissez-faire. Second, with the optimal subsidy policy, output, R&D investment, profit, and social welfare under the progress integrated abatement technology scenario become greater than those under end-of-pipe abatement technology for any value of the spillover. Social welfare under the progress integrated abatement technology scenario becomes greater than those under end-of-pipe abatement if the emission tax is sufficiently small. Moreover, output, R&D investment, profit, and social welfare under the progress integrated abatement technology scenario become greater than those under end-of-pipe abatement technology if the damage parameter is sufficiently small.

Key words: abatement R&D, spillover rate, subsidy policy, emission tax

中图分类号:

F062.9

李冬冬, 杨晶玉. 基于政府补贴的企业最优减排技术选择研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(7): 177-185.

LI Dong-dong, YANG Jing-yu. Choice of Optimal Environmental Technology Based on Government Subsidy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(7): 177-185.

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基于政府补贴的企业最优减排技术选择研究

Choice of Optimal Environmental Technology Based on Government Subsidy

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