考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.05.013

中国管理科学 ›› 2019, Vol. 27 ›› Issue (5): 119-129.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.05.013

考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究

孙书省¹, 浦徐进¹, 韩广华²

1. 江南大学商学院, 江苏无锡 214122;
2. 上海交通大学国际与公共事务学院, 上海 200030

收稿日期:2017-09-08 修回日期:2018-08-01 出版日期:2019-05-20 发布日期:2019-05-25
通讯作者: 浦徐进(1979-),男(汉族),江苏无锡人,江南大学商学院,教授,博士,研究方向:供应链管理,E-mail:puyiwei@ustc.edu E-mail:puyiwei@ustc.edu
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目（71871105）；教育部人文社会科学规划项目（18YJAZH068）

The Strategy of Online Channels Under Different Offline Channel Power Structures

SUN Shu-xing¹, PU Xu-jin¹, HAN Guang-hua²

1. School of Business, Jiangnan University, Wuxi 214122, China;
2. School of International and Public Affairs, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, Shanghai 200030, China

Received:2017-09-08 Revised:2018-08-01 Online:2019-05-20 Published:2019-05-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 在线下垂直实力对等、制造商主导和实体店主导三种渠道权力结构下，构建制造商、实体店和电商之间的博弈模型，探讨线下渠道权力结构与制造商线上销售模式的匹配关系。研究结果表明：（1）当电商要求的佣金比例较小时，在不同的线下渠道权力结构下，制造商都应该选择线上代销模式；而当电商要求的佣金比例较大时，在线下垂直实力对等结构下，制造商应该选择线上转销模式，而在制造商主导和实体店主导结构下，制造商应该选择线上代销模式。（2）当制造商选择线上转销模式时，在线下制造商主导的结构下，制造商给予实体店的批发价格最大，在垂直实力对等结构下次之，在实体店主导结构下最小。然而，线下渠道权力结构的差异并不会影响制造商给予电商的批发价格。（3）当制造商选择线上代销模式时，在线下制造商主导结构下，线下销售价格最高；在线下垂直实力对等结构下，线上销售价格最高。

关键词: 双渠道供应链, 渠道权力结构, 转销, 代销

Abstract: The matching relationship between the offline channel power structures and online channel distribution modes, and is investigated the effects of manufacturer's optimal online channel model under different offline channel power structures are explored, including offline vertical Nash equilibrium, manufacturer Stackelberg, and retailer Stackelberg game. The game theory approach is established to analyze supply chain members' optimal pricing decisions and profits in the online reselling and online agency selling distribution models, respectively. Then, the manufacturer's equilibrium profits and supply chain members' optimal prices are compared under different offline channel power structures. The findings show that:When the commission coefficient is intuitively lower, the manufacturer would choose agency selling model in three scenarios; while the commission coefficient is significantly larger, the manufacturer tends to choose reselling model in vertical Nash equilibrium case, but in manufacturer Stackelberg and retailer Stackelberg case, the manufacturer would choose agency selling model. When the manufacturer chooses reselling model, the offline wholesale price is the largest in manufacturer Stackelberg case, while online wholesale price is identical in three offline channel power structures. When the manufacturer chooses agency selling model, the retailer would set the largest offline sales price in manufacture Stackelberg situation, while in the case of vertical Nash equilibrium, the manufacturer would decide the largest online sales price. Our findings not only complement the literature on emerging online channel distribution but also provide several practical insights and guidelines on the coexistence of the online and brick-and-mortar channels.

Key words: offline power structure, online distribution, reselling, agency selling, game theory

中图分类号:

F224

孙书省, 浦徐进, 韩广华. 考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(5): 119-129.

SUN Shu-xing, PU Xu-jin, HAN Guang-hua. The Strategy of Online Channels Under Different Offline Channel Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(5): 119-129.

参考文献

[1] 贾思曼. CNNIC发布第39次《中国互联网络发展状况统计报告》[EB/OL]. (2017-01-22)[2017-05-22]. http://tech.cnr.cn/techgd/20170122/t20170122_523519176.shtml.

[2] Choi C S. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer[J]. Marketing Science,1991,10(4):110-129.

[3] Wu Chenghan, Chen C W, Hsieh C C. Competitive pricing decisions in a two-echelon supply chain with horizontal and vertical competition[J].International Journal of Production Economics,2012,135(1):265-274.

[4] Ertek G, Griffin P M. Supplier and buyer driven channels in a two-stage supply chain[J].ⅡE Transactions,2002,34(8):691-700.

[5] Pan Kewen, Lai K K, Leung S C H, et al. Revenue-sharing versus wholesale price mechanisms under different channel power structures[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2010,203(2):532-538.

[6] 姚树俊,陈菊红.考虑渠道权力结构的产品服务能力竞争机制研究-制造商服务视角[J].中国管理科学,2014,7(22):107-115.

[7] Luo Zheng, Chen Xu, Chen Jing, et al. Optimal pricing policies for differentiated brands under different supply chain power structures[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2016,259(2):437-451.

[8] 许民利,聂晓哲,简惠云.不同风险偏好下双渠道供应链定价决策[J].控制与决策, 2016,8(1):91-98.

[9] Dumrongsiri A, Fan Ming, Jain A, et al. A supply chain model with direct and retail channels[J].European Journal of Operational Research,2008,187(3):691-718.

[10] Yan Ruiliang, Pei Zhi. Retail services and firm profit in a dual-channel market[J]. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, 2009,16(4):306-314.

[11] 赵连霞.制造商开辟网络直销下的混合渠道供应链定价决策[J].中国管理科学, 2015,11(23):557-563.

[12] 申成然,熊中楷,宴伟.网络比价行为下双渠道定价及协调策略研究[J].中国管理科学, 2014,1(22):84-93.

[13] Chiang W Y, Chhajed D, Hess J D. Direct marketing, indirect profits:A strategic analysis of dual-channel supply chain design[J]. Management Science,2003,49(1):1-20.

[14] Abhishek V, Jerath K, Zhang Z J. Agency selling or reselling? Channel structures in electronic retailing[J].Management Science, 2015,62(8):2259-2280.

[15] Dennis Z Y, Cheong T, Sun D. Impact of supply chain power and drop-shiping on a manufacturer's optimal distribution channel strategy[J]. European Journal of Operational Research,2017,259(2):554-563.

[16] Hagiu A, Wright J. Marketplace or reseller?[J].Management Science,2015,61(1):184-203.

[17] Mantin B, Krishnan H, Dhar T. The strategic role of third-party marketplaces in retailing[J]. Production and Operations Management,2014,23(11):1937-1949.

[18] Tan Yinliang, Carrillo J E, Cheng H K. The agency model for digital goods[J]. Decision Sciences,2016,47(4):628-660.

[19] Kumar N,Ruan Ranran. On manufacturers complementing the traditional retail channel with a direct online channel[J].Quantitative Marketing and Economics, 2006,4(3):289-323.

[20] Yan Ruiliang, Pei Zhi. The strategic value of cooperative advertising in the dual-channel competition[J].International Journal of Electronic Commerce,2015,19(3):118-143.

[21] Shang Wenfang, Yang Lei. Contract negotiation and risk preferences in dual-channel supply chain coordination[J]. International Journal of Production Research, 2015,16(53):4837-4856.

考虑线下权力结构的制造商线上销售模式选择研究

The Strategy of Online Channels Under Different Offline Channel Power Structures

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 10

[1]	曹晓宁, 王永明, 薛方红, 刘晓冰. 供应商保鲜努力的生鲜农产品双渠道供应链协调决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(3): 109-118.
[2]	叶欣, 周艳菊. 考虑商誉的双渠道供应链动态定价与联合减排策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2021, 29(2): 117-128.
[3]	孙红霞, 李晓芳, 周珍. 双渠道零售商和传统零售商的定价策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(6): 104-111.
[4]	黄帅, 樊治平. 不同渠道权力结构下资金约束零售商的采购和融资策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2020, 28(1): 79-88.
[5]	石纯来, 聂佳佳. 网络外部性对双渠道供应链信息分享的影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(8): 142-150.
[6]	曹裕, 易超群, 万光羽. 基于“搭便车”行为的双渠道供应链库存竞争和促销策略[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(7): 106-115.
[7]	龚本刚, 汤家骏, 程晋石, 刘志. 产能约束下考虑消费者偏好的双渠道供应链决策与协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(4): 79-90.
[8]	申强, 徐莉莉, 杨为民, 刘笑冰, 侯云先. 需求不确定下双渠道供应链产品质量控制研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(3): 128-136.
[9]	张伸, 孟庆春, 安国政. 电商平台扣点率影响下的双渠道供应链协调定价研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(10): 44-55.
[10]	张学龙, 吴豆豆, 王军进, 刘家国, 张一纯. 考虑退货风险的制造商双渠道供应链定价决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2018, 26(3): 59-70.
[11]	王道平, 张博卿, 李小燕. 联合促销下双渠道VMI供应链的竞争与协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(3): 52-60.
[12]	浦徐进, 龚磊. 消费者“搭便车”行为影响下的双渠道供应链定价和促销策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(10): 86-94.
[13]	林志炳. 基于利他属性的双渠道供应链研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(12): 126-134.
[14]	王文宾, 达庆利, 聂锐. 考虑渠道权力结构的闭环供应链定价与协调[J]. 中国管理科学, 2011, 19(5): 29-36.
[15]	徐广业, 但斌, 肖剑. 基于改进收益共享契约的双渠道供应链协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2010, 18(6): 59-64.