基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.02.008

中国管理科学 ›› 2016, Vol. 24 ›› Issue (2): 61-68.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.02.008

基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究

黄宗盛¹, 聂佳佳², 赵映雪³

1. 上海海事大学经济管理学院, 上海 201306;
2. 西南交通大学经济管理学院, 四川成都 610031;
3. 对外经济贸易大学国际经济贸易学院, 北京 100029

收稿日期:2013-08-05 修回日期:2015-04-14 出版日期:2016-02-20 发布日期:2016-02-25
通讯作者: 黄宗盛 E-mail:chris163@yeah.net.
作者简介:黄宗盛(1985-),男(汉族),四川绵阳人,上海海事大学经济管理学院博士,讲师,研究方向:供应链管理,E-mail:chris163@yeah.net.
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71171074)

The Choice of Money-back Guarantees of Dual Channel Retailer

HUANG Zong-sheng¹, NIE Jia-jia², ZHAO Ying-xue³

1. School of Economics and Management, Shanghai Maritime University, Shanghai 201306, China;
2. School of Economics and Management, Southwest Jiaotong University, Chengdu 610031, China;
3. School of International Trade and Economics, University of International Business and Economics, Beijing 100029, China

Received:2013-08-05 Revised:2015-04-14 Online:2016-02-20 Published:2016-02-25

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 研究了双渠道销售商的退款保证策略选择问题。将销售商的退款保证策略分为两个渠道都不提供、仅实体渠道提供、仅网络渠道提供以及两个渠道同时提供等四种。分别求解得到相应的最优定价及利润。研究发现:销售商在实体渠道和网络渠道的产品价格仅与其是否在该渠道提供退款保证服务有关,而与另一渠道是否提供退款保证无关。如果销售商想要刺激某渠道的利润水平,当退货产品残值较高时应选择在该渠道提供退款保证,而当残值较低时应选择在另一渠道提供退款保证。通过数值分析发现,同时在两个渠道提供退款保证并非总是销售商的最优策略。销售商的退款保证策略选择与两个渠道间的成本差异有关,当两个渠道间的成本差异较高时,销售商最好仅在网络渠道提供退款保证。

关键词: 退款保证, 双渠道, 直销渠道

Abstract: The strategy choice of Money-back guarantees of a dual channel retailer is studied. There are four kinds of MBG policies for the retailer, i.e., no MBG, MBG only in traditional channel, MBG only in direct channel, as well as MBG in both traditional and direct channels. The optimal pricing strategy as well as the optimal profit of the retailer in different MBG scenarios are derived. By the comparison analysis, it's found that the product price in the two channels only depends on the MBG state in the channel, while it has nothing to do with the MBG state in the other channel. If the retailer wants to incur the profit level in one channel, it should provide MBG in the channel when the salvage value of the return product is high and provide MBG in the other channel when the salvage value is low. By the numerical analysis, it's found that the policy which provides MBG in both channels is not always the optimal choice for the retailer. When the cost difference between the two channels is small comparatively, it is beneficial for the retailer to provide MBG in both of the channels. However, when the cost difference is moderate, the choice depends on the salvage value of product. Once the cost difference between the two channels is very large, it is always favorable for the retailer to provide MBG only in the direct channel.

Key words: money-back guarantees, dual channel, direct channel

中图分类号:

F270

黄宗盛, 聂佳佳, 赵映雪. 基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2016, 24(2): 61-68.

HUANG Zong-sheng, NIE Jia-jia, ZHAO Ying-xue. The Choice of Money-back Guarantees of Dual Channel Retailer[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016, 24(2): 61-68.

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基于消费者满意的双渠道销售商退款保证策略研究

The Choice of Money-back Guarantees of Dual Channel Retailer

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