不同权力结构下考虑持股的需求信息不对称供应链定价研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0709

Abstract

Abstract:

In the context of supply chains， there is an emerging trend where retailers acquire equity in manufacturers， and gain a position of dominance. This equity holding， coupled with the inherent power structure in supply chains， significantly impacts the flow of demand information signals between upstream and downstream enterprises. A two-tier supply chain comprising a manufacturer and a retailer is considered， where the retailer holds equity in the manufacturer and possesses private information about market demand scale. The aim is to analyze pricing decisions made by both upstream and downstream enterprises， taking into account scenarios where either the retailer or the manufacturer dominates the supply chain. Furthermore， it aims to explore the impact of equity holding on signal transmission and pricing decisions. The findings reveal that， regardless of who leads the supply chain， the retailer's marginal revenue exhibits a negative correlation with both the equity holding ratio and the probability of a high-type market size. Conversely， the wholesale price demonstrates a positive correlation with these factors. In scenarios where the market size is low-type， supply chain members tend to achieve higher profits when acting as leaders， regardless of their equity holding ratio. However， when the market size is high-type， being a leader may not always be advantageous. Notably， when the manufacturer leads the supply chain， the profits of supply chain members remain unaffected by the equity holding ratio. Under retailer leadership， the retailer's signaling behavior is influenced by market size and equity holding ratio. Specifically， when the market size is low-type and the equity holding ratio is low， the retailer must signal the market size information costly， while it can signal the market size information cost-free if the equity holding ratio is high enough. Furthermore， at lower equity holding ratios， both the retailer's marginal revenue distortion and signaling costs increase as the equity holding ratio rises. Finally， an elevated equity holding ratio can indeed boost the retailer's profitability， though it does not guarantee a corresponding increase in the manufacturer's earnings. Nevertheless， under specific circumstances， both entities can achieve a harmonious outcome that leads to mutual advantages.

Key words: supply chain management, equity holding, information asymmetry, signaling game, power structure

CLC Number:

F270

Liangjie Xia,Mengxian Gu,Youdong Li, et al. Pricing Strategies of Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information Considering Equity Holding under Different Power Structures[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(6): 250-260.

Figures/Tables 5

序号	$a L$	$λ$	$η$
①	$a H 3 < a L ≤ a H 2$	$0 < λ < λ 1$	$0 < η < η 1$
②	$a H 2 < a L < a H$	$0 < λ ≤ λ 2$	$0 < η < 12$
③	$a H 2 < a L < a H$	$λ 2 < λ < λ 1$	$0 < η < η 1$

序号	$a H$	$λ$	$η$
①	$2 a L < a H < 3 a L$	$λ 3 < λ < 1$	$0 < η < 12$
②	$2 a L < a H < a H 1$	$0 < λ < λ 3$	$0 < η < η 7$
③	$a H 1 < a H < 3 a L$	$λ 4 < λ < λ 3$	$0 < η < η 7$

序号	$a H$	$λ$	$η$
①	$2 a L < a H < 3 a L$	$3 a L - 2 a H 3 a L - 3 a H < λ < λ 5$	$0 < η < 12$
②	$2 a L < a H < 3 a L$	$λ 6 < λ < λ 7$	$η 9 < η < 12$

序号	$a L$	$λ$	$η$
①	$a H 3 < a L ≤ a L 1$	$λ 8 < λ < λ 9$	$0 < η < 12$
②	$a L 1 ≤ a L < a H 2$	$λ 8 < λ < λ 9$	$0 < η < η 10$
③	$a L 1 < a L ≤ a H 2$	$0 < λ < λ 9$	$η 10 < η < 12$

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Pricing Strategies of Supply Chain with Asymmetric Demand Information Considering Equity Holding under Different Power Structures

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