政府激励科创平台协同创新的契约设计——基于双重信息不对称视角

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.0917

Abstract

Abstract:

China regards scientific and technological （S&T） self-reliance and self-improvement as strategic support for national development， and governments at all levels are actively promoting the construction of high-capacity science and technology innovation platforms. S&T innovation platforms gather a large amount of S&T innovation resources and are important vehicles for research users to carry out S&T innovation activities. The efficient operation of S&T innovation platforms is a powerful means to realize high-level self-reliance and self-improvement in science and technology. The introduction of a market-based operation mechanism can improve the operation efficiency of S&T innovation platforms. Therefore， for governmental S&T innovation platforms， how to build a market-based operation mechanism and how the government can stimulate the collaborative innovation of S&T innovation platforms have attracted our attention.

With the government as the principal and the platform enterprise as the agent， it is a feasible model for the government to entrust the operation of S&T innovation platform to the platform enterprise. However， in the principal-agent process， the government will face private information from the agent， including ex-ante private information about the platform’s operational capability and ex-post private information about the supporting service inputs. Given this， the principal-agent theory is applied to design two kinds of incentive contracts under the double information asymmetric： one-time payment and proportional share payment， the incentive effect of different contracts on the agent is compared， the preference of the government and the agent on the contract is discussed， and then the government’s contract selection strategy is analyzed.

The following key findings are yielded in this paper. （i） The government needs to have certain conditions to implement the screening contract， otherwise it can only choose the pooling contract. （ii） Based on the goal of maximizing the benefits of S&T and the economy， different contracts may be the best choice for the government under the corresponding circumstances. （iii） However， from the perspective of separating different types of agents， the government should choose the proportional payment screening contract. From the perspective of incentivizing the quality of the platform’s supporting services， it should choose the one-time payment pooling contract. （iv） Agents need to make contractual choices depending on their ability types， but any ability type of agents should avoid the pooling contract of proportional share payment.

The research work can bring some managerial insights to the government and enterprise. First， if the government chooses to implement a screening contract， it cannot design a one-time payment contract because it can only become a pooling contract. Second， the government’s proportional share payment screening contract can screen enterprises’ private information， which solves the adverse selection problem of “bad money drives out good”. Third， from the perspective of incentivizing platform enterprises to provide higher-quality supporting services， the government should choose a one-time payment contract. Fourth， platform enterprises of all capacity types should not opt for the proportional share payment pooling contract.

The principal-agent modeling is applied under double information asymmetric to the study of operations management of S&T innovation platforms， which enriches the literature in the fields of mechanism design， collaborative innovation， and platform-based operations management. Admittedly， there are some limitations in this study， which are mainly reflected in the fact that the price of S&T innovation resource-sharing services is considered to be controlled by the government， that is， it is defined as an exogenous variable in the model， and although some useful conclusions are obtained， it fails to discuss the market pricing mechanism of S&T innovation platforms well， which will be the direction of further research in the future.

Key words: scientific and technological innovation platform, scientific and technological innovation benefits, contract design, principal-agent theory, information asymmetry

CLC Number:

F224

Qiang Hu,Jiqing Xie,Guangsi Zhang, et al. Contract Design of Government Incentives for Collaborative Innovation in Scientific and Technological Innovation Platforms: A Double Information Asymmetry Perspective[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(1): 153-166.

Figures/Tables 9

符号上下标	含义
P	科创平台代理方
G	政府
(1)	一次性转移支付契约
(2)	比例分成支付契约
(2p)	比例分成支付混同契约
(2s)	比例分成支付分离契约
SB (Second Best)	不对称信息下得到的次优结果
*	最优(反应)决策
参数/函数
Q	科创平台的科研用户数量
π(Q)	代理方运营科创平台的收入
p	共享服务价格
α	网络效应系数
m	科创资源提供者规模
c	配套服务投资成本
h	配套服务投资成本影响系数
r	代理方风险规避系数
β	科创效益溢出系数
Δ	均衡时两种契约下配套服务质量的差距
$π P$	代理方收益
$π G$	政府收益
变量
ξ	不确定性因素, $ξ ∈ N 0, σ 2$ ;随机变量
a	代理方能力, $a ∈ A = a ̲, a ¯$ ;随机变量
T(a)	a类代理方一次性转移支付契约;政府决策变量
λ(a)	a类代理方比例分成支付契约;政府决策变量
q(a)	a类代理方配套服务质量;代理方决策变量

均衡解及期望收益契约类型		次优契约	配套服务质量	代理方期望收益	政府期望收益
一次性转移支付契约		$a ̲ 2 2 h + α m - p - r σ 2 2$	$a h$	$a 2 - a ̲ 2 2 h$	$β m h E a 2 + a ¯ - a ̲ 1 + β m α m - p + a ̲ 2 2 h - r σ 2 2$
比例分成支付混同契约	$X < 4 h α m - p$ ^①	$12 1 - β m - h a ¯ - a ̲ p - α m E a 2$	$a 1 - λ S B h$	$1 8 h a 2 - h r σ 2 X h r σ 2 - a ̲ 2 2 + 12 α m - p X h r σ 2 - a ̲ 2$	$1 4 h 1 + β m E a 2 - h a ¯ - a ̲ p - α m E a 2 2$
比例分成支付混同契约	$X ≥ 4 h α m - p$ ^②	$1 - 2 h p - α m a ̲ 2 - h r σ 2$	$a 1 - λ S B h$	$2 h a 2 - a ̲ 2 p - α m a ̲ 2 - h r σ 2 2$	$p - α m 2 E a 2 a ̲ 2 - h r σ 2 - a ¯ + a ̲ 1 + β m - 2 h p - α m a ̲ 2 - h r σ 2$
比例分成支付分离契约	$0 < p < α m$ ^③ $0 < a ̲ < a ¯ < σ h r$ ^④	$1 - h p - α m a 2 - h r σ 2$	$a 1 - λ S B a h$	$h p - α m 2 2 h r σ 2 - a 2$	$∫ a ̲ a ¯ h r σ 2 p - α m a 2 - h r σ 2 1 + β m - h p - α m a 2 - h r σ 2 f a d a$

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Contract Design of Government Incentives for Collaborative Innovation in Scientific and Technological Innovation Platforms: A Double Information Asymmetry Perspective

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