考虑灾民痛苦感知的应急物资储备模型及协调机制研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0109

Abstract

Abstract:

After sudden disasters， the affected people’s demand for emergency supplies sees a sharp increase in number and variety. If governments can’t deliver the needed supplies to the affected areas immediately， the victims are subject to suffer from pain owing to the lack of critical emergency supplies. For example， at the beginning of COVID-19 outbreak， people are forced to purchase medical supplies like masks and protective suits. One of the most important reasons is that the amount of key medical supplies is insufficient. There exist some deficiencies in the current emergency supplies security system in our country. Therefore， to continuously optimize the emergency supplies security system is the key of raising government efficiency of emergency management， which is of great significance.Emergency supplies as a kind of important emergency resources， is the material foundation for the implementation of emergency rescue. A five-level emergency supplies reserve system has been built in our country. Although the ability of emergency rescue is improved significantly， the problems such as inadequate reserve of emergency supplies， lack of disaster-characterized emergency supplies， and low level of emergency supplies reserve socialization still exist. Emergency supplies reserve socialization is a useful supplement to national emergency supplies reserve system that makes social materials in the market as a source of emergency rescue. Agreement reserve under government consigning is an important form of emergency supplies reserve socialization， under which the governments trust some companies to pre-store emergency supplies. It attempts to study the mode of emergency supplies agreement reserve under government consigning. The governments as the leader， need to actively carry out emergency rescue and deliver the needed supplies to the affected areas in a timely manner. On the other hand， they must adopt measures to reduce casualties and relieve pain of the victims， and control costs as the same time. To run the mode of emergency supplies agreement reserve， the governments need to set a quantity or price mechanism under which agreement enterprises are willing to store emergency supplies.From literature review， it is found that an increasing number of researchers pay attention to prepositioning strategies of emergency supplies. However， less attention has been paid to human suffering in the prepositioning of emergency supplies， which leads to an imbalance between emergency supply and demand， even a serious shortage. This exacerbates the amount of suffering caused by the victims. In view of this， it attempts to analyze how human suffering affects the decisions of the governments and the enterprises. To facilitate analysis， an option contract is introduced into a relief supply chain which consists of a government agency and a supplier. Furthermore， the averted total amount of human suffering is described， and a prepositioning model of emergency supplies considering human suffering via an option contract is built. The optimal decision strategies of the government and the supplier in different situations are attained. Several conditions under which this relief supply chain is coordinated are uncovered. Moreover， combining a case study， the proposed model is compared with the prepositioning model without considering human suffering and the government-single prepositioning model. The conditions are determined to secure the supplier’s willingness to engage in the emergency prepositioning arrangement and to improve social benefits.In our study， since the alleviated human suffering is formulated as social benefit， the proposed model is closer to our country’s “people-oriented” concept of emergency management. The related conclusions not only provide theoretical support for making more accurate emergency supplies prepositioning strategies as well as coordination mechanism， but also help to establish a stable trust-agent relationship between the government and the supplier.

Key words: emergency supplies, prepositioning model, coordination mechanism, suffering perception, option contract

CLC Number:

TP339

Yang Liu,Jun Tian,Ning Yu, et al. Prepositioning Model of Emergency Supplies and Coordination Mechanism Considering Human Suffering Perception via an Option Contract[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(2): 120-132.

Figures/Tables 11

政府应急物资储备量 $Q$	突发灾害发生概率 $θ$	期权执行价格 $e$	企业最优储备量 $q *$	情形
$0 < Q < F - 1 ω - c - h + o ω - v$	$c + h - o - v (ω - v) (1 - F (Q)) < θ < 1$	$e < M$	$F - 1 1 - c + h - o - v θ (e - v) - Q$	Ⅰ
$0 < Q < F - 1 ω - c - h + o ω - v$	$c + h - o - v (M - v) (1 - F (Q)) < θ < c + h - o - v (ω - v) (1 - F (Q))$	$v + c + h - o - v θ (1 - F (Q)) < e < M$	$F - 1 1 - c + h - o - v θ (e - v) - Q$	Ⅱ
$F - 1 ω - c - h + o ω - v < Q < F - 1 M - c - h + o M - v$	$c + h - o - v (M - v) (1 - F (Q)) < θ < 1$	$v + c + h - o - v θ (1 - F (Q)) < e < M$	$F - 1 1 - c + h - o - v θ (e - v) - Q$	Ⅲ

救灾物资储备库最大容量 $V$	突发灾害发生概率 $θ$	期权执行价格 $e$	政府最优决策 $Q 0 *$	情形
$0 < V < F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v$	$ω + h - o - v M - v < θ < ω + h - o - v (M - v) (1 - F (V))$	$ω + h - o - v θ + v < e < M$	$F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v θ (e - v)$	Ⅰ
$0 < V < F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v$	$ω + h - o - v (M - v) (1 - F (V)) < θ < 1$	$ω + h - o - v θ + v < e < ω + h - o - v θ (1 - F (V)) + v$	$F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v θ (e - v)$	Ⅱ
$0 < V < F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v$	$ω + h - o - v (M - v) (1 - F (V)) < θ < 1$	$ω + h - o - v θ (1 - F (V)) + v < e < M$	$V$	Ⅲ
$V > F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v$	$ω + h - o - v M - v < θ < 1$	$ω + h - o - v θ + v < e < M$	$F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v θ (e - v)$	Ⅳ

救灾物资储备库最大容量 $V$	突发灾害发生概率 $θ$	期权执行价格 $e$	政府最优决策 $Q 0 *$	情形
$0 < V < F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v + Δ H$	$ω + h - o - v M - v + Δ H < θ < ω + h - o - v (M - v + Δ H) (1 - F (V))$	$e 1 - Δ H < e < M$	$F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v θ (e - v + Δ H)$	Ⅰ
$0 < V < F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v + Δ H$	$ω + h - o - v (M - v + Δ H) (1 - F (V)) < θ < 1$	$e 1 - Δ H < e < e 2 - Δ H$	$F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v θ (e - v + Δ H)$	Ⅱ
$0 < V < F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v + Δ H$	$ω + h - o - v (M - v + Δ H) (1 - F (V)) < θ < 1$	$e 2 - Δ H < e < M$	$V$	Ⅲ
$V > F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v M - v + Δ H$	$ω + h - o - v M - v + Δ H < θ < 1$	$e 1 - Δ H < e < M$	$F - 1 1 - ω + h - o - v θ (e - v + Δ H)$	Ⅳ

匮乏时间（ $t$ ）	灾民痛苦水平（帐篷）
1	1.089
2	2.536^*
3	3.983
5	5.7435^*
7	7.504
11	8.626^*
15	9.748

匮乏时间（ $t$ ）	转化效率（ $H (t)$ ）
1	2.9713
2	12.6291^*
3	53.6778
5	312.155^*
7	1815.289
11	5574.7346^*
15	17119.9546

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地震强度	发生频次	百分比（%）
2.0≤R<3.0	117	10.8938
3.0≤R<4.0	807	75.1396
4.0≤R<5.0	123	11.4525
5.0≤R<6.0	22	2.0484
6.0≤R<7.0	3	0.2793
7.0≤R<8.0	2	0.1862

Prepositioning Model of Emergency Supplies and Coordination Mechanism Considering Human Suffering Perception via an Option Contract

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