Abstract:

Disasters can easily damage the functionality of urban transportation infrastructure and even create the risk of systemic paralysis， thereby compromising its important role in urban operation. Therefore， it is necessary to study how to improve the post-disaster resilience governance. Existing research mainly focus on the single-agent decision-making of the government or operating companies， and limited consideration has been placed on the public （e.g.， their participation， cooperation and bargaining）. The disaster factors and public participation are incorporated into the decision making of transportation infrastructure’s post-disaster resilience governance， a dynamic game model is constructed for government and operating companies， and the effects of such a resilience governance structure and improvement strategies is discussed under different resource constraints. It is found that： （1） public scrutiny and government incentives are conducive to improving resilience， but in the case of a high disaster level， the effect of government incentives is reduced； and （2） government incentive policies and the operating company’s resilience governance plans should be adjusted according to resource constraints， namely， when resource constraints are too strict， incentives may fail. The interactive influence of multi-agent decision-making behavior and its impact on the post-disaster resilience level is revealed in the context of transportation infrastructure， and thus a robust decision-making underpinning for transportation infrastructure’ post-disaster resilience governance is provided.

Key words: transportation infrastructure, resilience governance, Stackelberg game, public participation, resource constraints