电商平台信息披露策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0355

中国管理科学 ›› 2022, Vol. 30 ›› Issue (5): 192-203.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0355cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0355

电商平台信息披露策略研究

余航^1,2, 田林³, 陈云⁴

1.暨南大学经济学院，广东广州510632； 2.广东顺德农村商业银行股份有限公司博士后科研工作站，广东佛山528300； 3.复旦大学管理学院，上海200433； 4.上海财经大学上海市金融信息技术研究重点实验室，上海200433

收稿日期:2019-03-16 修回日期:2019-10-31 出版日期:2022-05-20 发布日期:2022-05-28
通讯作者: 田林(1987-)，男(汉族)，湖北洪湖人，复旦大学管理学院,副教授，博士，研究方向：平台运营，Email: tianlin@fudan.edu.cn. E-mail:tianlin@fudan.edu.cn
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71922008；72091211)；国家社会科学基金资助项目(21CGL019)

Information Disclosure Strategies in the E-Commerce Platform

YU Hang^1,2, TIAN Lin³, CHEN Yun⁴

1. School of Economics, Jinan University, Guangzhou 510632, China; 2. Post-Doctoral Research Center, Guangdong Shunde Rural Commercial Bank Company Limited, Foshan 528300, China; 3. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China; 4. Shanghai University of Fiuance and Economics Shanghai Key Laboratory of Financial Information Technology, Shanghai 200433, China

Received:2019-03-16 Revised:2019-10-31 Online:2022-05-20 Published:2022-05-28
Contact: 田林 E-mail:tianlin@fudan.edu.cn

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 电商平台模式下，供应商决定产品价格将产品直接出售给消费者，并与平台企业共享收益。通常，消费者与产品供应商/平台企业在产品属性(匹配)信息上存在不对称性。本文基于博弈理论，研究电商平台(如：亚马逊、京东等)的产品信息披露策略，比较两种信息披露方式：“平台披露”与“供应商披露”。首先考虑由一个平台企业和一个供应商组成的垄断结构。研究表明，信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)的相对重要性。同时，与平台披露相比，供应商更愿意披露全部产品信息。然后考虑一个平台企业和两个供应商组成的竞争结构。研究发现，与垄断结构不同，平台披露下，平台总是披露全部产品信息；而供应商披露下，信息披露策略取决于产品属性(匹配)信息的相对价值。此外，平台会偏好由供应商负责信息披露。

关键词: 电商平台；信息披露；属性(匹配)信息；竞争

Abstract: In the e-commerce platform mode, the supplier determines the product price, sells the product directly to consumers and shares the revenue with the platform. Usually, there exists information asymmetry in product (matching) attributes between consumers and product suppliers/platforms. In reality, a consumer is not certain about whether his private taste matches a product unless firms provide some information, and he will make an expectation about his matchness for that product if no information is provided. To resolve consumers’ fit uncertainty, a seller faces two complicated issues: how to offer product information for consumers and how much?What makes this issue more complicated is that even platforms can directly disclose product information.

Key words: e-commerce platform; information disclosure; attribute (matching) information; competition

中图分类号:

F224

余航,田林,陈云. 电商平台信息披露策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2022, 30(5): 192-203.

YU Hang,TIAN Lin,CHEN Yun. Information Disclosure Strategies in the E-Commerce Platform[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2022, 30(5): 192-203.

参考文献

［1］ Hong K, Pavlou P. Product fit uncertainty in online markets: nature, effects, and antecedents［J］. Information Systems Research, 2014, 25(2):328-344.
［2］ Kim Y, Krishnan R. On product-level uncertainty and online purchase behavior: An empirical analysis［J］. Management Science, 2015, 61(10): 2449-2467.
［3］ Kwark Y, Chen J, Raghunathan S. Online product reviews: Implications for retailers and competing manufacturers［J］. Information Systems Research, 2014, 25(1):93-110.
［4］ Kwark Y, Chen J, Raghunathan S. Platform or wholesale? A strategic tool for online retailers to benefit from third-party information［J］. MIS Quarterly, 2017, 41(3):763-786.
［5］ Guo Liang. Quality disclosure formats in a distribution channel［J］. Management Science, 2009, 55(9):1513-1526.
［6］ Gu Zheyin, Xie Ying. Facilitating fit revelation in the competitive market［J］. Management Science，2013, 59(5):1196-1212.
［7］ Tadelis S, Zettelmeyer F. Information disclosure as a matching mechanism: theory and evidence from a field experiment［J］. American Economic Review, 2015, 105(2):886-905.
［8］ Tian L, Vakharia A, Tan Y, et al. Marketplace, reseller, or hybrid: A strategic analysis of emerging e-commerce model［J］. Production and Operations Management, 2018, 27(8):1595-1610.
［9］ Tan Y, Carrillo J. Strategic analysis of the agency model for digital goods［J］. Production and Operations Management, 2017, 26(4):724-741.
［10］ Guo Liang, Zhao Ying. Voluntary quality provision and market interaction［J］. Marketing Science, 2009, 28(3):488-501.
［11］ Kuksov D, Lin Y. Information provision in a vertically differentiated competitive marketplace［J］. Marketing Science, 2010, 29(1):122-138.
［12］周建亨, 赵瑞娟. 搭便车效应影响下双渠道供应链信息披露策略［J］. 系统工程理论与实践, 2016, 36(11):2839-2852.Zhou Jianheng, Zhao Ruijuan. Quality disclosure strategy in a dual-channel supply chain based on free-riding effect［J］ Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice, 2016, 36(11):2839-2852.
［13］张翠华, 孙莉莉. 双零售商动态博弈下分销渠道的质量信息披露策略研究［J］. 管理工程学报, 2012, 26(4):199-204.Zhang Cuihua, Zhao Lili. A quality disclosure strategy in a distribution channel based on two competitive retailers［J］. Journal of Industrial Engineering/Engineering Management, 2012, 26(4):199-204.
［14］ Bhardwaj P, Chen Y, Godes D. Buyer-Initiated vs. Seller-Initiated information revelation［J］.Management Science, 2008, 54(6):1104-1114.
［15］ Lewis T, Sappington D. Supplying information to facilitate price discrimination［J］. International Economic Review, 1994, 35(2):309-327.
［16］ Gu Zheyin, Liu Ying. Consumer fit search, retailer shelf layout, and channel interaction［J］. Marketing Science, 2013, 32(4):652-668.
［17］ Hao Lin, Tan Yong. Who wants consumers to be informed? Facilitating information disclosure in a distribution channel［J］. Information Systems Research, 2018, 30(1):34-49.
［18］ Sun M, Tyagi R. Product fit uncertainty and information provision in a distribution channel［J］. Production and Operations Management, 2020, 29(10):2381-2402.
［19］ Chen Yubo, Xie Jinhong. Online consumer review: word-of-mouth as a new element of marketing communication mix［J］. Management Science, 2008, 54(3):477-491.
［20］ Branco F, Sun M, Villas-Boas J. Too much information? Information provision and search costs［J］. Marketing Science, 2016, 35(4):605-618.
［21］ Branco F, Sun M, Villas-Boas J. Optimal search for product information［J］. Management Science, 2012, 58(11):2037-2056.
［22］ Dukes A, Liu L. Online shopping intermediaries: The strategic design of search environments［J］. Management Science, 2016, 62(4):1064-1077.
［23］ Ke T, Shen Z, Villas-Boas J. Search for information on multiple products［J］. Management Science, 2016, 62(12):3576-3603.
［24］ Anderson S, Renault R. Advertising content［J］. American Economic Review, 2006, 96(1): 93-113.
［25］ Liu Y, Cooper W, Wang Z. Information provision and pricing in the presence of consumer search costs［J］. Production and Operations Management, 2019, 28(7):1603-1620.
［26］李雷, 赵先德, 简兆权. 网络环境下平台企业的运营策略研究［J］. 管理科学学报, 2016, 19(3):15-32.Li Lei, Zhao Xiande, Jian Zhaoquan. Operation strategy of platform enterprises in network environments［J］. Journal of Management Sciences in China, 2016, 19(3):15-32.
［27］张立功, 郭晓龙, 韩东亚, 等. 考虑消费者网购体验滞后的产品定价研究［J］. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(3):77-84.Zhang Ligong, Guo Xiaolong, Han Dongya, et al. Optimal pricing strategy considering the effect of experience delay in online shopping［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(3):77-84.
［28］王芳, 叶作亮, 杨亦行. 在线零售商运营的关键成功因素实证研究［J］. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(s1):409-414.Wang Fang, Ye Zuoliang, Yang Yixing. The empirical analysis on CSFS of online retail stores［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2014, 22(s1):409-414.
［29］文悦, 王勇, 但斌, 等. 电商平台自营和制造商直销的多渠道竞争策略研究［J］. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(10):77-89.Wen Yue, Wang Yong, Dan Bin, et al. Research on multi-channel competition strategy considering introduction of self-operated channel by e-commerce platform and online direct channel by manufacturer［J］ Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(10):77-89.
［30］王玉燕, 于兆青. 基于电商平台销售的E-供应链主导模型与佣金协调机制研究［J］. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(5):109-118.Wang Yuyan, Yu Zhaoqing. Research on the dominant models and commission coordination mechanism of E-supply chain based on e-commerce sales platform［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(5):109-118.
［31］何彦东, 王旭, 周福礼, 等. 基于双边努力因素的网购供应链协调研究［J］. 中国管理科学, 2019, 27(2):83-92.He Yandong, Wang Xu, Zhou Fuli, et al. Coordination of online shopping supply chain based on bilateral effort factors［J］. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2019, 27(2):83-92.
［32］ Nelson P. Information and consumer behavior［J］. Journal of Political Economy, 1970, 78(2):311-329.

[1]	胡梦瑶, 李登峰. 双积分政策下汽车制造商的产量与充电基础设施投资联合决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(6): 103-116.
[2]	陈海军, 徐琪. 双边平台竞争下超级卖家的独家协议及其影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(6): 261-274.
[3]	丁龙, 关旭, 常珊. 保持神秘还是公开透明？奢侈品的质量披露策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(5): 123-133.
[4]	张文明, 孔文静, 张湘玥. k阶设备更新问题的在线策略设计与竞争分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(5): 144-152.
[5]	陈绍刚, 穆宇杰. 多物品持久型一口价拍卖双方参与者策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(5): 35-43.
[6]	彭正银, 孙莹, 李妍, 车响午. 基于Myerson值优化的企业创新网络共创价值分配研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(5): 351-359.
[7]	吕文蓉, 单而芳, 刘涛, 吕建林. 基于一致性的联盟Banzhaf值的刻画及其在产业联盟创新收益分配中的应用[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(5): 86-96.
[8]	李敏强, 苑楠, 冯海洋. 软件平台跟进性技术投资策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(4): 231-242.
[9]	张玲红, 夏雨微, 朱立龙. 考虑电动汽车销售目标的最优充电站数量与政府补贴决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(4): 343-357.
[10]	赵树然, 李金宸, 张洁, 任培民. 高频网络波动率矩阵模型构建及其应用[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(3): 122-133.
[11]	王玉燕, 高俊宏, 孙煜林, 崔莹. 基于“搭便车”引发需求转移和质量感知的双渠道供应链服务与定价研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(3): 253-262.
[12]	冯颖, 王舒婷, 张炎治. 物流外包下商务模式对生鲜农产品供应链运作的影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(3): 263-274.
[13]	李犟, 吴和成, 王励文. 考虑不确定性的共同权重鲁棒DEA模型及其应用研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(3): 333-344.
[14]	周礼南, 周根贵, 郑健壮, 张鲁光. 考虑消费者异质性偏好的定制绿色农产品供应链均衡研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(2): 275-286.
[15]	姚锋敏, 谭琦, 李涛, 刘斌. 链与链竞争环境下的供应链CSR捐赠决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(2): 287-297.

电商平台信息披露策略研究

Information Disclosure Strategies in the E-Commerce Platform

PDF (PC)

可视化

摘要/Abstract

引用本文

使用本文

参考文献

相关文章 15

Metrics

本文评价

推荐阅读 0