双积分政策下汽车制造商的产量与充电基础设施投资联合决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1056

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

针对双寡头垄断市场结构，本文对传统汽车制造商与新能源电动汽车（NEV）制造商在产量竞争和充电基础设施投资合作展开研究。通过构建并求解非合作-合作两型博弈模型，揭示制造商如何确定最佳的生产与投资方案，并实现利润的合理分配。理论分析与数值分析得出以下结论：1）NEV与燃油汽车（FV）之间的替代率显著影响制造商的产量与充电基础设施投资决策；2）充电服务费调整需分阶段实施，当NEV替代率较低时，降低服务费可有效扩大NEV市场规模并驱动传统制造商转型，高替代率阶段则应避免过度干预；3）双积分政策效果随替代率变化不同，NEV积分值与交易价格对低替代率市场具有正向激励，但高替代率下将产生政策效力反转，且NEV积分价格敏感性高于积分值变化；4）充电基础设施补贴在NEV普及初期效果明显，但随着替代率提升，补贴边际效益逐渐下降。本研究拓展了双积分政策对制造商生产决策影响的分析，深化充电基础设施投资在竞争与合作环境中的战略作用，为政策制定与企业实践提供了理论依据及决策参考。

关键词: 新能源电动汽车, 燃油汽车, 充电基础设施投资, 非合作-合作两型博弈, 双积分政策

Abstract:

The production competition and charging infrastructure investment collaboration strategies between traditional automobile manufacturers and new energy vehicle （NEV） manufacturers under a dual oligopoly market structure are investigated. By constructing and solving both non-cooperative cooperative biform game model， how manufacturers determine the optimal production and investment strategies is revealed， as well as how profits are reasonably distributed. Theoretical and numerical analyses lead to the following conclusions： 1） The substitution rate between NEVs and fuel vehicles （FVs） significantly impacts manufacturers' production and charging infrastructure investment decisions； 2） Adjustments to charging service fees should be implemented in stages. When the NEV substitution rate is low， reducing service fees can effectively expand the NEV market and drive traditional manufacturers to transition. However， in the high substitution rate phase， excessive intervention should be avoided； 3） The effectiveness of the dual credit policy varies with the substitution rate. NEV credit values and trading prices have a positive incentive effect in low substitution rate markets， but their effectiveness reverses in high substitution rate markets. Additionally， the sensitivity of NEV credit price changes is higher than that of credit value changes； 4） Charging infrastructure subsidies have a significant effect during the early stages of NEV adoption， but their marginal benefits gradually decline as the substitution rate increases. The analysis of the impact of the dual credit policy on manufacturers' production decisions is expanded， the strategic role of charging infrastructure investment in a competitive cooperation environment is deepened， and theoretical foundations and decision-making references for policymakers and industry practitioners are provided.

Key words: new energy vehicles, fuel vehicle, charging infrastructure investment, noncooperative-cooperative biform game, dual?credit policy

中图分类号:

F224

胡梦瑶,李登峰. 双积分政策下汽车制造商的产量与充电基础设施投资联合决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(6): 103-116.

Mengyao Hu,Dengfeng Li. The Joint Decisions of Automakers' Production and Charging Infrastructure Investment Under the Double Credit Policy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(6): 103-116.

图/表 5

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