考虑网络效应和匹配能力投资的网约车平台定价决策研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2024.1117

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

在匹配能力可提升和网络效应影响下，考虑乘客与司机对价格和转换成本感知的差异，构建博弈模型，探讨网约车平台的双边定价决策。研究发现：（1）当乘客和司机均为转换成本敏感型或均为价格敏感型时，随着服务水平提升成本系数的增大，平台应降低服务价格和司机佣金。（2）当乘客为价格敏感型而司机为转换成本敏感型时，或当乘客为转换成本敏感型而司机为价格敏感型时，若乘客（司机）边的网络外部性系数大于一定阈值，平台对乘客（司机）收取的服务价格（司机佣金）随着服务水平提升成本系数和服务水平提升成本的增加而增加；当乘客（司机）边的网络外部性系数小于一定阈值时，平台对乘客（司机）收取的服务价格（司机佣金）随着服务水平提升成本系数和服务水平提升成本的增加而降低。（3）随着平台服务水平提升成本的增加，平台两边用户规模均增加。（4）当乘客/司机加入平台可获得的基础效用大于一定阈值时，平台利润随着服务水平提升成本的增大而增大；反之，平台利润随着服务水平提升成本的增大而减小。

关键词: 网约车平台, 匹配能力, 网络外部性, 定价

Abstract:

In recent years， the growing demand for user travel has driven the rapid development of ride-hailing platforms. However， despite the continuous expansion of the user base and the increasing number of drivers， the phenomenon of “drivers without orders and passengers unable to hail a ride” remains prevalent in the ride-hailing market. To enhance ride-hailing efficiency and improve driver order acceptance rates， platforms are continuously optimizing their matching algorithms. These platforms aim to facilitate better transactions between drivers and passengers through dynamic pricing， thereby achieving more efficient supply-demand matching. The enhancement of supply-demand matching capabilities in ride-hailing platforms directly strengthens the cross-side network effects between the driver and passenger ends， increasing the utility for both passengers and drivers who join the platform. This， in turn， influences the platform's pricing decisions for its bilateral user base. However， investments in matching capabilities also result in higher operational costs for the platform. Consequently， it is becoming increasingly crucial for ride-hailing platforms to optimize their bilateral pricing strategies while simultaneously enhancing their matching capabilities to improve overall revenue.In addition， passengers often have different preferences for switching cost attributes and price attributes in different scenarios. For example， on ride-hailing platforms， passengers are more sensitive to switching cost attributes such as learning costs and account information transfer involved in switching to a new platform， while drivers are more sensitive to price attributes. Currently， there are relatively few pricing decisions for ride-hailing platforms that take into account the different preferences of passengers and drivers. However， as the ability of platforms to match supply and demand improves， the impact of user preference differences on platform pricing decisions becomes more important. Therefore， studying the pricing decisions of ride-hailing platforms in this situation is of great importance.Given the differences in perceived prices and switching costs between passengers and drivers， a game-theoretic model is constructed to explore the bilateral pricing of ride-hailing platforms in the context of matching ability can be improved and network effects can be observed. It is found that：（1） When both passengers and drivers are switching cost-sensitive or both passengers and drivers are price-sensitive， the platform should lower prices for passengers and drivers as the cost coefficient for the service level improvement increases. （2） When passengers are price-sensitive and drivers are switching-cost-sensitive， or when passengers are switching-cost-sensitive and drivers are price-sensitive， if the network effect on the passenger （driver） side is greater than a certain threshold， the platform's optimal pricing for the passenger （driver） increases with the increase of cost coefficient for the service level improvement and the service improvement cost. When the network externality on the passenger （driver） side is less than a certain threshold， the platform should decrease its pricing for the passenger （driver） with the increase of cost coefficient for the service level improvement and the service improvement cost. （3） As the cost of platform matching services increases， the scale of users on both sides of the platform increases. （4） When the basic utility that passengers/drivers can obtain by joining the platform exceeds a certain threshold， the platform’s profit increases with the increase of matching ability and cost. In contrast， the platform’s profit decreases with the increase of matching ability and cost.

Key words: ride-hailing platforms, matching ability, network effects, pricing

中图分类号:

F062.9

黄虹富,李静,李莉, 等. 考虑网络效应和匹配能力投资的网约车平台定价决策研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2026, 34(7): 127-144.

Hongfu Huang,Jing Li,Li Li, et al. Research on the Pricing of Ride-hailing Platforms Considering Network Effects and Matching Ability Investments[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2026, 34(7): 127-144.

图/表 23

图1

表1

重要参数说明"

参数类型	参数符号	含义
决策变量	$φ b$	网约车平台对单个乘客收取的服务价格
决策变量	$φ s$	网约车平台对单个司机抽取的佣金
其他变量	$V$	乘客/司机加入平台可获得的基础效用
	$α b, α s$	乘客/司机边的基础交叉网络外部性强度
	$n b, n s$	乘客/司机的数量
	$x b, x s$	乘客/司机转换成本的异质性
	$δ ∈ 0,1$	显著属性的相对权重被扭曲程度
	$C$	平台匹配能力提升付出的成本
	$k 0 < k < 1$	平台匹配能力提升对网络外部性的影响系数

表1

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