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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (7): 106-116.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.0948

• • 上一篇    

考虑技术溢出效应的新能源汽车供应链纵向合作研发决策研究

张玲红1(), 史文策2, 尤建新3   

  1. 1.山东师范大学商学院,山东 济南 250014
    2.上海大学管理学院,上海 200444
    3.同济大学经济与管理学院,上海 200092
  • 收稿日期:2023-06-09 修回日期:2024-06-06 出版日期:2026-07-25 发布日期:2026-06-18
  • 通讯作者: 张玲红 E-mail:zhanglinghong2005@126.com

The Optimal Vertical Cooperation R&D Decisions in the New Energy Vehicle Supply Chain Considering Technology Spillover Effects

Linghong Zhang1(), Wence Shi2, Jianxin You3   

  1. 1.School of Business,Shandong Normal University,Shandong,Ji’nan 250014,China
    2.School of Management,Shanghai University,Shanghai 200444,China
    3.School of Economics and Management,Tongji University,Shanghai 200092,China
  • Received:2023-06-09 Revised:2024-06-06 Online:2026-07-25 Published:2026-06-18
  • Contact: Linghong Zhang E-mail:zhanglinghong2005@126.com

摘要:

针对新能源汽车电池创新的高成本与供给短缺的现实困境,考虑一个电池供应商与两个竞争整车制造商的纵向合作研发策略,通过构建不合作、合作与合作时产生技术溢出效应3种不同情形下新能源汽车供应链研发的博弈模型,探讨研发合作的适用条件及不同情形下供应商与竞争整车制造商的最优决策。研究结果表明:(1)合作研发未必显著提升电池续航性能,尤其在制造商通过谈判获得较低电池批发价格的情境下,供应商可能缺乏合作激励,进而导致其选择不参与或采取消极合作策略。(2)技术溢出效应未必能提升非合作研发情形下的电池续航性能,其效果取决于电池批发价格、消费者对续航里程的敏感度以及市场中的价格竞争强度等关键参数的取值。(3)对于合作研发的制造商而言,合作研发投入越多,制造商从合作中获取利润的可能性越大,并且随着技术溢出效应的增大,制造商需要投入更多的资金才能保证从合作研发中获利。(4)合作研发未必同时提升供应商及两家制造商的利润,然而,在特定参数区域内,三方均有可能从技术溢出效应中获益。

关键词: 电池续航里程, 纵向研发合作, 技术溢出效应, 电池供应商, 竞争整车制造商

Abstract:

With the rapid development of the electric vehicle (EV) industry, competition among original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) is intensifying. As a core component of EVs, the range of batteries affects the demand for electric vehicles. To ensure the supply of high-range batteries, many OEMs collaborate with battery suppliers on R&D. However, whether cooperation between vehicle manufacturers and suppliers can effectively improve battery range and thereby increase profits for both parties remain need to explore. In a supply chain consisting of a single battery supplier and two competing OEMs, considering customers’ sensitivity toward battery range, the optimal decisions of supply chain members when the supplier independently develops batteries are investigated. Next, the optimal decisions of the three parties are considered when manufacturer 1 collaborates with the supplier on battery R&D, while manufacturer 2 does not participate in the cooperation. Finally, the technology spillover effect is introduced when manufacturer 1 collaborates with the supplier and the impact of the technology spillover effect on the decisions of supply chain members is explored. The game sequence in the model is as follows: in the first stage, the battery supplier decides the range of batteries 1 and 2 to maximize its own profit; in the second stage, vehicle manufacturers 1 and 2 decide the EV prices to maximizing their own profits. The optimal battery range and electric vehicle prices under the three models are obtained using the backward induction method. Further, the impact of parameters such as customer sensitivity to battery range, price competition, and technology spillover effect on optimal decisions are analyzed, and the changes in optimal decisions and profits of supply chain members under the three scenarios are compared. Finally, through parameter simulation, numerical experiments are conducted. The main finding are: (1) cooperation on R&D does not necessarily lead to significant improvements in battery range, especially when manufacturers negotiate lower wholesale battery prices. In such cases, suppliers may lack the incentive to engage in cooperation, potentially resulting in non-participation or passive collaboration strategies; (2) technological spillover effects do not inherently enhance battery range in the absence of collaborative R&D. Their impact depends on key parameters such as the wholesale battery price, consumer sensitivity to driving range, and the intensity of price competition in the market; (3) for manufacturers engaged in collaborative R&D, greater investment in cooperation increases the likelihood of obtaining profits. However, as the technological spillover effect intensifies, manufacturers must invest more resources to ensure profitability from collaborative R&D; (4) collaborative R&D does not necessarily improve the profits of both the supplier and the two manufacturers. Nevertheless, within specific parameter regions, all three parties may benefit from technological spillovers.

Key words: battey range, vertical collaborative r&d, technology spillover effect, battery supplier, competitive EV manufacturers

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