政府补贴下订单农业供应链的内部融资决策

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0183

摘要/Abstract

摘要：

订单农业供应链，常借助于多种金融工具，从根本上缓解农业生产的资金压力，保障订单农业下市场供需的平衡和各主体的利益，是近年来研究的热点领域之一。不同于较多文献中的公司视角，本文从政府视角出发，考虑在“公司+农户”型订单农业模式下，公司向资金短缺的农户提供生产农资这一定向融资服务，着力研究政府如何通过制定贷款贴息补贴政策，实现该供应链和社会福利的优化。具体地，本文构建了三个决策模型：无融资模型（NF）、无政府贴息下的生产农资融资模型（FNS）和政府贴息下的生产农资融资模型（FS），分别以农户种植量、公司收购价格、融资比例和政府补贴贴息比例为决策变量，系统地对比了农户与公司在这三个模型中的决策和利润，发现：（1）政府补贴可以从整体上提升社会福利，但其效果受到农户自有资金量的影响，需要对其进行分类并差异化地制定补贴比例；（2）政府的贴息补贴对于第一和第二类农户的增产增收和社会总福利的增长等效果明显，但该策略并不适合于第三类农户；（3）尽管政府的贴息补贴策略对于第二类农户有正面的促进作用，但是公司会利用其强势地位，压低收购价格来限制农户利润增长，攫取贴息补贴的红利。基于此，面对第二类农户，本文提出了改进思路——贴息补贴辅以最低收购价策略，并给出了收购价参数范围。政府利用该方案可以通过控制收购价，在不改变农户的决策和社会总福利的情况下，调整和平衡公司与农户间的利润比例，进一步保障订单农业供应链的稳定和发展。本研究为政府制定多样化、针对性的农业政策提供决策参考。

关键词: 订单农业供应链, 生产农资融资, 自有资金, 政府补贴政策

Abstract:

Contract farming supply chain is one of the popular research areas in recent years， which can use different financial instruments to fundamentally relieve the financial pressure of agricultural production， and ensure the balance of supply and demand in the market. However， the risk-averse characteristic of farmers curbs their willingness to finance when they face with financing and interest rates. In order to relieve the pressure on farmers' interest rates and increase farmers' willingness to finance， the government has been implementing some subsidy policies. Based on this， this paper considers a contract farming supply chain consisting of a company， a farmer and the government. In this model， the company signs a contract with the farmer， agreeing to purchase all of the farmer's agricultural products at the end of the production period. At the same time， the company provides the farmer who is limited capital production financing aimed to help the farmer purchase agricultural materials such as seeds and fertilizers. In addition， the government provides interest subsidy at the end of the production period to relieve the pressure on the farmer's interest rates （i.e.， a subsidy is paid to the farmer based on the amount of the financing after the production period）. Different from the company's perspective in many literatures， this paper aims to explore how government influences the quantity planted by farmer and purchasing price of company to improve the supply chain and social welfare by formulating loan subsidies in the “company + farmer” mode of contract farming. And different from the simple assumption about farmers' initial capital in many literatures on supply chain financing， this paper classifies farmers based on the amount of their own capital. Specifically， three decision models are developed： no financing model （NF）， financing model without government subsidy （FNS）， and financing model with government subsidy （FS）， in which production quantity， purchasing price， financing ratio， and government subsidy discount ratio are considered as decision variables. Given different own capital scenarios， the decisions made by the different participants are compared， and a differentiated government subsidy policy is proposed. The main findings include：（1） government subsidy can improve social welfare， but the effects are affected by the amount of farmer's capital， which implies the necessity of setting differential subsidy ratio based on classification of production funds；（2） government subsidy is more significant for the first and second type of farmers to increase production and income and improve social welfare， but it is not suitable for the third type of farmers；（3） for the second type of farmers， the company would suppress the purchase price to limit the profit growth of farmers and capture the benefits of the subsidy. Based on this， an improved government subsidy solution integrating the discount subsidy and a minimum purchasing price strategy is proposed. The range of key purchasing price parameters was offered， which can help the government adjust the profit proportion between company and farmer， and further guarantee the stability and development of the contract farming supply chain. This paper provides a decision reference for the government to formulate diversified and targeted agricultural policies.

Key words: contract farming supply chain, production materials financing, own capital, government subsidy policy

中图分类号:

F274

李琳,卢永康. 政府补贴下订单农业供应链的内部融资决策[J]. 中国管理科学, 2025, 33(12): 274-284.

Lin Li,Yongkang Lu. Internal Financing Decision of Contract Farming Supply Chain Under Government Subsidy[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2025, 33(12): 274-284.

图/表 7

图1

表1

无融资决策均衡结果表"

$K$ 的范围	$q N F *$	$w N F *$	$π f N F *$	$π c N F *$
$K ≥ K 0$	$Q 0$	$c 1 + c 2 Q 0$	$K 1$	$a - c 1 Q 0 2$
$K < K 0$	$Δ - c 1 c 2$	$Δ$	$Δ - c 1 2 2 c 2$	$Δ - c 1 b c 1 + a c 2 - b + c 2 Δ c 22$

表1

表2

不提供补贴的生产农资融资均衡结果表"

$K$ 的范围	$q F N S *$	$w F N S *$	$α F N S *$	$π f F N S *$	$π c F N S *$
$K 1 ≤ K < K 0$	$Q 0$	$(1 + r) c 1 + (2 + r) c 2 Q 0 2 - K r Q 0$	$1 - 2 K - c 2 Q 02 2 Q 0 c 1$	$K 1$	$a - c 1 Q 0 2$
$K < K 1$	$Q 1$	$c 2 Q 1 + (1 + r) c 1$	$1$	$K$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - 2 K b + c 2 c 2$

表2

表3

提供补贴的生产农资融资均衡结果表"

$K$ 的范围	$q F S$	$w F S$	$α F S$	$π f F S$	$π c F S$
$K 2 ≤ K < K 0$	$Q 2$	$(1 + (1 - λ) r) c 1 + c 2 Q 2$	1	$K 2$	$a - c 1 Q 2 + λ r c 1 Q 2 2$
$K 1 ≤ K < K 2$	$Q 1$	$c 2 Q 1 + (1 + (1 - λ) r) c 1$	$1$	$K$	$(a - (1 - r λ) c 1) Q 1 - 2 K b + c 2 c 2$
$K < K 1$	$Q 1$	$c 2 Q 1 + (1 + (1 - λ) r) c 1$	$1$	$K$	$(a - (1 - r λ) c 1) Q 1 - 2 K b + c 2 c 2$

表3

图2

表4

定理2（1）情况下政府参与决策后均衡结果表"

$K$ 的范围	$q F S *$	$w F S *$	$π f F S *$	$π c F S *$	$S W F S *$
$4 K 1 ≤ K < K 0$	$2 Q 0$	$1 + r c 1 - 2 b Q 0$	$4 K 1$	$2 a - c 1 Q 0$	$a - c 1 Q 0$
$K 1 ≤ K < 4 K 1$	$Q 1$	$a + r c 1 - (2 b + c 2) Q 1$	$K$	$2 K b + c 2 c 2$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - K b + c 2 c 2$
$K < K 1$	$Q 1$	$c 2 Q 1 + (1 + r) c 1$	$K$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - 2 K b + c 2 c 2$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - K b + c 2 c 2$

表4

表5

定理2（2）情况下政府参与决策后均衡结果表"

$K$ 的范围	$q F S *$	$w F S *$	$π f F S *$	$π c F S *$	$S W F S *$
$K 3 ≤ K < K 0$	$Q 3$	$c 1 + c 2 Q 3$	$K 3$	$a - (1 - r) c 1 Q 3 2$	$3 a - 3 + r c 1 Q 3 4$
$K 1 ≤ K < K 3$	$Q 1$	$a + r c 1 - (2 b + c 2) Q 1$	$K$	$2 K b + c 2 c 2$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - K b + c 2 c 2$
$K < K 1$	$Q 1$	$c 2 Q 1 + (1 + r) c 1$	$K$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - 2 K b + c 2 c 2$	$(a - c 1) Q 1 - K b + c 2 c 2$

表5

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