供应商和销售商拥有部分信息的信息共享

中国管理科学 ›› 2012, Vol. ›› Issue (1): 109-116.

供应商和销售商拥有部分信息的信息共享

张菊亮^1,2, 章祥荪²

1. 北京交通大学经管学院,北京 100044;
2. 清华大学现代管理研究中心,北京 100084;
3.中国科学院数学与系统科学研究院,北京 100080

收稿日期:2010-04-07 修回日期:2011-10-10 出版日期:2012-02-29 发布日期:2012-03-09
基金资助:
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71072029,71132008);教育部人文社会科学重点研究基地基金资助项目(11JJD630004)

Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Supplier and Retailer's Partial Information

ZHANG Ju-liang^1,2, ZHANG Xiang-sun²

1. School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing 100044, China;
2. Research Center for Contemporany Managent, Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084,China;
3. Academy of Mathematics and System Sciences, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100080, China

Received:2010-04-07 Revised:2011-10-10 Online:2012-02-29 Published:2012-03-09

摘要/Abstract

摘要： 本文研究供应链纵向信息共享。考虑由一个生产商和一个销售商组成的供应链,生产商和供应商都拥有部分市场信息。生产商首先根据自己的信息决定批发价,销售商根据批发价和自己的信息决定零售价。本文利用三阶段主从对策为这一问题建模,证明了双方都不愿意共享信息是唯一的均衡。进一步还证明了不完全确定情形下供应链的利润比完全确定情形下的供应链利润还高。这就说明,如果在决策上没有相应的协调机制,信息共享不能增加供应链的利润。

关键词: 信息共享, 供应链, 主从对策, 均衡

Abstract: This paper addresses the vertical information sharing problem in a supply chain which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer. Both of them possess partial information about market. First the manufacturer sets the wholesale price based on his information and then the retailer sets the retail price based on her information and the wholesale price. This problem can be modeled as a three-stage leader-follower game. It is shown that the unique equilibrium of the game is to share no information. Moreover, the supply chain profit in the uncertain environment is larger than that in the certain case. This implies that information sharing cannot improve the efficiency and effectiveness of supply chain if there is no coordinative mechanism on the member's decisions.

Key words: information sharing, supply chain, leader-follower game, equilibrium

中图分类号:

F224
F274

张菊亮,章祥荪. 供应商和销售商拥有部分信息的信息共享[J]. 中国管理科学, 2012, (1): 109-116.

ZHANG Ju-liang,ZHANG Xiang-sun. Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Supplier and Retailer's Partial Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (1): 109-116.

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