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中国管理科学 ›› 2026, Vol. 34 ›› Issue (3): 57-68.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1980cstr: 32146.14.j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1980

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考虑韧性的平台融资模式选择、冲突与机制设计

刘露(), 胡磊, 姜涛, 姜力文   

  1. 山东科技大学经济管理学院,山东 青岛 266590
  • 收稿日期:2023-11-29 修回日期:2024-05-03 出版日期:2026-03-25 发布日期:2026-03-06
  • 通讯作者: 刘露 E-mail:LiuLu_77@126.com
  • 基金资助:
    国家自然科学基金项目(72272089);泰山学者工程专项经费项目(tsqn202312191);山东省社会科学规划研究项目(25DGLJ26)

Selection, Conflict, and Mechanism Design of Platform Financing with Resilience Considerations

Lu Liu(), Lei Hu, Tao Jiang, Liwen Jiang   

  1. College of Economics and Management,Shandong University of Science and Technology,Qingdao 266590,China
  • Received:2023-11-29 Revised:2024-05-03 Online:2026-03-25 Published:2026-03-06
  • Contact: Lu Liu E-mail:LiuLu_77@126.com

摘要:

在复杂多变的发展环境中,韧性因素对于平台供应链融资模式选择具有重要影响。本文建立由电商平台、生产商和资金约束零售商组成的决策模型,分析电商平台和零售商在需求中断风险环境中数字授信、担保授信和贸易信用三种融资模式间的供给和选择策略,双方的融资供需冲突及化解机制。研究结果表明:当零售商初始资金较少且产品生产成本较高时,电商平台偏好贸易信用模式;当零售商初始资金较少且产品生产成本较低时,电商平台在零售商韧性较高和较低时,分别偏好数字授信和担保授信模式;当零售商初始资金较多时,电商平台再次选择贸易信用模式。初始资金处于少、中和多的零售商分别选择贸易信用、担保授信和数字授信模式。本文设计利率动态调节机制缓解电商平台和零售商融资供需冲突并实现双方共赢。研究为考虑韧性的平台融资模式选择和冲突化解提供策略方法。

关键词: 平台融资, 资金约束, 供应链韧性, 模式选择, 机制设计

Abstract:

E-commerce platform plays a key role in alleviating the financing difficulties of small and medium-sized enterprises in the digital economy era. Meanwhile, in a complex and ever-changing development environment, resilience factors have a significant impact on the stability of capital flow and the selection of financing models for platform supply chains. It systematically explores financing supply and selection strategies in the platform supply chain, conflicts between strategies, and proposes corresponding conflict resolution mechanisms in this study. A decision-making system consisting of an e-commerce platform, a manufacturer, and a retailer is constructed that faces the risk of demand interruption and has a certain resilience to resist risks. The e-commerce platform provides digital credit financing and guarantee credit financing for the financially constrained retailer. Meanwhile, the manufacturer provides trade credit financing to the retailer. First, it explores the optimal financing supply strategy of the e-commerce platform and the optimal financing selection strategy of the retailer. Second, the strategic conflict between financing supply and financing choice is analyzed. Finally, the interest rate dynamic adjustment mechanism is designed to resolve the conflict between financing supply and demand.The results show that when the initial capital of the retailer is low and the production cost of the products is high, the e-commerce platform can obtain the highest profit in trade credit financing. When the initial capital of the retailer is low and the production cost of the product is low, the platform prefers to provide digital credit financing and guarantee credit financing when the resilience is high and low, respectively. When the initial capital of the retailer is high, the best choice for the e-commerce platform is trade credit financing. Retailers with low, medium and high initial capital prefer to select trade credit, guarantee credit and digital credit financing models respectively. The dynamic interest rate adjustment mechanism designed in this research can effectively alleviate the financing choice conflicts between e-commerce platform and retailer and achieve win-win situation for both sides. Methodological tools and strategic recommendations for selecting financing models and resolving financing conflicts in the platform supply chain with resilience considerations are provided in this study.

Key words: platform financing, capital constraints, supply chain resilience, model selection, mechanism design

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