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中国管理科学

中国管理科学 ›› 2006, Vol. ›› Issue (2): 77-81.

• 论文 • 上一篇    下一篇

不同质量权重评分规则下的多维招标机制设计

周蓉, 张韩, 王昊   

  1. 复旦大学管理学院, 上海, 200433
  • 收稿日期:2005-05-08 修回日期:2005-12-11 出版日期:2006-04-28 发布日期:2012-03-07

On Multidimensional Auctions Mechanism Design under Different Quality Preference Scoring Rule

ZHANG Han, ZHOU Rong, WANG Hao   

  1. School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China
  • Received:2005-05-08 Revised:2005-12-11 Online:2006-04-28 Published:2012-03-07

PDF (PC)

1859

被引次数

9

摘要： 本文主要研究包括价格变量及非价格变量(质量)的多维招标机制设计,在Che模型评分规则的基础上引入新的参数,研究了赋予质量不同权重的第一高分和第二高分招标机制的均衡情况。研究发现,不管新参数如何变化,第一高分招标和第二高分招标是等价的。在该评分规则下,买方还可以灵活根据自己的质量偏好、设定质量门槛筛选企业。如果买方和中标企业在中标后有协调机制,则能实现共赢、社会福利的最大化。

关键词: 多维招标, 第一高分招标, 第二高分招标, 评分规则, 最优机制

Abstract: This article studies the design of multidimensional auctions,when firms bid on both price and non-price(quality).We have built a new scoring rule on the basis of Che Model's by adding a parameter,and studied the equilibrium of the first-score auction and secondscore auction ulnder different quality preference.The results show that the first-score auction and second-score auction are equivalent no matter how the new parameter changes.Under the new scoring rule,the buyer can easily build the quality threshold and choose the firm according to his own quality preference.If the coordination mechanism exists after some firm wins,win-win will come true and it will maximize the social welfare.

Key words: multidimensional, optimal mechanism, first-score auction, second-score auction

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