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主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
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Table of Content

    20 June 2019, Volume 27 Issue 6 Previous Issue    Next Issue
    Articles
    Housing Price Volatility, Housing Credit, and Macroprudential Policy
    ZHANG Li-deng, TANG Qi-ming, ZHANG Yu-hang
    2019, 27 (6):  1-9.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.001
    Abstract ( 688 )   PDF (1282KB) ( 682 )   Save
    The existing literature does not take housing credit default into a general analysis framework, albeit the subprime crisis proved that it would lead to systemic risk. By implanting the idiosyncratic housing shock and housing credit default into a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, the spillover effects of housing price volatility are explored and the supervisory effects of macroprudential policy on housing credit are studied. Based on China's actual data, the following conclusions are drawn from the simulation analysis:The spillovers from the housing market to the broader economy are concentrated on consumption rather than output and inflation, the spillover effect on the financial system is greater than the broader economy. The fluctuation of housing price will increase the default rate of housing credit and reduce the supply of housing credit for commercial banks. The dynamic capital adequacy ratio targeting the expansion of housing credit can effectively control credit risk, and the short-term effect is even more pronounced. The housing price volatility shock and interest rate shock are the main cause of fluctuations in China's housing credit.
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    Share Pledge and Market Value Management: Empirical Test Based on Companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Markets
    SONG Yan, SONG Shuang
    2019, 27 (6):  10-20.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.002
    Abstract ( 605 )   PDF (1140KB) ( 375 )   Save
    Due to the increasing investment opportunities of enterprises, share pledge has also attracted more and more attention from enterprises and investors. When there are capital requirements for controlling shareholders of listed companies, with low cost, strong liquidity and high efficiency, share pledge has become one of the preferred financing methods for controlling shareholders. However, this is not without risk. Because of the uncertainty of the value of the pledge equity and the immaturity of the securities market, once the stock market environment changes, such as abnormal or continuous fluctuations in stock prices, if the controlling shareholder fails to make up the value of the pledge in time, controlling shareholders will be forced to liquidate or even transfer control, thus triggering the risk of corporate governance. In the face of frequent incidents of default in the capital market, how will listed companies with share pledge reduce the risk of pledge is worth studying.
    In this paper,the main problems of this study are divided into two aspects. First,compared with other enterprises, whether controlling shareholders are more likely to have market value management after share pledge. Second, after the occurrence of share pledge, whether controlling shareholders adopt equity incentive to manage market capitalization. The initial sample is selected from all listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2012 to 2016. In order to ensure the integrity and continuity of data, the financial industry, St, *st and outliers and missing values are excluded. 12829 sample data are obtained, while all statistics are from the CSMAR database, whose raw data were processed.
    In this paper, the relationship between equity pledge and market value management is analyzed through OLS multiple regression model. Then, by simultaneous equations, we examine the transmission mechanism between share pledge, equity incentive and market value management among the three are examined.
    The empirical results in this paper show that, first, the coefficient between market value management and share pledge is positive, which has a significant positive correlation at 1% significant level. Compared with companies without share pledge, controlling shareholders are more likely to carry out market value management to avoid abnormal fluctuation of stock price after pledge. Second, The coefficient between market value management and share pledge is positive and has a significant positive correlation at 1% level; the correlation coefficient between equity incentive and share pledge is positive and has a significant positive correlation at 1% level; the regression of the last three variables in one equation is also positively correlated with the level of 1%. This indicates that the mediation effect is valid.
    The research contributions of this paper are embodied in the following three aspects:first, taking share pledge as explanatory variable, and using market value management as explanatory variable, the direct correlation between the two, enriching the research on the motivation of market value management is studied; secondly, taking event behavior-economic-consequences as research paradigm, and taking equity incentive as an intermediary variable, the transmission mechanism between share pledge, equity incentive and market value management among the three is explored; thirdly, the understanding of investors on the share pledge is deepened, which is of reference significance for the government and regulatory departments to formulate relevant policies.
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    The Influence of Control Strategy on the Stability of Affiliated Enterprises Network -Based on the Perspective of Associated Credit Contagion
    QIAN Qian, ZHOU Zong-fang, LI Yong-kui
    2019, 27 (6):  21-29.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.003
    Abstract ( 459 )   PDF (1228KB) ( 376 )   Save
    With the rapid development of economic and financial market, the associated credit risk is widespread in the affiliated enterprises. Associated credit risk control strategy has been widely considered as a hot but difficult problem in the credit risk management. Based on the epidemic model and complex network theory, the influence of control strategy on the associated credit contagion and the stability of the affiliated enterprise network are discussed. The results show that the control strategy is an important factor affecting the stability of the affiliated enterprise network. Simulation analysis illustrates:First, when the network of affiliated enterprise is risk stable, control strategy is proved to be valid in making the network achieve risk-free stability; Second, when the network of affiliated enterprise is in risk-free stable situation, the use of control strategy can help to shorten the time to be in risk-free stable, and can also reduce the peak value of infected enterprises in the process of credit contagion; Finally, under certain conditions, the treatment strategy is shown to be more effective than the immunization strategy in the control of the associated credit risk. The study of this paper has theoretical and practical significance to prevent and control the contagion of associated credit risk in the affiliated enterprise network.
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    Channel Selection and Financing Strategy with a Risk-averse Manufacturer under the Capital Constraint
    CAO Zong-hong, ZHANG Cheng-tang, ZHAO Ju, MIN Jie
    2019, 27 (6):  30-40.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.004
    Abstract ( 498 )   PDF (1218KB) ( 409 )   Save
    With the rapid development of e-commerce, many manufacturers have opened their direct channels besides traditional retail channels. When a direct channel is established, opportunities and threats coexist. From the manufacturer's perspectives, running a direct channel cannot only directly improve the profitability, but also enhance the bargaining power with retailers. However, as an emerging sale channel, the demand in the direct channel may be instability and unreliability. Thus, the manufacturer needs to consider the risk arising from the uncertainty of running a direct channel. Moreover, capital constraint is a common phenomenon in the manufacturer's operation due to a direct channel developed. In addition, the presence of the direct channel may intensify the competition between manufactures and retailers, sometimes deteriorating retailers. This may result in retailers' counterattack, including the improvement of service level etc..
    Based on the practical background, our research issues are examined:First, how does a risk-averse manufacturer choose the proper financing ways under the advance payment financing with price discount and bank loan financing; Second, whether or under what conditions should a manufacturer choose to run a direct channel; Third, how the manufacturer's financing strategy and channel selection is affected by the manufacturer's risk aversion and the retailer's add-value service. To answer the above questions, a supply chain consisting of a risk-averse manufacturer and one retailer is considered. The manufacturer is capital constrained. Under a manufacturer-Stackelberg game, by formulating the problem as a mean-variance optimization problem and based on the uncertainty of developing a direct channel and add-value services of a retail channel, the advance payment model and the bank loan model are constructed to dispose the manufacturer's optimal financing strategies and channel choice strategies.
    Through the analysis of the model, the advance payment is optimal for the capital constrained manufacturer. The retailer is willing to pat in advance when the initial capital is very small. The manufacturer runs the direct channel only when the initial capital is very small and the risk aversion coefficient is large. The retailer should improve the efficiency of the add-value services, and should choose the medium rate of the advance payment to prevent running the direct channel. A numerical example is provided to illustrate the analytical results.
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    Optimization of Distribution Service Quality with Constraints of Quality Preference for Data-driven Model
    SUN Qi, JI Shou-feng, DONG Ming
    2019, 27 (6):  41-52.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.005
    Abstract ( 498 )   PDF (1711KB) ( 455 )   Save
    The purpose of this paper is to take advantage of "Internet plus" and big data resources for logistics optimization problem. The data value of e-commerce platform accumulated over the years needs to be further explored to promote e-business decision makers to provide meticulous service according to the different quality of the recipients. The degree of service quality preference of the receiving party is summarized:(1) "no memory" type of receiving party; (2) "memory" type of receiving party; (3) "uncertain" type of receiving party (4) the whole receiving party. In addition, four types of programming solution space are deduced, and then the cost linear function of "no memory" type has an accurate solution for dynamic planning, and the other three types are designed to approximate the particle swarm optimization algorithm. The detailed research idea of dissertation is as following:the perceived quality is embedded into model constraints and used to describe the memory attribute of the data; the problem of distribution resource planning with "no memory" is equivalent to the optimal solution of zero inventory strategy, which is indirectly proved existence of accurate solution by the transformation; "memory" type of receiving party for k times delivery service, there is tolerance for the quality of the delivery service for each purchase, which the total amount of weight accumulation per time does not exceed a limit ensuring this type consumer's loyalty; the overall model of the consignee is a special case of the model of the "uncertain" type of receiving party. The recipient's historical data are clustered by simulation of the results of the formation process to form data memory characteristics and analyzed to obtain the quality requirements of different receiving parties. The e-commercial enterprises are guided to provide the relative precision service according to the different quality sensitivities of the receiving party to enhance the last-kilometers distribution service quality, so as to optimize the quality of the delivery service quality of the decision. The sources of case study come from the fresh supermarkets in the city of Shenyang in China, for cooperating to construct a convenient fresh O2O platform. The experimental data is collected from January 31st, 2014 to January 31st, 2016, with the 10 stores of the company as the receiving party sets containing 35 groups of consignee attributes and 8200 historical data, which are used to verify the performance of the model. One the one hand, by virtue of data-driven research framework, it is easier for operators to provide a relatively accurate delivery service through big data resources from the consignee's quality preferences. Since the uncertain demands for service are satisfied effectively, the utilization rate of quality input costs is higher. One the other hand, an optimization idea is provided to deal with the NP-hard problem by extracting the parts that can be precisely optimized, reducing the NP range and improving the accuracy of the overall solution by the method of feature classification.
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    How Cost-Learning Effect Affects the Channel Decisions
    LU Fen, XU He, ZHOU Pin
    2019, 27 (6):  53-63.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.006
    Abstract ( 498 )   PDF (1071KB) ( 379 )   Save
    In a traditional channel,a manufacturer distributes the product to consumers through a retailer. With the popularity of the Internet,many suppliers engage in dual-channel which consists of traditional channel and direct channel. Meanwhile, the existence of cost-learning effect phenomena has been found for a wide range of industries. However, the extant literature lack study of combining the channel structure problem with cost-learning effect, which motivates us to think about following research question:How does learning effect affect the supply chain members' equilibrium decisions and profits in different supply chain structures? To solve this problem, based on a supply chain with a manufacturer and a retailer, a two-period Stackelberg game model with cost-learning effect in different modes (traditional channel mode and dual-channel mode) is constructed. A pull contract between the manufacturer and the retailer is considered. Backward induction is used to identify the equilibrium of the games. The impacts of cost learning rate on equilibrium decisions and profits of supply chain members and how do they change with time periods in different supply structures are analyzed.
    It is found that the market price and wholesale price are decreasing with the increasing learning effect in both traditional channel and dual-channel. Besides, the manufacturer, customer and whole supply chain always benefit but the retailer is hurt by the increasing cost-learning effect in the dual-channel mode. Contrast with the traditional channel mode, it is found that the optimal production quantity increases and price decreases in the second period in the dual-channel mode. Meanwhile, the wholesale price and market price in the dual-channel mode are lower than those in the traditional channel mode. Further, through the numerical study, it is found that the manufacturer and the retailer can achieve a win-win situation in the dual-channel mode under some conditions. This result indicates that the dual-channel mode is still able to alleviate double marginalization effect even with a cost-learning effect. Some theoretical basis and practical guidance for the manufacturer and retailer will be provided to choose the optimal production and price decisions to enhance the profits. This paper will enrich the existing literature on channel structure and cost learning.
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    Quality Design and Supply Chain Channel Optimization in the Presence of Strategic Consumer Behavior
    CHEN Wen, XU Xian-hao
    2019, 27 (6):  64-75.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.007
    Abstract ( 499 )   PDF (1187KB) ( 404 )   Save
    In 2017 Chinese consumption structure continued to improve, and there was an increase demand for products with high quality. However, consumers' demand for higher product quality does not mean they have blind faith in product with high price, and they trade off cost and quality with rational consumption.Consumers who may postpone or prepone their purchasing decisions when they anticipate potential price drops or ascends in the future,are termed as strategic consumers. Their waiting behavior will have negative impact on both retailers and manufacturers. Although the importance of strategic consumer behavior is widely acknowledged, there has been little research taking its implications on product quality and supply chain simultaneously. In this paper both strategic consumers' behavior and products' quality design are considered. Firstly, quality and price decision are extended to supply chain with strategic consumers.Four strategies are categorized, different from each other in two dimensions:supply chain type (centralized or decentralized) and consumer type (myopic or strategic). Decisions of price, quantity and quality are analyzed in each strategy. Furthermore, the strategy of quantity commitment is introduced, and compared with the above strategies to analyze whether manufacturers can improve the profit of the supply chain under quantity commitment.Lastly, five different chains are compared through numerical analysis.
    Research shows, in decentralized supply chain, when manufacturer decides product quality, optimal quality is related to the bargaining power of retailer and manufacturer. The more power manufacturer has, the higher the quality. When wholesale price is completely decided by manufacturer, strategic consumer behavior may increase unfairness between manufacturer and retailer, and manufacturer can get a larger proportion of the profits. In the face of strategic consumers, quantity commitment can achieve higher profit than centralized supply chain, and with suitable product quality and wholesale price, the desired profit with quantity commitment can be attained through decentralized supply chain.Thus both improving product quality and increasing whole profit of supply chain can be achieved.
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    Study on Supply Chain Network Equilibrium Considering Quality Control by Retailer and Risk-aversion
    WANG Dao-ping, ZHAO Chao, CHENG Yan-ping
    2019, 27 (6):  76-87.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.008
    Abstract ( 437 )   PDF (945KB) ( 310 )   Save
    Product quality is fundamental factor for supply chain to obtain a competitive advantage and to build stable supply chain relationship. Retailers are the link between manufacturers and consumers. The effective product quality control by retailers not only can encourage manufacturers to improve the quality of products but also can ensure the quality of products purchased by consumers. In reality, the supply chain network in which the competition and cooperation coexist is complex. The research on the equilibrium state of the supply chain network has become a hot topic in recent years. In addition, fierce competition brings more uncertainty to the market demand, and supply chain members will show the characteristics of risk aversion which could affect them in making quality decisions. Therefore, this paper attempts to find the supply chain network equilibrium under quality control by retailers with risk-averse manufacturers and risk-averse retailers.
    In order to control the product quality, the retailer inspects the product purchased from the manufacturer. If unqualified products are found, the retailer claims compensation from the manufacturer. Meanwhile, conditional Value-at-Risk is used to evaluate the risk aversion of manufacturers and retailers. The effect of risk aversion on the quality decision of supply chain members is considered. Firstly, under quality control, conditional Value-at-Risk model of manufacturers and retailers are established respectively. According to the principle of maximizing the conditional Value-at-Risk, the optimal decisions of manufacturers and retailers are solved. Secondly, The optimal economic behavior of players in the supply chain network is portrayed by way of variational inequalities theory and supply chain network equilibrium model is constructed. Then, the equilibrium pattern in terms of existence and uniqueness results is provided. Finally, the Levenberg-Marquardt method is built to solve the equilibrium model. The impacts of the changes of the parameters in the model on the equilibrium solutions are presented through the sensitivity analysis of the parameters. Through the analysis, the impact of quality control and risk aversion on the solution of equilibrium model and player's conditional Value-at-Risk can be revealed.
    Several conclusions are drawn:first, with the risk aversion of manufacturers or retailers increasing, the product quality will improve and the manufacturers' conditional Value-at-Risk will increase more then retailers. In addition, if the risk aversion of manufacturers or retailers increases, their own conditional Value-at-Risk will reduce, and the manufacturers' conditional Value-at-Risk is very sensitive to changes in retailers' risk aversion. Further, the increase in the product qualification rate will increase the conditional risk value of both manufacturers and retailers. The manufacturers' benefits due to the increase in the qualification rate will be greater than those obtained by the retailers. Additionally when the manufacturers' qualification rate is too low, the retailers will refuse to order their products. Finally, increased selling price can promote the optimization of product quality.
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    Strategy of Supply Chain Information Sharing Based on Strategic Competition Game
    ZHOU Jian-heng, RAN Yun
    2019, 27 (6):  88-102.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.009
    Abstract ( 511 )   PDF (1570KB) ( 394 )   Save
    An accurate grasp of market demand is undoubtedly an important factor for retailers to gain a competitive advantage. Retailers often strategically use their informational advantage to control the direction of competitors' decision-making in the process of game in order to indirectly influence the information flow, logistics, capital flow, which will make they get optimal profits. Meanwhile, competitors could also strategically feedback decisions to avoid failure when they realize the information may be concealed, distorted. In addition, more and more products have a variety of cost price and different sources in the operation of supply chain and in the competitive market. The cost advantage is also one of the most important baselines in the competition for terminal retailers in supply chain. Therefore, the study of the motivation of information sharing under cost difference and the way that information is shared is the problem to be solved and is of practical significance. The reverse derivation method is used to discuss the strategy of information sharing for two terminal retailers including the large retailer making its own products and the small retailer wholesaling products from upstream manufacturer in the situation where market information and cost are asymmetric for members in supply chain. The strategy includes the large retailer of information advantage decide whether to share information and how to share information; how the small retailer of information disadvantage decide the order quantity according to the market information shared by the competitor; how the manufacturer from upstream supply chain decide wholesale price to control the situation of game of the entire supply chain and make the downstream retailer more proactive in competition. Research shows that the strategies chosen by large retailers are related to the market:The large retailer are inclined to share information in the low market type to make competitors reduce order quantity; the large retailer still choose to share information to show competition advantage in the high market type if the market fluctuation is small, which will deter the intruders to some extent; when the market fluctuation is large, the information sharing is not selected because the additional gains from information sharing cannot offset the rent of information transmission, however, because in the low market type large retailer would choose to share information, so in this case, although the large retailer are forced to share information even they do not want to do that. And manufacturer influence the cost advantage of large retailer by making wholesale price, which will finally affect the strategies of information sharing in supply chain. The final conclusions can be drawn by the way combining modeling with analysis of examples. What's more, the built model is simulated numerically by Mathmatica to verify the conclusions, which can ensure the accuracy and applicability.
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    Study on a “Main Manufacturer-Supplier” Bilateral Auction Grey Game Model Under the Background of Main Manufacturer Being at a Disadvantage
    WANG Huan, FANG Zhi-geng
    2019, 27 (6):  103-112.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.010
    Abstract ( 448 )   PDF (1033KB) ( 272 )   Save
    In the initial developing stage of some high-tech products, the main manufacturer is always in a disadvantaged position and passive in pricing negotiation because of the lack of systemic integration capability and market share, and its instable relationship with suppliers. The price negotiation problem between the main manufacturer and the supplier is a game problem based on each acceptable price. The final price has a lot to do with the pricing strategies of the two parties, this process can be simplified as a bilateral auction, which shows the feature of "small sample, poor information" and finite rationality of game players.
    In order to solve this problem, the grey coefficient is introduced to show the poor information and finite rationality in the pricing game between the main manufacturer and the supplier, and a "main manufacturer-supplier" bilateral auction grey game model is constructed. To reveal the game relationship in price negotiation, the equilibrium objective function, the equilibrium strategy condition, the optimal grey quotation, the transaction probability and the expected utility of both parties are analyzed. Then the transaction conditions and the scope of the grey game model are discussed. Through the analysis, it is found that the possible trading scope of the grey game model is larger than that in the classic model. It is known that the transaction loss area of the classic model is mainly due to incomplete information, however, in real transaction, the subjects can improve the transaction efficiency by collecting information and adjusting the game strategy to make part of the incomplete "black information" whitening.
    Finally, the parameter setting and system simulation are carried out for the game problem under the main manufacturer being at a disadvantage, the optimal grey price and the maximum utility of the main manufacturer are analyzed, and the strategy proposals of the main manufacturer in this game are put forward from the perspective of the early communication strategy, the price negotiation strategy and the long-term cooperation strategy. This study is a new exploration of grey game theory, and provides a scientific strategy support for the price negotiation of the main manufacturers.
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    Optimal Dual-sourcing Procurement Decisions with Suppliers' Random Yield and Disruptions
    CHEN Chong-ping, CHEN Zhi-xiang
    2019, 27 (6):  113-122.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.011
    Abstract ( 507 )   PDF (1031KB) ( 630 )   Save
    Since the uncertainty of production condition and other external factors in production process, suppliers' yield are random; meanwhile, unpredicted disruption events during delivery also occasionally take place. In order to reduce these two types of supply risks during procurement, many companies adopt dual-sourcing strategy. The optimal decision of dual sourcing procurement with suppliers' random yield and disruption is studied in this paper. A model is proposed in which one manufacturer order from two suppliers which have random yield and supply disruption with the uncertain demand. By solving the model, the optimal order quantity for the manufacturer and the optimal production quantities for suppliers in two situations is obtained:(1) the suppliers have only random yield without disruption, and (2) the suppliers have random yield and disruptions. It is found that, the reduction of the yield random not only increases the suppliers' profit but also improves the manufacturer's profit. Therefore, the manufacturer needs help the suppliers to improve the yield. The optimal production quantities for suppliers increase then decrease as the improvement in own yield, but the optimal production quantities for suppliers decrease as the improvement of anther supplier's yield. If one supplier's yield can improve to a certain extent, the manufacturer can just order from one rather than from two. The reduction of suppliers' disruption can help the manufacturer obtain higher order quantity. If one supplier's supply disruption reduces, the manufacturer will order more from this supplier and orders less from the another supplier. Dual-sourcing procurement is a temporary strategy used by the manufacturer in responding to the risk of random yield and disruption. As the risk reduces, the manufacturer can purchase from only one supplier.
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    Research on the Linkage Method of Relief Materials Warehouse Based on Demand Forecasting and Modularization
    WEI Yu-qi, YANG Min, LIANG Liang
    2019, 27 (6):  123-135.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.012
    Abstract ( 480 )   PDF (1269KB) ( 389 )   Save
    The management of relief materials is an interesting research area of the relief management. However, most of existing researches relative to relief materials management focus on the state of inventory level of relief materials and the distribution and supplement of materials, but without respect to the modularity and timeliness of materials. That is, the existing researches maybe unserviceable for modular relief materials management, and cannot improve the value-in-use of materials. Therefore, in this paper, an alternative chance-constrained programming is proposed for the redistribution and supplement of relief materials which can be transformed as a linear programming, under the assumption that the distribution of the demand at each warehouse is known. The objective of the proposed model is minimize the cost of redistribution and supplement of relief materials, and the mainly constraint is guarantee the materials demand can be satisfied under a certain stated probability. Finally,the proposed method is applied to the prestore adjustment of 20 National relief material warehouses of China, and the results show that the proposed method can greatly reduced the cost of prestore adjustment under the same level of material support.
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    VIKOR Method Based on the Reference Coefficient under Single-valued Neutrosophic Environment
    FAN Jian-ping, LIU Sheng-nan, WU Mei-qin
    2019, 27 (6):  136-145.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.013
    Abstract ( 341 )   PDF (927KB) ( 204 )   Save
    The proposed single-valued neutrosophic sets make up for the shortcomings of fuzzy sets that cannot handle inconsistent and discontinuous information. The study regards three parameters of single-valued neutrosophic sets as three coordinates to generate a 3D dimension, and extends VIKOR method to single-valued neutrosophic sets environment. The ranking of original VIKOR method is based on the closeness between alternatives and the positive ideal solution(PIS). Namely the optimal compromise solution is the closest to PIS. However, in the 3D space consists of single-valued neutrosophic sets, the closest distance between the alternative and PIS does not mean that it is the farthest from the negative ideal solution(NIS). That is, the ranking and the optimal compromise solution are different when take the closeness between alternatives and PIS as baseline compared with the closeness between alternatives and NIS. Different preference of decision makers for reference standard lead to different results which cause confusion in the decision making. The existing research does not propose some advices to solve the problem. For this reason, the concept of reference coefficient(RC) is proposed and the closeness between alternatives and NIS is introduced into original VIKOR method and the influence of different RC is explored on the ranking and the optimal compromise solution. In order to verify the effectiveness of the improved method, the result of the paper are compared with those of the existing literature. The result shows that the changes of RC have an impact on the ranking and the optimal compromise solution. It is more reasonable for decision makers to consider the results of different RC comprehensively. VIKOR method based on the reference coefficient amends the use of original VIKOR method under the imprecision environment which is an extension of VIKOR method. The research result shows that it is a reasonable ranking method.
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    Two-Step Difference Clustering-Firefly Algorithm for Sharing Commercial Network Development with Network Effect
    LV Tong, SHI Le-feng, ZOU Xiao-yan
    2019, 27 (6):  146-157.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.014
    Abstract ( 357 )   PDF (1424KB) ( 243 )   Save
    In order to study the expansion characteristics and layout methods of the commercial network of sharing economy, the positive and negative network effects that affect the development of the commercial network of sharing economy are taken into account, constructs the cost and revenue model of the commercial network of sharing economy are constructed, and the profit characteristics of all kinds of networks is analyzed step by step. On the above analysis, the sharing economy business networks are divided into six categories, and the two-step difference clustering-firefly algorithm for sharing economy business network layout is proposed. It is found that the comprehensive influence of positive and negative network effect makes the sharing points present different profit-development characteristics, and the layout order of different types of sharing points will have an impact on the profit of the whole network. The two-step difference clustering-firefly algorithm can not only improve the efficiency and accuracy of the early search, but also can conveniently recognize the layout order of the candidate sharing points by classifying the candidate nodes.
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    Project Decision Model of Multi-stage Residual Income Based on Product Life Cycle
    WANG Li-xia
    2019, 27 (6):  158-166.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.015
    Abstract ( 512 )   PDF (987KB) ( 318 )   Save
    Residual Income Model (RIM) is one of classic models that applied in evaluating the value of companies' equity. Specially, Ohlson RIM is popular model in the period of finance and accounting since it adopts history accounting data. Following the logic of deductive reasoning and normative analysis, a new investment decision model is built based on the general residual income model under the assumption that return on equity (ROE) changes in different period of product life cycle. Different period of product life cycle has different characteristic of development in ROE, namely, ROE increases in growth period and decreases in decline period while ROE keeps industry average in mature period of product life cycle. Then, empirical data which assigned differently to each parameter was used to test the feasibility of this model. The result shows that the new investment decision model is applicable for making investment decisions in practice and has made several theoretical contributions. Firstly, the application of RIM is expanded from evaluating company's equity to the application in the assessment of investment decision. Secondly, the infinite problem of RIM is resolved and finally, it could be used to find the maximum value of investment decisions.
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    Comparison of Incentive and Punitive Traffic Congestion Policies-Based on the Dynamic Evolutionary Game Model and Simulation Analysis
    LI Zhen-qi, OU Guo-li
    2019, 27 (6):  167-178.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.016
    Abstract ( 530 )   PDF (1611KB) ( 474 )   Save
    With the rapid development of urbanization, more and more people accommodate in urban areas and the number of private cars increases sharply, which make urban road congestion more and more serious. Traffic congestion concerns the public, researchers and authorities, for which a variety of measures from punishing to incentive perspectives have been conceived and carried out in practice. However the results of governance are quite unsatisfactory. An evolutionary congestion game model is built in this paper, lifting the veil on the process of different governance measures functioning on urban congestion problem and trying to give an explanation for observed results. The whole community is divided into two groups, one showing preference towards taking public transport and the other preferring private cars. The quantified government congestion measures are numerically examined which trigger trade-off matrix changes, and dynamic trends of two groups' ESS strategies in different situations. It is found that both the incentive and punitive traffic congestion policies can alleviate the congestion problem, but the punitive measures are more effective than the incentive measures in the rapidity and persistence.
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    Spatial Agglomeration of Resource Industry, Transmission Factor Extraction and Mediator Effectof Resource Curse
    XUE Ya-wei, ZHANG Jian, YUN Le-xin
    2019, 27 (6):  179-190.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.017
    Abstract ( 454 )   PDF (2122KB) ( 284 )   Save
    The relationship between resource abundance and economic growth is important to researchers and policy makers as it plays a great role in national and regional economic development and the improvement of residents' welfare level. The resource curse is an economic hypothesis for the relationship between resource abundance and economic growth which shows that the relationship is not as simple as imagined.Therefore, the measurement and transmission analysis for the resource curse is particularly important.
    In recent years, the test of resource curse's existence and endogeneity problem for intermediary variant have been solved. However, the scientificity of index selection and the simplicity of intermediary model do not have a lasting settlement. Aimed at the scientific problem of natural resources index selection in resource curse study, the spatial agglomeration of resource industry is used instead of the abundance of natural resources and the dependence of resource industry as explanatory variable for the natural resource abundance in this paper. Meanwhile, the mediating effect model of resource curse is proposed based on B-K mediation analysis.
    Through above analysis, the calculation formula is constructed suitable for measuring the spatial agglomeration of resource industry by the gini coefficient of Krugman. Based on the panel data of 10 typical oil and gas resource cities during 1998-2013, the spatial agglomeration degree of resource industry is analyzed.From the results of data analysis, only Nanyang City is no longer rich in oil and gas resources due tourban development transformation, which fits with the facts. A static panel regression model based on OLS as well as a dynamic panel regression model based on DIF-GMM are established for empirical testing and analysis, in order to extract the transmission elements. Through the measurement, it shows the significant mediator variables which are used as the independent variables in the mediator effect model. Then intermediary model of resource curse is constructed as to further clarify the specific relationship between the variables index and transmission elements of resource curse with reference to the analysis method of B-K mediator effect. Based on above analysis, the transmission mechanism of resource curse of oil and gas resource cities are explored and the model of resource curse transmission mechanism is drawn.
    The results show that in the whole estimation model, the coefficient signs of spatial agglomeration of resource industrial are significantly negative correlated at the level of 0.05. It indicates that the regional economic growth is inversely related to the spatial agglomeration of resource industry, which is in accordance with the basic assumption of resource curse. In the step estimation model, the regional economic growth is positively correlated with the increase of household savings, human capital investment, and the development of manufacturing industry, which accords with logical relation of classical economic growth theory; the material capital investment and regional economic growth is negatively related which is due to the fact that the local economic subject has less intertemporal substitution elasticity of consumption. The direct gain of economic growth from physical capital investment is less than the negative effect that of human capital accumulation, and thus hinders the regional economic growth. The higher degree of government intervention, the lower economic growth. In addition to the relationship between government intervention and economic growth, the rest of the relationships are confirmed in the mediator effect model.This shows that government intervention itself impedes some aspect of economic growth. According to the results, it is suggested that we need to strengthen the economic guiding mechanism which mainly relies on the market regulation while government regulation subsidiary to further enhance the spatial agglomeration degree of resource industry, improve the staff quality matched to the technology development and raise the efficiency of production and utilization of natural resources gradually, so as to accelerate the transformation of the regional economy and to promote the sustainable development of economy.
    Different from most other literatures, the spatial agglomeration of resource industry is used in this paper as the index of abundance of resource industry which enriches the empirical study on the econometric modelling. It is alsoa valuable endeavor to excavate the relationship of resource abundance and economic growth by the effect of mediating variables.
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    Value Sharing of Business Model Innovation Based on Shapley Value
    WU Jun, XU Di
    2019, 27 (6):  191-205.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.018
    Abstract ( 446 )   PDF (1713KB) ( 256 )   Save
    The value creation activities of business model are evolving from individual enterprise conduct to the joint efforts of the main enterprise, partners and customers. Only the value acquisition based on reasonable value sharing can guarantee the continuous value creation of business model innovation, and ensure the success of innovation. It is studied in this paper how the value of business model innovation is shared between the main enterprise and various stakeholders, and what are the conditions for reasonable value sharing.
    Firstly according to the reference of previous literatures about how the added value of enterprise or business model is measured, this paper proposes the method of measuring the value of business model innovation. Then based on the Shapley value method, the added value after the business model innovation is shared between the main enterprise and other stakeholders. This method considers the amount of contribution of the main enterprise and various stakeholders to the business model innovation, and takes it as the basis of value sharing, which somehow shows the "individual rationality" and "collective rationality" of the value sharing of business model innovation. According to the result of calculation, the amount of the added value gained by the principal enterprise and other stakeholders are compared. Lastly the reasonable conditions for value sharing are also obtained, that is, the relationship between the variables which affect the value sharing(such as the variation of the price that customers pay, or the variation of the capitalised costs that the principal enterprise pay the suppliers or the partners and so on) and the variables of the achievements of the innovation (such as the variation of the capacity of the market, the variation of the price of the product or service, or the variation of the costs of providing its own resources by the principal enterprise in the business model and so on). Above all, this is of some guiding significance for the enterprises to innovate the business models. In order to improve the enthusiasm of all stakeholders to participate in innovation, it is necessary to adjust the parameters that affect value sharing according to different innovation results.
    The results show that, the stakeholders who have no direct contribution to business model innovation may also share the value of innovation, however, the objects and quantities of value sharing are different based on different innovation results. The change of innovation result parameters will affect the sharing value in different extent. In order to improve the enthusiasm of all stakeholders to participate in the innovation, it is necessary to adjust the sharing value to the results of different innovations. Only with the reasonable value sharing, the value of business model innovation can be realized better through the joint promotion of each participant in the innovation value network. This research makes up for the research gap of value sharing in business model innovation.
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    On-Demand Extra Resource Allocation
    WANG Qia
    2019, 27 (6):  206-216.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.06.019
    Abstract ( 417 )   PDF (1852KB) ( 232 )   Save
    The last paragraph of literature Wei Quanling et al. [1] raises an extra resource allocation problem:suppose there are some extra resources which can be given to all or only a part of DMUs, and if we want the allocation to be most beneficial to the whole system, how should the extra resources be distributed. They also point out that the extra resource allocation problem and the selection of DUMs should depend on not only DMUs' efficiency, but also the returns to scale. An on-demand allocation method is proposed to deal with such problem.Firstly, on the basis of technical efficiency and scale elasticity,DMUs'development curves are established. Development curves are used to reveal the corresponding relationships between input change and output change. Secondly, extra resources are divided into several equal parts, and the allocation goal of each part is to achieve the maximum output increase.The allocation will stop once all extra resources are allocated or a part of extra resources does not result in any output increase. Finally, the extra resources obtained by DMU in each allocation process are accumulated to obtain the final allocation results.At the end of this paper, two examples are given to illustrate our method, in the case of ‘one input and one output’ and ‘two inputs, one output’ respectively.The allocation results show that the method proposed in this paper do not reduce the amount of input resources currently occupied by any DMU. Moreover, it can identify the redundancy of extra resources in scale or in structure, so as to timely avoid unnecessary distribution.
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