With the internet penetration into daily life and the development of consumers’ online consumption habits， fresh produce e-commerce has seen explosive growth. However， with the increasing growth of fresh e-commerce， Numerous actual cases show that the corporate social responsibility （CSR） of fresh produce firms is woefully insufficient. For example，the “Dingdong” platform was investigated by the Haidian District Market Supervision Bureau due to sellingseconds at best quality prices andunauthorized “repacking” for labeling.“Miss fresh” was frequently complained by consumers for selling expired food.To deal with the reality，the Food Safety Law of the People’s Republic of China， updated in 2021， states that food businesses must be responsible for customers and practice social responsibility.As a result， several leading Fresh businesses， such as Freshippo， J.D. Fresh， and Dilifresh， have been impelled to incorporate CSR in their supply chains. However， it is still unclear what are the effects of CSR practice on fresh supply chain members， and how can CSR be shared among supply chain members to improve supply chain performance.To answer the research questions posed above， a two-stage supply chain with a fresh produce supplier and an e-tailer is explored in which each supply chain member considers CSR in addition to profit.Stackelberg game is constructed for the following four strategies： The fresh produce supplier practices CSR alone and supply chain members jointly practice CSR are discussed separately under wholesale price contract and revenue-sharing contract. The four models are formulated and some equilibrium results are gotten. Then the effects of CSR levels on optimal decisions， profits， and consumer surplus are investigated. Finally， the optimal decisions， profits， and consumer surplus of the four models are compared and analyzed. The conclusions are also verified through numerical examples.It is shown that CSR behaviors can always improve the freshness of fresh produce， reduce retail price， stimulate demand， and improve consumer surplus and social welfare. It is also shown that the fresh supplier practices CSR can reduce its profit but increase the profit of the e-tailer， while the e-tailer practices CSR can improve its and the supplier’s profits under certain conditions. It is further shown that the supply chain members jointly practicing CSR has a more significant stimulating effect on demand than the fresh supplier practices CSR alone.Finally， the supplier and the e-tailer jointly practice CSR under a revenue-sharing contract， which can both improve the level of freshness-keeping effort and achieve Pareto improvement of supply chain members’ profits under certain conditions， but at this time the fresh suppliers should not pursue high revenue sharing blindly.