Energy performance contracting has become the popular method to solve the carbon emission problem for manufacturers. In academia， research on the problem of supply chain cooperation and emission reduction under share savings or guarantee savings contracts has been studied， and the emission reduction issues under energy cost hosting contracts have not been considered. In view of the above considerations， the decision-making issue of cooperative emission reduction in the supply chain when energy service company （ESCO） provides embedded low-carbon services under energy costs hosting contract is explored. Two scenarios of game models are established including cooperative emission reduction in the supply chain without the participation of ESCO， and with the participation of ESCO under energy costs hosting contract. The results indicate that， only when certain condition is met， the supply chain will choose to cooperate with ESCO； when the embedding degree （the ratio of the equal present value coefficient during the contract period to the equal present value coefficient during the economic life of the project） reaches a certain value， the degree of commonality in the value of carbon emission reduction begins to converge； A high level of embedding degree could achieve better emission reduction effects， and the embedding degree has an U-shaped relationship with the expected profit of the supply chain， and is positively correlated with the expected profit of the ESCO； For manufacturers， it is better to build a medium and long-term cooperative relationship with ESCO. These conclusions provide theoretical reference for the effective application of energy cost hosting contracts in the context of supply chain.