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Articles

Heterogeneous Institutional Investors and Corporate Reputation:Social Responsibility: Intermediate Effect Test Based on Corporate Social Responsibility

  • SONG Yan ,
  • LIU Yue-ting ,
  • ZHANG Lu-guang
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  • School of Economics and Management, Yantai University, Yantai 264005, China

Received date: 2021-01-11

  Revised date: 2021-06-13

  Online published: 2023-07-17

Abstract

With the development of the economy and the continuous improvement of the capital market, the rapid development of institutional investors has been attracted more and more attention. Institutional investors have many advantages such as capital, information and expertise, so they can participate more in the daily operation and decision-making of the company, so people have high expectations of them in supervising the development of the invested enterprises and improving the capital market. At the same time, as the economic structure of our country is upgraded and developed, the focus of development is transformed into quality and sustainability, and all kinds of problems in the process of deepening the reform of enterprises are also increasingly prominent. Especially in the pandemic of Covid-19, the quasi-insurance role of corporate social responsibility has been fully confirmed, and the role of corporate social responsibility and corporate reputation in crisis is becoming more and more significant, so exploring the relationship between heterogeneous institutions and corporate reputation is worth studying.

Cite this article

SONG Yan , LIU Yue-ting , ZHANG Lu-guang . Heterogeneous Institutional Investors and Corporate Reputation:Social Responsibility: Intermediate Effect Test Based on Corporate Social Responsibility[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023 , 31(7) : 103 -114 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0070

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