As the fundamental guarantee of industrialization construction and national economic development, the product quality control decision of the equipment manufacturing under the environment of supply chain has attracted a wide spread attention. Considering the impact of the product quality on the profit of supply chain, the paper tries to explore the coordination problem of quality control behaviors in the three-echelon equipment manufacturing supply chain consisted of a single manufacturer, a single component supplier and a single part supplier using differential game theory.Relevant conclusions are gained through comparing the equilibrium results of the decentralized decision models including Nash non-cooperative game and Stackelberg leader-follower game and the centralized decision model of coordinated cooperation game. Then the model is verified by a numerical analysis. The results indicate that,① the quality control behavior of the manufacturer remains the same in the decentralized decision models, but the Stackelberg leader-follower game is more effective than the Nash non-cooperative game to improve the quality control behaviors of the component supplier and the part supplier, as well as enhance the profits of the supply chain members;②the quality control behaviors of the supply chain members and the total profit of the supply chain achieve optimality in the centralized decision model. The research conclusions provide the theoretical basis for the construction of quality control strategic alliance among the equipment manufacturing supply chain members.
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