Using the samples of listed companies in Chinese A share market which implemented equity incentive plans during the 2006-2012, and using the difference between the rights vesting performance requirements is set in equity incentive plan and company's past actual performance level to measure the independent variables, this paper investigates the relationship between performance-based equity incentive and the choice of earnings management modes. This paper finds that:the degree of real earnings management which implemented by the company with a "incentive" equity incentive plan is greater than the one which implemented by the company with a "non-incentive" equity incentive plan. The higher the exercise rights vesting performance requirements compared to company's past actual performance level is, the greater the extent of real earnings management induced is. In order to achieve the exercise rights vesting performance requirements, the listing corporation's managements will comprehensively use real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management. The results show that, it is very important to set reasonably performance indicators level in the equity incentive plans, and too high or too low performance indicators level would make the equity incentive effect run counter to our desire. The main contribution of the paper is that equity incentive intensity is measured according to exercise rights vesting performance requirements which is an innovation based on Chinese situation, and that the literature about the relation between equity incentives and earnings management are enriched from the perspective of real activities earnings management and the comprehensive use of real and accrued earnings management.
LIU Yin-guo, SUN Hui-qian, WANG Ye, GU Liu
. Performance-based Equity Incentive and the Choice of Earnings Management Modes[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017
, 25(3)
: 49
-58
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.03.006
[1] Bergstresser D, Philippon T. CEO Incentives and Earnings Management[J]. Journal of Financial Economics,.2006, 80(3):511-529.
[2] Cheng Q, Warfield T D. Equity incentives and earnings management[J]. The Accounting Review, 2005,80(2):441-476.
[3] Jiang Xufeng, Petroni K R, Wang I Y, CFOs and CEOs:Who have the most influence on earnings management?[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2010,96(3):513-526.
[4] Badertscher B. Overvaluation and the choice of alternative earnings management mechanisms[J]. The Accounting Review, 2011,86(5):1491-1518.
[5] Cohen D A. Zarowin P. Accrual based and real earnings management activities around seasoned equity offerings[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2010,50(1):2-19.
[6] 蔡春,朱荣,和辉,等.盈余管理方式选择、行为隐性化与濒死企业状况改善——来自A股特别处理公司的经验证据[J].会计研究,2012,(9):31-39.
[7] Cohen D A, Dey A, Lys T. Real and accrual-based earnings management in the pre and post-sarbanes-oxley periods[J]. The Accounting Review, 2008,82(3):757-787.
[8] Zang A Y. Evidence on the tradeoff between real manipulation and accrual manipulation[D]. Durham, North Carolina:Duke University, 2016
[9] 李增福,董志强,连玉君.应计项目盈余管理还是真实活动盈余管理?——基于我国2007年所得税改革的研究[J].管理世界,2011,(1):121-134.
[10] 龚启辉,吴联生,王亚平.两类盈余管理之间的部分替代[J].经济研究,2015,(6):175-188.
[11] 谢德仁,陈运森.业绩型股权激励、行权业绩条件与股东财富增长[J].金融研究,2010,(12):99-114.
[12] Kanagaretnam K, Mathieu R, Ramanan R. Stock option grants, current operating performance and deferral of earnings[J]. International Journal of Management, 2009,26(1):26-32.
[13] Ke B. Do equity-based incentives induce CEOs to manage earnings to report strings of consecutive earnings increases?[R]. Working Paper, Smeal College of Business Administration Pennsylvania State University, 2005.
[14] Watts R L, Zimmerman J L. Positive accounting theory[M]. Englewood Cliffs:Prentice Hall, 1986.
[15] Graham J R, Harvey C R, Rajgopal S. The economic implications of corporate financial reporting[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics,2005,40(1-3):3-73.
[16] Roychowdhury S. Earnings management through real activitied manipulation[J]. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 2006,42(3):335-370.
[17] Gunny K. The relation between earnings management using real activities manipulation and future performance[J]. Contemporary Accounting Research, 2010,27(3):855-888.
[18] 李江涛,何苦.上市公司以真实盈余管理逃避高质量审计监督的动机研究[J].审计研究,2012,(5):58-67.
[19] 李曜.两种股权激励方式的特征、应用与证券市场反应的比较研究[J].财贸经济,2009,(2):57-62.
[20] 陈冬华,陈信元,万华林.国有企业中的薪酬管制与在职消费[J].经济研究,2005,(2):92-101.
[21] 晏艳阳,金鹏.公平偏好下的多任务目标与国企高管薪酬激励[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(7):82-93.
[22] 孔峰,张微.基于双重声誉的国企经理长期激励最优组合研究[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(9):133-140.
[23] 王建文,国艳玲,王丽娜,等.重要股东市场行为引导下的利益趋同与壕沟防守效应[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(3):76-81.
[24] 林永坚,王志强,李茂良.高管变更与盈余管理——基于应计项目操控与真实活动操控的实证研究[J].南开管理评论,2013,(1):4-14.
[25] 吴泽福,陈金龙,吴捷.盈余管理、审计怀疑与诉讼风险溢价[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(12):26-33.
[26] 章雁,樊晓霞.中小板上市公司股权激励与公司绩效实证研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,(S1):405-410.
[27] 陈艺萍,张信东,史金凤.零杠杆公司业绩研究[J].中国管理科学,2016,24(6):171-176.
