The loss of knowledge is popular in knowledge transfer between enterprises. And the risk attitude of the knowledge sender, which is private information in most cases, always influences the effect of knowledge transfer. In order to prevent the loss of knowledge under these conditions, the risk attitude of the knowledge sender is introduced and assumed as private information. And the knowledge sender who discloses a false risk attitude or the knowledge accepter who doesn't believe the knowledge sender is assumed to be punished. Evolutionary game theory is used to analysis the evolutions of the information disclosure strategy of the knowledge sender and the information processing strategy of the knowledge accepter. By discussing the influences of evolutionary equilibriums on knowledge transfer, the way to realize the best evolutionary equilibrium that can not only maximize the total revenue of the knowledge sender and the knowledge accepter but also avoid the loss of knowledge is found. The conclusions of this paper are further illustrated by numerical simulations. The results show that the knowledge sender should punish the knowledge accepter based on its risk attitude; only when the knowledge sender severely punish the knowledge accepter, can the best evolutionary equilibrium be realized; otherwise, only if the knowledge sender is risk aversion party, may the best evolutionary equilibrium be realized when the knowledge sender punish the knowledge accepter more severely or selects a knowledge accepter who severely punish the knowledge sender. The above findings provide effective suggestions for both sides of knowledge transfer on how to prevent the loss of knowledge during knowledge transfer between enterprises and enrich the related research achievements of knowledge transfer between enterprises.
CHEN Guo, QI Er-shi
. Knowledge Transfer between Enterprises under Asymmetric Risk Attitude[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016
, 24(12)
: 82
-90
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.12.010
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