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Articles

Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain Logistics Strategy and Compensation Mechanism Considering Two-way Leading Dissimilarity

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  • 1. School of Economics and Management, Southeast University, Nanjing 210096, China;
    2. School of Information Enginerring, Yangzhou University, Yangzhou 225009, China;
    3. School of Management Science and Engineering, Nanjing Audit University, Nanjing 211815, China

Received date: 2015-06-26

  Revised date: 2015-08-03

  Online published: 2016-12-27

Abstract

At present, closed-loop supply chain is studied under the condition that forward leading enterprise and reverse leading enterprise are the same. However, forward supply chain enterprise attaches importance to product quality, reverse supply chain enterprise attaches importance to recycling channels, and logistics strategy of forward supply chain is not necessarily suitable for the reverse supply chain. Based on this, the dominant model of supply chain is divided into forward manufacturers dominated and reverse retailer dominated, logistics strategy is divided into forward logistics strategy and reverse logistics strategy. By building model and using game theory, the pricing strategy, subsidy mechanism and the stability of different closed-loop supply chain are discussed. Conditions of supply chain stability are obtained by choosing logistics strategy and subsidy mechanism for dominated enterprise.

Cite this article

ZHANG Fu-an, DA Qing-li, GONG Yan-de . Research on Closed-loop Supply Chain Logistics Strategy and Compensation Mechanism Considering Two-way Leading Dissimilarity[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016 , 24(10) : 44 -51 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.10.005

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