Strength of preference is incorporated into the graph model for conflict resolution (GMCR) to enhance intensity of relative preference. It is very important to obtain a ranking of strength of preference based on option prioritization for modeling module. The option prioritization approach for simple preference is extended to strength of preference in this paper. The proposed approach is employed to the "Water Pollution Conflict in Lanzhou" in which there are three decision makers with strength of preference. The conflict model is established and then the process of this conflict's negotiations and consultations is simulated. Finally, the equilibria of this model are obtained using the decision support system based on GMCR. The results from this research provide a valuable view for the sustainable development of China's economy.
HOU Yu-hang, XU Hai-yan
. Research on Option Prioritization for Strength of Preference Based on the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016
, 24(9)
: 64
-70
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.09.008
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