In this paper, the feature and implications of three main different channel modes of fresh agricultural products supply chain in China are summarized. Using game theory approach to build different channel modes, production efforts, sales efforts and the total utility of the supply chain are analyzed. The results show that farmer's risk-aversion preference is the key factor to the choice of different channel modes, when the farmer holds a low degree of risk-aversion, he should choose the "direct to consumers" mode, and production and sales efforts will be higher than others. While the farmer holds a high degree of risk-aversion, it is better for him to take part in the "farmers to supermarket" mode for the reason of a higher utility, and the production and sales efforts will be higher. In particularly, compared with loose-type "farmers to supermarket" mode, symbiotic-type "farmers to supermarket" mode can both improve the production efforts of farmers and the sales efforts of the supermarket. This study will provide a valuable guidance to the decision of fresh agricultural products supply chains.
PU Xu-jin, FAN Wang-da, WU Ya
. Study on Channel Mode, Efforts Input & Efficiency of Fresh Agricultural Products Supply Chains[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(12)
: 105
-112
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.013
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