Based on the land supply competition and cooperation relationships between developed and developing counties, a evolutionary game model is established; According to this model and lots of research on different typical cases,the directions and tendencies of convergence of evolutionary stable strategy are finally analyzed; The results prove that, whether the county governments will take the strategy of mutual cooperation in land supply policy, is largely depended on the inspection from the superior governments, value-added benefits from the local industry and the costs of infrastructure construction.
GUO Ben-hai, LI Jun-qiang, LIU Si-feng
. Evolutionary Game Model on Competition and Cooperation between Counties in Land-supplied Process[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(12)
: 77
-85
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.010
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