Managers' moral hazard problem exists in debt financing contracts and equity financing contracts so that efficiency improvement is available compared with symmetric information situation.For this problem,under the premise of the deficiency pledge of small and medium enterprises and existence of accounts receivable,the conditional financing contracts with accounts receivable are presented based on asymmetric information game theory.This research shows that the conditional financing contracts can effectively reduce small and medium enterprises lie about real project benefits and move capital for investment of higher risk projects compared with debt contracts,at the same time,the conditional financing contracts can ensure managers pay more efforts compared with equity contracts.Furthermore,the conditional financing contracts can achieve strict Pareto improvement of both the equity and debt contracts,but the latter is under certain conditions.At the end,an example is used to explain the effectiveness of research conclusions.
MA Ben-jiang, JIANG Yun-fang, CHEN Xiao-hong
. Deficiency Pledge Financing Contract Design with Accounts Receivable for SMEs[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(12)
: 35
-44
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.005
[1] 李志赟. 银行结构与中小企业融资[J]. 经济研究, 2002, (6):38-45.
[2] 王霄, 张捷. 银行信贷配给与中小企业贷款——一个内生化抵押品和企业规模的理论模型[J]. 经济研究, 2003, (7):68-75.
[3] 林毅夫, 孙希芳. 信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资[J]. 经济研究, 2005, (7):35-44.
[4] 叶飞, 徐学军. 供应链伙伴特性、伙伴关系与信息共享的关系研究[J]. 管理科学学报, 2009, 12(4):115-128.
[5] 王夏阳. 契约激励、信息共享与供应链的动态协调[J]. 管理世界, 2005, (4):106-115.
[6] 深圳发展银行, 中欧国际工商学院"供应链金融"课题组. 供应链金融——新经济下的新金融[M]. 上海:上海远东出版社, 2009.
[7] 胡跃飞, 黄少卿. 供应链金融:背景、创新与概念界定[J]. 金融研究, 2009, (8):94-206.
[8] Berger AN, Udell GF. A more complete conceptual framework for SME finance[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2006, 30(11):2945-2966.
[9] Kallberg JG, Udell GF. The value of private sector business credit information sharing:The US case[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2003, 27(3):449-469.
[10] Klapper L. The role of factoring for financing small and medium enterprises[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 2006, 30(11):3111-3130.
[11] 李勤, 韩凯. 供应链融资的现状与问题——93家企业样本[J]. 改革, 2009, (6):78-85.
[12] 王文利, 骆建文, 张钦红.银行风险控制下的供应链订单融资策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, (3):73-80.
[13] 白少布, 刘洪, 孔锦. 面向供应链融资的企业无风险收益合约研究[J]. 科研管理, 2011, 32(3):137-144.
[14] 弯红地. 供应链金融的风险模型分析研究[J]. 经济问题, 2008, (11):109-112.
[15] Stiglitz J, Weiss A. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information[J]. The American Economic Review, 1981, 71(3):393-410.
[16] 燕志雄,费方域. 企业融资中的控制权安排与中小企业经营者的激励[J]. 经济研究, 2007, (2):111-123.
[17] Santos JAC. Bank capital and equity investment regulations[J]. Journal of Banking & Finance, 1999, 23(7):1095-1120.
[18] Hellmann T, Stiglitz J. Credit and equity rationing in markets with adverse selection[J]. European Economic Review, 2000, 44(2):281-304.
[19] Aghion P, Bolton P. An incomplete contracts approach to financial contracting[J]. The Review of Economic Studies, 1992, 59(3):473-494.
[20] Williamson OE. Transaction cost economics:The comparative contracting perspective[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 1987, 8(4):617-625.
