Fund managers use the reputation and information manipulation strategy to obtain excess profits,which has seriously hindered the healthy development of the securities market in China. Hence, it is an worthy region to study the game evolution mechanism in order to reduce the occurrence of fund manager's moral risk. In this paper, the mathematical model of reputation and information manipulation of fund managers strategy evolutionary game process is presented. It is found that, if the net income of non-star-fund-manager establishing reputation is greater than the average market returns, after a long-term evolutionary game, star-fund-manager who have limited rationality will choose the strategy to continue to maintain the reputation, non-star-fund-manager will have strategy to establish the reputation. When a star-fund-manager's earnings by information manipulation is less than the cost of information manipulation, whether the external investors supervise, limited rational powerful star-fund-manager will choose strategy to disclose information. When the profit of external investor's supervision is less than the cost of supervising, external investors will give up supervision strategy. When the benefit of external investors supervision is higher than the supervision cost, external investor's strategy selection relies on powerful star-fund-manager's strategy, the probability that powerful star fund manager selects information manipulating is higher, the more likely that external investors will select the supervision strategy.
Wang Liang, Feng Tao
. Intuitionistic Fuzzy Decision-making Methods Based on Case-based Reasoning[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(9)
: 116
-123
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.09.014
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