This paper aimed to insight into the internal mechanism of institutional factor's effect on enterprise risk behavior. Following Bowman's paradox, a comprehensive research and comparison on the risk propensity between state-own enterprises and private enterprises in China are developed in this article. By empirical comparison on the sample derived from listed companies during three different periods, the following results are indicated:(1) Whether at the overall level or at the industry level, the state-owned enterprises are more inclined to take risks than private enterprises before the outbreak of financial crisis in 2008, and the gap of risk propensity between the two has been reducing constantly; (2) In the wake of financial crisis, it is found that the contrast results of risk propensity between state-owned and private enterprises are different from the previous results at different target level cases; (3) In the cases above the target level, the risk behaviors of both state-owned enterprises and private enterprises are not consistent with the expectation of prospect theory. These indicate that institutional factor largely determines the enterprise risk behavior in China. In addition, the risk propensity of enterprises is partly affected by their own development level and economic environment. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a mechanism of enterprise risk behavior management in China, which can effectively advance multi-lateral cooperation among government, enterprise and market, and achieve optimization of organizing function, based on the reform and development.
SONG Jian, LIANG Liang
. Comparative Study on Risk Propensity between Listed State-owned Enterprises and Private Enterprises in China[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(4)
: 53
-60
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.04.007
[1] Pratt J W. Risk aversion in the small and in the large[J]. Economica, 1964, 32(1):122-136.
[2] Fisher I N, Hall G R. Risk and corporate rates of return[J]. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1969, 83(1):79-92.
[3] Bowman E H. A risk-return paradox for strategic management[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1980, 21(3):17-31.
[4] Bowman E H. Risk seeking by troubled firms[J]. Sloan Management Review, 1982, 23(4):33-42.
[5] Bowman E H. Content analysis of annual reports for corporate strategy and risk[J]. Interfaces, 1984, 14(1):61-72.
[6] Fiegenbaum A, Thomas H. Dynamic and risk measurement perspectives on Bowman's risk-return paradox for strategic management:An empirical study[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1986, 7(5):395-407.
[7] Bettis R., Mahajan V. Risk/return performance of diversified firms [J]. Management Science, 1985, 31(7):785-799.
[8] Nikel M N, Rodriguez M C. A review of research on the negative accounting relationship between risk and return:Bowman's Paradox [J]. Omega, 2002, 30(1):1-18.
[9] Friedman M, Savage L J. The utility analysis of choices involving risk[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1948, 56(4):279-304.
[10] Hurdle G F. Leverage, risk, market structure and profitability[J]. Review of Economics and Statistics, 1974, 56(4):478-485.
[11] Armour H O, Teece D. Organizational structure and economic performance:A test of the multidivisional hypothesis[J]. Bell Journal of Economics, 1978, 9(1):106-122.
[12] Janis I L. Groupthink:Psychological studies of policy decisions and fiascoes[M]. Boston:Houghton Mifflin, 1982.
[13] Swalm R O. Utility theory:Insights into risk taking[J]. Harvard Business Review, 1966, 44(6):123-136.
[14] Fishburn P C. Mean-risk analysis with risk associated with below target returns[J]. American Economic Review, 1977, 67(2):116-126.
[15] Kanheman D, Tversky A. Prospect theory:An analysis of decisions under risk[J]. Econometrica, 1979, 47(2):263-291.
[16] Fiegenbaum A, Thomas H. Attitudes toward risk and the risk-return paradox:Prospect theory explanations[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1988, 31(1):85-106.
[17] Cyertr R, March J. A behavioral theory of the firm[M]. New Jersey:Prentice-Hall, 1963.
[18] Jegers M. Prospect theory and the risk-return relation:Some belgian evidence[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1991, 34(1):215-225.
[19] Singh J. Performance, Slack, and risk taking in organizational decision making[J]. Academy of Management Journal, 1986, 29(3):562-585.
[20] Henderson R, Mitchell W. The interactions of organizational and competitive influence on strategy and performance[J]. Strategic Management Journal, 1997, 18(S1):5-14.
[21] 曾进. 企业风险倾向的跨国比较——基于前景理论视[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2009, (05):151-157.
[22] 曾进. 中国上市公司风险倾向的实证研究[J]. 预测, 2010, 29(4):47-52.
[23] Krueger A O. The political economy of the rent-seeking society[J]. The American Economic Review, 1974, 64(3):291-303.
[24] Jensen M, Meckling W. Theory of the firm:Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure[M]. Netherlands:Springer, 1979.
[25] Claessens S, Djankov S, Fan J P H, et al. Disentangling the incentive and entrenchment effects of large shareholdings[J]. Journal of Finance, 2002, 57(6):2741-2771.
[26] Porta R L, Lopez-de-Sianes F, Shleifer A, et al. Law and Finance[J]. Journal of Political Economy, 1998, 106(6):1113-1155.
