终极所有权结构与企业委托贷款行为

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0462

Abstract

Abstract:

As China’s economy steps into the “new normal”， structural problems caused by economic growth have become prominent one of the important problems， “Moving from real to virtual” attracting extensive attention from the business and academic. In particular， entrusted loan transaction develops rapidly and has become an important part of the social financing system. A large number of entity enterprises engage in financial activities and allocate their own funds to entrusted loan transaction， which has gradually become an important feature of capital allocation behavior of entity enterprises in China. In this context， it is very important to clarify the influencing factors of entrusted loans for the normative development of corporate governance. Using manually collected dataset of entrusted loans of A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2016 in China， the effect of ultimate ownership structure on entrusted loan behavior of enterprises is examined. Our results show that different structures of ultimate shareholder ownership have different effects on enterprises engaged in entrusted loans. Cash flow right significantly decreases the behavior of entrusted loans with the tunneling motivation. The divergence between control right and cash flow right significantly increases the behavior of entrusted loans with tunneling motivation. Furthermore， the different effects of cash flow right and control-ownership wedge are significantly reflected in affiliated entrusted loans. State-owned property of enterprises weakens the significant effect of cash flow right and control-ownership wedge on entrusted loan behavior. New evidence is provided for a comprehensive understanding of the economic consequences of ownership structure， and enlightenment is also provided for understanding the influencing factors of enterprise entrusted loan behavior in this paper.

Key words: ultimate shareholder, cash flow right, control-ownership wedge, entrusted loans

CLC Number:

F830

Xiaoyan Wang,Shenggang Yang,Kekun Zhang. Ultimate Ownership Structure and Entrusted Loan Behavior of Enterprises[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(4): 48-57.

Figures/Tables 6

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Entrusted	Entrusted	Entrusted	Entrusted
	全样本		关联方委托贷款+未发放委托贷款
CR	-0.113^***		-0.144^***
CR	(-3.763)		(-3.618)
CR $×$ State	0.095^***		0.129^***
CR $×$ State	(3.629)		(3.654)
Sep		2.217^***		2.957^***
Sep		(6.318)		(6.583)
Sep $×$ State		-3.133^***		-3.841^***
Sep $×$ State		(-5.075)		(-5.147)
State	1.611^*	9.142^***	3.056^**	12.831^***
State	(1.653)	(9.373)	(2.412)	(10.499)
VR	0.053^*		0.063*
VR	(1.957)		(1.848)
Constant	-68.157^***	-73.838^***	-89.226^***	-96.802^***
Constant	(-21.339)	(-23.973)	(-19.245)	(-21.520)
Control	控制	控制	控制	控制
Year	控制	控制	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制	控制	控制
Obs	15532	15532	14958	14958
Pseudo R²	0.060	0.061	0.086	0.087

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变量名称	变量符号	变量定义	均值	标准差
是否放贷	D_Entrusted	上市公司若发放委托贷款取值为1，否则取值为0	0.109	0.312
发放规模	Entrusted	上市公司发放委托贷款规模加1，取自然对数	1.031	2.989
现金流权	CR	每条控制链持股比例的乘积之和	34.465	16.610
控制权	VR	每条控制链最低持股比例之和	39.912	15.157
两权分离	Sep	控制权/现金流权	1.336	0.680
所有权性质	State	终极股东为国有属性取值为1，否则取值为 0	0.450	0.498
公司规模	Size	上市公司的年末总资产，取自然对数	12.787	1.236
资产负债率	Lev	年末总负债/年末总资产	0.429	0.203
企业成长性	Growth	（本年营业收入-上一年营业收入）/上一年营业收入	0.184	0.360
内部监督	Indep	年末独立董事人数/全部董事人数	0.369	0.052

变量	未发放委托贷款组	发放委托贷款组	关联方委托贷款组	非关联方委托贷款组
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)-(2)	(3)-(4)
	N=13836	N=1696	N=1122	N=574
Entrusted	0.000	9.432	9.637	9.028	-9.432^***	0.609^***
CR	34.127	37.220	38.284	35.138	-3.093^***	3.146^***
VR	39.576	42.652	43.544	40.916	-3.076^***	2.628^***
Sep	1.336	1.336	1.325	1.357	0.000	0.032
State	0.423	0.666	0.745	0.510	-0.242^***	0.235^***
Size	12.675	13.697	13.918	13.267	-1.022^***	0.651^***
Lev	0.422	0.493	0.515	0.449	-0.071^***	0.066^***
Growth	0.186	0.166	0.185	0.128	0.020^**	0.056^***
Indep	0.369	0.367	0.369	0.364	0.002^*	0.005^*

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
变量	D_Entrusted	Entrusted	D_Entrusted	Entrusted
CR	-0.007^**	-0.057^**
CR	(-2.109)	(-2.283)
Sep			0.158^***	1.239^***
Sep			(3.884)	(4.117)
VR	0.007^*	0.050*
VR	(1.896)	(1.826)
State	0.640^***	4.681^***	0.663^***	4.885^***
State	(9.474)	(9.564)	(9.921)	(10.039)
Size	0.521^***	4.288^***	0.523^***	4.274^***
Size	(20.078)	(22.399)	(20.593)	(22.949)
Lev	-0.620^***	-4.871^***	-0.653^***	-5.078^***
Lev	(-3.491)	(-3.673)	(-3.697)	(-3.868)
Growth	-0.014	-0.220	-0.001	-0.125
Growth	(-0.171)	(-0.369)	(-0.018)	(-0.211)
Indep	-2.145^***	-15.830^***	-2.123^***	-15.792^***
Indep	(-3.962)	(-3.938)	(-3.934)	(-3.940)
Constant	-8.697^***	-71.363^***	-8.930^***	-73.030^***
Constant	(-20.552)	(-23.367)	(-20.794)	(-23.638)
Year	控制	控制	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制	控制	控制
Obs	15532	15532	15532	15532
Pseudo R²	0.111	0.059	0.112	0.060

变量	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
变量	CR	Entrusted	Sep	Entrusted
CR_Indu	0.241^***
CR_Indu	（4.786）
IV CR		-0.166^*
IV CR		（-1.756）
Fs			0.062^***
Fs			（11.493）
Unemploy			0.073^***
Unemploy			（10.346）
IV Sep				2.856^***
IV Sep				（3.111）
VR	0.946^***	0.160^*
VR	（238.539）	（1.783）
Constant	-11.231^***	-7.221^***	1.363^***	-7.276^***
Constant	（-6.265）	（-12.944）	（19.525）	（-4.696）
Control	控制	控制	控制	控制
Year	控制	控制	控制	控制
Industry	控制	控制	控制	控制
第一阶段F值	22.902		98.927
不可识别检验（Kleibergen-Paap rk LM统计量）		22.847^***		190.742^***
弱识别检验 Cragg-Donald Wald F 统计量		21.965		98.930
过度识别检验（Hansen J 统计量）				2.468
Obs	15532	15532	15269	15269

[1]	QIAN Xue-song, QU Shen, KANG Jin, DU Li. A Study on Default Risk and Prevention Mechanism of China Shadow Banking——Evidence from Entrusted Loans of Listed Firm [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2020, 28(7): 35-44.
[2]	Xiao Zuo-ping. The Effects of Ultimate Ownership Structure on the Choice of Capital Structure: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2012, (4): 167-176.
[3]	CAO Yu, CHEN Xiao-hong, WAN Guang-yu. Control Rights, Cash Flow Rights and Corporate Value: Based on the Perspective of Enterprise Life Cycle [J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2010, 18(3): 185-192.

Ultimate Ownership Structure and Entrusted Loan Behavior of Enterprises

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